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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
The Role of Social Structure and Financial Incentives in Individual and
Organizational Performance
by
Timothy Gubler
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration
Graduate School of Arts & Sciences
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015
Professor Lamar Pierce, Chair

This dissertation investigates the role of individuals in firm strategy and performance by
exploring how social factors at the individual-level combine with financial incentives to
influence individual behaviors and performance. By drawing on unique proprietary datasets from
two service settings, I investigate 1) how social affiliations between real estate listing agents and
clients influence value creation, appropriation, and the types of transactions agents engage in,
and 2) how corporate awards, which primarily reward individuals based off non-pecuniary social
factors, are influenced by individual heterogeneity. The results of this dissertation suggest that a
more nuanced view of the impact of social structures on individual and firm performance is
needed. Moreover, the results suggest that focusing on the micro-macro links is important to both
managers and to future theory in strategic management.
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PREFACE
Strategy scholars are fundamentally interested in investigating the determinants of firm
profitability and performance. In approaching this question, however, scholars have historically
tended to ascribe much of the variation in performance outcomes to industry or firm-level
variables (e.g., Rumelt 1974; Wernerfelt & Montgomery 1988; Porter 1980; Rumelt 1991;
McGahan & Porter 1997; Barney 1991; Teece et al. 1997). Surprisingly, significantly less work
has focused on the role of individuals, or the intersection of individuals and organizations, in
determining firm performance. Indeed, many scholars have recently called for a more thorough
investigation of the micro-macro links of strategy, sometimes called the “microfoundations of
strategy”, in an effort to address this gap (e.g., Felin & Foss 2005; Felin & Hesterly 2007;
Barney & Felin 2013). While some progress has been made to date, there remains much debate
about the value of microfoundational research to strategy theory and practice. Moreover, debates
continue about how to define micro-macro links, and around which micro-macro links are worth
investigating.
This is surprising, given the fact that labor is frequently the largest resource cost to
organizations, and is often cited as the key resource underlying a firm’s competitive advantage
(e.g., Barney & Wright 1998). Indeed, in many service industries, which now represent nearly
70% of US GDP (USTR, 2014), labor is the primary competitive resource. This is likewise
surprising because scholars have long noted the potential importance of exploring the role of
individuals in firm strategy and performance. For instance, Arrow argued that “There is really no
need for the firm to be the fundamental unit of organization…there is plenty of reason to suppose
that individual talents count for a good deal more than the firm as an organization” (1962,
1

p.624). Similarly, Barnard argued that “The individual is always the basic strategic factor of
organization” (1968, p.139). Yet, despite the potential importance of individual-level research to
strategy, there has been significantly less work focused at this level that links the micro with the
macro.
This dissertation seeks in part to fill this gap by investigating the role of social structure
and financial incentives in individual productivity and organizational performance. I explore how
heterogeneity in individuals, including in their social affiliations and motivations, influence their
productivity and behaviors in the face of financial incentives and career concerns. Financial
incentives have long been studied as key determinants of individual productivity, behavior, and
sorting (e.g., Prendergast 1999; Lazear 2000). Similarly, social structures have been argued and
found to significantly impact individual choices and behaviors (e.g., Granovetter 1985; 2005;
Coleman 1988; Burt 1997). However, significantly less research has investigated the intersection
of these factors, and particularly how social factors at the individual level combine with financial
incentives and other organizational variables to influence firm-level outcomes.
To approach this question I use two hand-collected proprietary datasets that link
individual-level variables surrounding productivity and social structures with organizationallevel variables and performance measures. Both of these datasets are derived from service
settings—one from the residential real estate industry, and the other from a commercial laundry
cleaning company—where individual productivity is of paramount importance to firm success.
Using data from these settings, I investigate 1) how social affiliations between employee-experts
and clients impact value creation and appropriation in real estate transactions, 2) how these
affiliations influence the selection process and the types of transactions agents engage in, and 3)
how non-pecuniary incentives, which primary draw on social factors to motivate employees,
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influence individual behaviors and productivity. While the granularity of the data allow me to
study individual outcomes and behaviors in each setting, I also explore the impact of individuallevel behaviors and productivity on organizational outcomes.
The first chapter investigates how social affiliations between real estate listing agents and
home sellers impact value creation and appropriation in transactions. While many studies have
emphasized the potential efficiency and costs benefits from transacting within social structures, it
remains unclear how transacting with socially-affiliated clients impacts the performance of
experts and firms. Using a novel dataset that pairs elements from the Wasatch Front Regional
Multiple Listing Service with data on geographically-assigned LDS congregation boundaries in
Utah, I identify listings for which listing agents and home sellers share a social affiliation
through the formal structure of the church. I then investigate the impact of this affiliation on the
value that is created in the transaction, in terms of final sale price, probability of sale, and days
on market, and the value appropriation tactics used by agents in transactions, including dual
agency. Finally, I investigate the impact of transacting with affiliates on overall firm revenues
over time.
The results from this chapter suggest that agents create and appropriate more value in
transactions, and significantly improve performance, by engaging in transactions with sociallyaffiliated clients. First, I find agents sell comparable homes for 2% more when listing for
affiliates without increasing time of market, and increase the probability that a home will sale.
My results suggest that one avenue through which this occurs is increased marketing efforts.
Second, I find that agents increase their use of dual agency by 17% when listing for affiliates,
suggesting that affiliations allow agents to employ additional tactics to appropriate value in
transactions. Finally, I find that firms significantly improve revenues as the percentage of homes
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sold to affiliates increases—A 10% increase in the number of yearly transactions with affiliates
leads to an approximately 2% increase in total yearly firm revenues. Overall, these results
suggest that firms and employee-experts can significantly improve performance on transactions
by leveraging social affiliations between employees and clients.
The second chapter builds on and extends the first chapter, and explores how social
affiliations influence the type of transactions listing agents are able to secure, as well as the
underlying selection process. In many industries access to valuable transactions is critical to firm
performance and survival. However, it is still not well understood how social affiliations
influence the selection process, and the types of transactions available to firms. Indeed, the
literature argues they could either lead to selection benefits (e.g., DiMaggio & Louch 1998) or to
the firm becoming a “relief organization” (Uzzi 1997). Similarly, it is still not well understood
how social affiliations interact with observables commonly used to select transaction partners,
such as previous experience, reputation, or status. This chapter investigates these questions using
the residential real estate data from Utah.
The findings of this chapter suggest that agents list more valuable homes when listing for
affiliates, and that the underlying selection process differs when affiliations are present. I find
that agents list 14% more expensive homes, 11% larger homes, and are significantly less likely
to list low quality homes when listing for affiliates. I also find that while experience, previous
performance, fit, and working for a franchise brokerage all typically increase the odds of being
chosen by a client to list a home, social affiliations substitute for these variables. Similarly, my
results suggest that agents are able to list more expensive homes at lower levels of experience
when listing for social affiliates. This creates a feedback loop where agents are able to gain
valuable experience listing expensive homes through listing for affiliates. Added experience and

4

reputation then results in more valuable future sales for agents with non-affiliates. Taken
together these results suggest that in addition to the performance benefits found in chapter 1 from
transacting with social affiliates, there are also significant selection benefits. Moreover, these
selection benefits significantly improve agent and firm performance, and imply important entry
and competition benefits.
The final chapter investigates the impact of a corporate award program on employee
motivation, productivity, and plant performance. Awards are a commonly used method to
incentivize employee behaviors, and today more than 80% of organizations use some type of
award program (Garr 2012). In contrast to financial incentives, awards reward primarily through
non-pecuniary methods, such as through social or psychological mechanisms. While awards are
commonly used in the workplace, surprisingly, we still have only a limited understanding of how
awards impact employee motivation and productivity, and particularly when they result in
unanticipated outcomes. Indeed, the current literature primarily focuses on the benefits of
awards, often viewing awards as cheap subtle motivation that avoids many of the unintended
consequences of monetary incentives.
In this chapter my co-authors and I propose and test a theoretical framework of how
workplace awards affect employee motivation and performance. Using a proprietary dataset from
multiple plants of a commercial laundry cleaning company, we investigate how the
implementation of an attendance award program influenced employee attendance behaviors, as
well as individual productivity. We find that while the implementation of the award had a
positive impact on the intended dimension, significantly decreasing tardy and late behaviors by
plant workers, it also led to a host of unintended consequences. First our results suggest it led to
employee gaming, where employees used sick days to strategically preserve eligibility. Second,
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we find that the award only led to positive attendance impacts when employees were eligible for
the award, and that workers reverted to previous behaviors once ineligible. Finally, and most
importantly, we find the award led to a significant decrease in daily productivity for employees
with high pre-award task motivation, likely out of fairness concerns or because of a violation of
psychological contracts. Overall these findings suggest that the implementation of this program
led to a 1.4-3.1% decrease in total plant efficiency. Thus, the results of this chapter suggest that
awards can be far more costly than anticipated, and do not always function as cheap subtle
motivation. Moreover, our results suggest further research is needed to understand when awards
are beneficial, and when they may lead to unintended consequences and costs.
Taken together, the results of this dissertation suggest that focusing on micro-macro links
is a fruitful avenue for future research. The key idea underpinning the recent push to investigate
micro-macro links in strategy is that individual-level factors are responsible for a significant
portion of the observed variance in organizational performance, and that scholars have perhaps
over focused on firm or industry-level factors in explaining the variation in organizational
performance. In each chapter of this dissertation I have found that micro individual-level factors
dramatically influence macro organizational-level outcomes. Moreover, the results imply that
managing the micro correctly, either through hiring and staffing policies, or through
implementing proper policies to manage social factors, are critical to organizational success.

6
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CHAPTER 1
It’s Who You Know: How Transacting with
Socially-Affiliated Clients Impacts Expert and
Firm Performance
CHAPTER ABSTRACT
While many studies have emphasized the efficiency and cost benefits from transacting within
social structures, it remains unclear the extent to which experts and firms can create and
appropriate value when transacting with socially-affiliated clients, especially in the absence of
repeat transactions. I investigate this question using a novel approach that pairs data from the
Wasatch Front Regional Multiple Listing Service in Utah with hand-collected data on
geographically assigned LDS (Mormon) congregation boundaries. By identifying listings for
which real estate agents and home sellers share a common church congregation affiliation, I
explore the impact of affiliations on the value listing agents create and appropriate in real estate
transactions. I find that agents sell comparable homes for 2% more when listing for affiliates
without significantly increasing time on market, and exert more care and effort on transactions.
Moreover, agents increase use of dual agency by 17% when listing for affiliates, suggesting
affiliations provide agents increased flexibility and access to value appropriation tactics. Data on
exogenous shocks to congregation boundaries suggest all results are driven by current social
affiliations, and not simply by proximity. Overall my results show firms increase revenues
significantly as the percentage of listings with affiliated clients increases. This suggests that a
more nuanced view of social structures is needed that incorporates individual choice, the context,
and the opportunity space created for value appropriation by information advantages and
assumed trust.
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1.1 Introduction
Professional service industries account for four out of five US jobs and 68% of US GDP
(USTR, 2014). Often critical to firm success in such industries are employee experts, or
individuals given discretion over their time and firm resources in order to employ specialized
skills or knowledge to generate value for the firm. A growing literature has focused on issues
surrounding expert productivity, choices, and sorting in various service settings, including legal
services (Carnahan et al. 2010; Campbell et al. 2011), science and engineering (Stern 2004;
Sauermann & Cohen 2010; Elfenbein et al. 2010), medicine (Huckman & Pisano 2006), financial
services (Mullainathan et al. 2012), emissions inspections (Gino & Pierce 2010), and enterprise
sales (Larkin 2014). A key takeaway from this literature is that experts significantly impact
organizational outcomes, but they often face conflicting incentives that lead to firm inefficiencies
or problems of moral hazard.
One important, yet understudied, set of factors that influence expert performance stem
from social affiliations with clients (Granovetter 1985; 2005; Burt 1997; Bandiera et al. 2005;
Charness & Rabin 2002; Uzzi & Lancaster 2004). When uncertainty is high, clients often choose
to transact with socially-affiliated experts in service settings (DiMaggio & Louch 1998).
However, such affiliations create a paradox for firms: While transacting with affiliates may
provide trust, influence, and information benefits that allow experts to create additional value in
the transaction, transacting with affiliates can also create obligations and pressures that limit the
value experts appropriate in transactions, leading to ambiguous performance outcomes and
potential moral hazard problems for the firm. Indeed, social affiliates often transact in a business
setting in order to “get a good deal” or to extract favors (DiMaggio & Louch 1998). Thus, an
open question remains: When an employee expert transacts with a socially-affiliated client, what
9

impact will this have on the value created and appropriated by the expert in the transaction?
Moreover, how will this impact firm performance?
In this chapter I argue that in settings where information is incomplete and the shadow of
the future is weak,1 experts can leverage social affiliations, defined as common memberships
between experts and clients in formal social institutions, to both create and appropriate additional
value in transactions. These advantages stem from information and solidarity benefits created by
the social structure, which lead to greater levels of trust and added flexibility in the transaction. I
argue that increased value creation and appropriation ultimately result in significant performance
benefits for experts and firms. I test my argument using data from the residential real estate
industry in Utah, which allows me to investigate how transacting with affiliated home sellers
impacts listing agent and brokerage performance through value creation and appropriation. My
goal is to show that future research and theory must continue to explore not only value creation
from transacting with social affiliates, but also value appropriation through the opportunity space
for opportunistic behaviors created by increased levels of information and trust.
The idea that transacting with socially-affiliated clients could lead to opportunistic
behavior and increased value appropriation by experts runs counter to extant theory. Theories in
social network theory (e.g., Coleman 1990; Granovetter 2005), social identity theory and conflict
theory (e.g., Sherif et al. 1961; Tajfel et al. 1971; Billig & Tajfel 1973; Ashforth & Mael 1989),
social capital (e.g., Arrow 2000; Adler & Kwon 2002), and social preferences (e.g., Bandiera et
al. 2005; Fehr & Fischbacher 2002; Charness & Rabin 2002) all suggest that social affiliations
generate trust and goodwill in transactions, and consequently lead individuals to behave more
responsibly and eschew opportunistic behaviors. Consequently, the prescription is that when

1

For an example of work that focuses on transactions and relationships where the shadow of the future is strong, see
Elfenbein and Zenger, 2013.
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uncertainty and the risk of opportunism are high, value can be created by transacting with social
affiliates (e.g., DiMaggio & Louch 1998). This creates a dilemma for experts and firms,
however, as they seek to generate profit in transactions. In order to generate the trust and
goodwill that facilitates value creation in uncertain exchanges, experts and firms must be willing
to accept the obligations and social pressures inherent in the social structure (Granovetter 1985).
However, accepting these obligations and pressures makes it difficult for them to behave
opportunistically or use affiliations to appropriate additional value, reducing the flexibility
afforded by the increased levels of trust. Thus, while transacting with affiliates may lead to
greater value creation in transactions, it is unclear the extent to which experts and firms can
exploit social affiliations as a resource to appropriate value and improve firm performance.
To address this gap, and test my argument, I pair rich transactional data from the Wasatch
Front Regional Multiple Listing Service (MLS) with data on religious congregation boundaries
in Utah County, Utah for 1998-2014. In Utah County nearly 90% of the approximately halfmillion residents report belonging to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (ASARB
2010).2 This church geographically assigns each home in the county to a congregation, which
church members are required to attend to remain in good standing with the church. By collecting
a panel of congregation boundaries, as well as home addresses for real estate agents and the
homes being sold, I identify listings for which real estate agents share a common social
affiliation with the home seller through the formal social structure of the church congregation. I
then investigate the impact of these affiliations on 1) agent effort and performance on
transactions, including original listing price, final selling price and time on market, 2) agent
flexibility and use of tactics to appropriate additional value in transactions, such as dual agency,
and 3) firm outcomes, in terms of brokerage yearly revenues.
2

This church is also often referred to as the LDS Church of the Mormon Church.
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I find that agents exert more effort and increase revenues on transactions when listing for
affiliates. After controlling for home vacancy, agents are 4% more likely to require buying
agents call them prior to showings and 5% less likely to only use a key box to show the home
when listing for affiliates. These results imply increased agent care and marketing effort. I also
find agents list and sell comparable homes for 2% (~$4012) more when listing for affiliates, and
do so without increasing days on market or decreasing probability of sale. Interestingly, I find
these performance benefits increase in size with affiliation strength.
In addition to these value creation benefits, I also find evidence suggesting that listing for
affiliates provides agents additional flexibility and access to value appropriation tactics. First, I
find agents are 17% more likely to act as dual agents when listing for affiliates, where they
represent both the seller and the buyer, and sell homes cheaper and quicker as dual agents when
listing for affiliates. This result suggests agents leverage social affiliations to engage in such
deals, which effectively double commission revenues on transactions. Second, I find evidence
suggesting agents use social affiliations to “break slumps” and relieve associated financial need.
These results suggest listing for affiliates provides agents increased flexibility, which may be
used to appropriate additional value in transactions.
Finally, I find that these benefits of transacting with social affiliates significantly improve
listing agent and brokerage performance. Agents increase commission revenues both through
higher sale prices as well as through increased use of dual agency. Similarly, brokerages increase
yearly revenues as the percentage of sales to affiliates in a year increases: A 10% increase in the
percentage of yearly sales to affiliates increases brokerage revenues by approximately 2%.
Multiple robustness checks, including analyses that explore the impact of unexpected changes to
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congregation boundaries, add support to these findings and suggest all results are driven by
current social affiliations, and not simply by geographic proximity.
This study has important managerial implications and contributes to several important
literatures. First, this study contributes to the literatures on incentives and motivation by showing
that transacting with social affiliates can significantly increase expert effort, performance, and
value appropriation, separate from financial incentives. Moreover, these outcomes do not require
repeat economic transactions or transacting within the shadow of the future. My results also
suggest that a potential alternative to attracting high-performing experts is to hire experts that can
transact with social affiliates.
Second, this study contributes to the literatures on social capital and network ties by
presenting a more nuanced view of embeddedness that includes both value creation and
appropriation. A constant criticism of many studies in these literatures is that they overlook
human agency (Salancik 1995; Coleman 1988; Kilduff & Brass 2010). While actors are regularly
characterized as being responsive to social pressures and concerns, relatively few studies have
been able to examine the “engine of action” that drives individual choices in the face of
numerous motivations (Coleman 1988, p.96). The results of this chapter suggest that experts
make conscious choices surrounding value appropriation behaviors when transacting with
affiliates that significantly impact transaction outcomes. Moreover, elements of the context,
including the strength of affiliation, significantly impact their choices.
Finally, this study contributes to recent calls to investigate micro-macro links in strategy
(Felin & Foss 2005; Mollick 2012; Barney & Felin 2013). The results of this chapter suggest that
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an important firm resource is embedded in the social affiliations of individual employees. 3 Such
affiliations make up an important component of human capital, which is often conceptualized as
the knowledge, information, skills, abilities, and other resources of individuals (e.g., Ployhart &
Moliterno 2011; Becker 2002; Wright et al. 2014). Deploying this resource in economic
transactions can significantly improve firm outcomes. However, firms must understand how the
context within which the transaction is embedded influences expert choices when dealing with
social affiliates, and provide complimentary policies that support experts appropriating value for
the firm. The results of my study also suggest that firms may experience persistent differential
performance outcomes that are driven by the number and quality of social structures to which
employee-experts belong.

1.2 General Theory
1.2.1 The Organizational Challenge of Experts
A substantial literature has focused on the difficulty of motivating employees to act in the
interests of the firm. Much of this difficulty stems from the fact that individuals respond to
numerous factors, including financial incentives (see Prendergast 1999 for a review), social
pressures and concerns (Coleman 1988; Granovetter 1985; 2005; Charness & Rabin 2002; Fehr
& Fischbacher 2002), identity (Ashforth & Mael 1989; Akerlof & Kranton 2005), and intrinsic
motivations (Deci 1971; Amabile et al. 1994). Multiple interacting incentives make it difficult
for firms to design effective incentive systems and policies (Kerr 1975), and may lead to
unexpected outcomes that decrease productivity (e.g., Gneezy & Rustichini 2000; Gubler et al.

Previous work has theorized on the potential benefit of personal relationships and other “intangible assets” to
individual productivity and firm performance (e.g., Hall 1993). This study adds empirical evidence and additional
theoretical insight to this literature.
3
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2014). Moreover, individuals often face incentives outside the firm, which may lead to problems
of moral hazard.
Motivating individuals and avoiding moral hazard problems are particularly difficult
when individuals are given discretion in their work. Such individuals may include experts (e.g.,
Jacob & Levitt 2003; Pierce & Snyder 2008; Snyder 2010), top management teams (Jensen &
Meckling 1976), managers (e.g., Frank & Obloj 2014), salespeople (e.g., Larkin 2014), or
independent contractors (e.g., Baker & Hubbard 2003). When individuals have unique skills or
knowledge they often must be given discretion over the use of their time and firm resources,
such as pricing, to generate value for the firm. While allowing discretion potentially creates
benefits for the firm and allows flexibility by decentralizing organizational decisions (e.g.,
Garicano 2000), discretion can also lead to problems of moral hazard for two reasons. First,
discretion usually exists with high levels of asymmetric information between experts and the
firm. This results in increased opportunity for experts to act in ways counter to firm goals, but
which benefit them personally, at low risk of punishment. Second, experts face incentives from
both inside and outside the firm. In many cases incentives provided outside the firm, such as
from social reputation, overwhelm incentives provided inside the firm, creating pressures for
experts to use discretion for their own benefit to the detriment of the firm. Consequently, when
experts are given discretion this can lead to moral hazard problems and performance decreases
for the firm.

1.2.2 Social Structures and Social Motivations
A significant motivator of expert behavior stems from social affiliations between experts
and clients. I define social affiliations as connections arising from common membership in
formal social institutions that are external to the firm and the economic transaction. Such
15

institutions define the social structure, and may include churches, schools, the military, clubs,
corporations, alumni groups, or charitable organizations. While social affiliations create potential
benefits, they also impose obligations and social pressures that may impact expert choices and
behaviors in ways important to the firm. Granovetter was among the first to articulate the
importance of understanding the impact of social structures and affiliations on economic
outcomes. He argued that economics had largely taken an “under socialized” view of individual
behavior, and overlooked that “actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context”,
but that “their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of
social relations" (Granovetter 1985, p.487). Similarly, psychologists have long argued that social
identities significantly impact individual behaviors, and that these identities are often constructed
by social affiliations (Sherif et al. 1961; Tajfel et al. 1971; Falk & Zehnder 2007). Consequently,
scholars have argued and found that social structures significantly influence individuals in both
positive and negative ways (Ben-Porath 1980; Coleman 1988; Granovetter 1985; Greif 1993;
Bandiera et al. 2005; Granovetter 2005; Yenkey 2014).
Social structures may create benefits for experts that lead to value creation in
transactions. This value creation can be thought of as either increased revenues or reduced costs
in the transaction. There are two primary mechanisms through which this may occur. First, social
structures facilitate the flow of quality information between affiliates, resulting in information
advantages (Coleman 1988; Krackhardt & Hanson 1993; Uzzi 1997; Reagans & McEvily 2003;
Granovetter 2005). Such information is more fine-grained and allows experts to better anticipate
customer preferences (Uzzi 1997). Additionally, social structures provide experts increased
access to private or tacit information. This comes both from increased observation and
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interaction, which are more frequent in social structures, as well as from increased knowledge
sharing by clients under weaker concerns of opportunism.
Second, social structures create solidarity benefits. These benefits arise either from ingroup preferences (e.g., Tajfel et al. 1971; Billig & Tajfel 1973; Ashforth & Mael 1989) or from
shared expectations, norms, and obligations between affiliates (Coleman 1988; Granovetter
1985; Arrow 2000; Adler & Kwon 2002). Such benefits result in increased levels of confidence
and trust from clients, as well as feelings of goodwill and reciprocity. Solidarity benefits are
supported by a system of reward and punishment in the social structure, which creates pressure
for members to behave responsibly to maintain reputation and avoid social punishments
(Granovetter 1985; 2005). These features of the social structure may lead to decreased
transaction costs (Uzzi & Lancaster 2004; Lancaster & Uzzi 2012), reduced problems from
opportunism (Ben-Porath 1980; Greif 1993; Uzzi 1999), and improved transaction outcomes that
increase expert performance.
In addition to these two mechanisms, transacting with social affiliates may lead experts to
exert additional effort to improve performance on transactions. First, external pressures from
shared expectations, norms, and obligations provide incentives for experts to exert more effort
when transacting with affiliates, regardless of the strength of financial incentives, in order to
deliver a high quality service and avoid reputational losses or social punishments. Second,
internal pressures from social preferences (e.g., Charness & Rabin 2002) as well as in-group
preferences drive experts to increase effort to improve outcomes for affiliates. Third, solidarity
benefits increase expert confidence that affiliates will deal fairly with them and fulfill their
obligations, which may lead to improved motivation and additional expert effort. Overall I
expect increased effort, improved information, and solidarity benefits to lead to value creation in
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transactions when experts transact with affiliates. Such value creation leads to higher revenues
and/or lower transaction costs for the transacting parties. This leads to my first hypothesis:
H1: Experts will create more value in transactions with socially-affiliated clients,
compared to transactions with non-affiliated clients
In addition to simply creating value in the transaction, however, social affiliations may
also influence how value is distributed between experts and clients. Such considerations have
been underexplored in the literature to date. Yet, understanding this process, including the
pressures influencing the split, is critical to explaining how transacting with affiliates impacts
expert and firm performance. The literature has argued that the same obligations and social
pressures that create trust and allow for value creation in transactions also necessarily tie the
experts hands (Granovetter 1985). This results in reduced flexibility as it prohibits experts from
acting in ways that could be perceived as opportunistic without damaging social reputation and
future levels of trust. Consequently, the implication is that while value may be created by social
affiliations, it may be difficult for experts to appropriate without harming social reputation.
The literatures on social preferences and parochialism/in-group preferences provide
similar predictions, suggesting that experts will be less likely to act opportunistically to
appropriate value when transacting with affiliates. Social preferences are defined as concern by
experts for the welfare and monetary outcomes of other parties in the transaction, which lead
experts to take actions that decrease their own monetary gains but increase welfare for other
parties. Social preferences may include many types of preferences including pure altruism
(Andreoni & Miller 2002), inequity aversion (Fehr & Schmidt 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels 2000),
or reciprocal fairness (Fehr & Fischbacher 2002). Social preferences have been shown to be
activated by social relationships (Bandiera et al. 2005; Bandiera et al. 2009), especially when
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there is potential for inequity in monetary outcomes (Charness & Rabin 2002; Fehr & Schmidt
1999; Bolton & Ockenfels 2000). Relatedly, psychologists have argued and found that
individuals tend to act in ways that benefit in-group members (Sherif et al. 1961; Tajfel et al.
1971; Billig & Tajfel 1973; Ashforth & Mael 1989; Falk & Zehnder 2007).
While the above literatures suggest social structures limit expert flexibility and
opportunistic behaviors in transactions, paradoxically social structures may also provide experts
increased flexibility and access to value appropriation tactics because of information benefits and
the assumed trust and goodwill from clients. Granovetter, for instance, noted that increased trust
“presents, by its very existence, enhanced opportunity for malfeasance” (1985, p.491). A related
literature in criminology (e.g., NASAA 2001; Fairfax 2001) as well as more recent work in
management (Yenkey 2014) have found evidence supporting this claim, showing that social
similarity and affiliations lead individuals to exercise less vigilance when dealing with social
connections, which may lead to increased victimization by socially-connected criminals. While
Granovetter and these studies specifically reference unethical or criminal behaviors, the logic
applies to opportunistic behaviors. Thus, while pressures exist for experts to avoid opportunistic
tactics that can be used to appropriate additional value in transactions when transacting with
affiliates, the opportunity space for opportunistic behaviors increases with information and trust.
A key element underlying expert value appropriation from affiliates is individual choice.
A consistent criticism of work in social capital and social networks is that these studies often
overlook human agency (Salancik 1995; Coleman 1988; Kilduff & Brass 2010). For instance,
Coleman argued that while actors are often characterized as being “shaped by the environment…
there are no internal springs of action that give the actor purpose or direction” (Coleman 1988,
p.96). Consequently, while many studies have emphasized that social structures impose social
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pressures on individuals, few studies have focused on how individuals respond to such pressures.
Yet, a robust literature in economics highlights that individuals are self-interested, and respond
to incentives (see Prendergast 1999 for a review). Moreover, humans have proven remarkably
adept in gaming incentive schemes (e.g., Holmstrom & Milgrom 1991). Consequently, when
given the opportunity to do so, I expect that agents will sometimes leverage social affiliations to
appropriate additional value in transactions, especially when the threat of punishment is low.
In settings where information is incomplete, and the shadow of the future is weak, I argue
that experts will leverage social affiliations for their own benefit and purposes. Incomplete
information reduces the risk of social punishments, as performance evaluation becomes more
difficult and costly. Similarly, when the shadow of the future is weak the potential harm to
reputation is dramatically reduced. I expect that under such conditions experts will leverage the
flexibility and information benefits afforded by the social structure to engage in tactics that can
be used to appropriate additional value. Moreover, I expect that strong financial incentives will
drive experts to engage in such behaviors. It is important to note that such appropriation
behaviors need not necessarily result in inferior outcomes overall for clients, as appropriation
may also flow from other parties in the transaction. Additionally, flexibility may allow experts to
increase their use of tactics that may otherwise be unavailable because of inherent conflicts of
interest, but which do not necessarily result in negative outcomes for clients. Finally, it is
important to note that even if experts appropriate additional value from affiliated clients, clients
may still be strictly better off transacting with affiliated experts compared to non-affiliated
experts due to the value that is created by social affiliations in the transaction. My second
hypothesis now follows:
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H2: Experts will appropriate more value in transactions with socially-affiliated clients,
compared to transactions with non-affiliated clients
Finally, I expect that firms will improve performance, in terms of accounting profits, as
the percentage of deals with social affiliates increases. This stems both from increased value
creation in transactions when employee-experts transact with affiliates, as well as from increased
value appropriation. While this result follows directly from the previous two hypotheses, the fact
that experts exert differential levels of effort on transactions clouds the outcome, as experts only
have a fixed amount of time and energy in a given day. Increased effort expended on affiliate
transactions could thus result in experts exerting less effort on non-affiliate transactions,
resulting in fewer overall transactions, lower performance on non-affiliated transactions, and
consequently lower overall performance for the firm. However, because experts have increased
flexibility when transacting with affiliates I expect them to manage transactions to avoid such
outcomes. My final hypothesis now follows:
H3: Ceteris Paribus, firms will improve performance as the percentage of total
transactions between employee-experts and socially-affiliated clients increases
Figure 1.1 provides a visual overview of the preceding three hypotheses, including the primary
mechanisms theorized to be driving the results.

1.3 Empirical Setting
The setting for this study is the residential real estate industry, an economically
significant industry in the United States that employs over 1 million workers and is roughly
equal in size to the brand name pharmaceutical industry, the hotel and motels industry, and the
single-location full service restaurants industry (IBISWorld 2014). Estimated revenues for real
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estate in the US were about $115 billion in 2013, down from $166 billion in 2005 (IBISWorld
2014). Real estate is a labor-intensive industry where brokerages (firms) and real estate agents
assist clients in finding, purchasing, or selling homes or other properties.
At the core of the real estate industry is the real estate transaction, where listing agents
assist sellers in selling a home and buyer agents assist buyers in finding and purchasing a home.
Figure A1.1 (see Appendix) details the transaction for listing agents, which are the focus of this
study. Sellers hire listing agents to assist them in the process of selling their home, including
devising a selling strategy, listing the home on relevant databases, marketing the home and
finding potential buyers, staging and managing home showings, negotiating offers, and filling
out necessary contracts and paperwork to close the deal. For their services listing agents receive
a fixed commission, typically 6% of the home selling price, which is then generally split in half
with the buyer’s agent. Listing agents also split their commission with their sponsoring
brokerage. Such broker-agent splits can range from a 50/50 split to as high as a 100/0 split where
agents pay a fixed desk fee, but retain the full value of their commissions.4 When working for a
franchised brokerage, agents may also pay a portion of their commission directly to the franchise
owner as a franchise fee. Commission splits vary both between and within brokerages.
To sell real estate in Utah agents and brokerages must be licensed by the state. To do
business and employ agents, each brokerage must have a broker that is licensed with the state
and that oversees the work of employed agents. Often brokers choose to franchise a national
company (e.g., RE/MAX, Prudential, etc.) to take advantage of their national brand and other
resources. Brokers may alternatively choose to form an independent brokerage and hire agents in
an effort to gain market share in a regional or local market. Brokers may also choose to be self-

Recently this traditional model has been challenged by the entrance of “discount brokerages.” These brokerages
typically charge a flat fee for their services, regardless of the home price, but provide more limited services.
4
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employed, perhaps working primarily out of their home or even remotely from their automobile.
Agents are required to have a sponsoring brokerage in order to engage in any deals, unless they
become brokers themselves. In Utah County, Utah there are approximately 1500 brokerages and
6450 agents that sell at least one home during my data sample. Forty-three percent of listings are
listed by brokerages, 49% by independents, and 8% by self-employed brokers.
Brokerages in the real estate industry compete primarily on labor. Agents are typically
hired as independent contractors and negotiate desk fees and commission splits based on
experience and previous performance. Consequently, there is low cost to firms to hiring or firing
agents, although attracting and retaining high quality agents is critical to firm performance.
Brokerages use many different models to attract and retain quality agents. Some provide agents
with significant resources, such as access to marketing resources, training programs, office
space, office supplies (e.g., copier, telephone, voicemail), or lead generation tools. The cost of
providing these resources is covered by fixed desk fees and smaller commission splits. Other
brokerages furnish few resources but provide larger commission splits. Overall, financial
incentives are relatively aligned between brokerages and listing agents, resulting in few problems
of moral hazard from financial incentives.
A primary tool brokers and agents use to list homes in Utah is the Multiple Listing
Service (MLS), which is a database of property information operated by the Wasatch Front
Regional Multiple Listing Service (WFRMLS). This database includes a wealth of information
on sold properties, as well as information on current listings. Much of the information collected
in this database, including final sold price, is not shared with government agencies or third party
companies, such as Zillow. To gain access to and use the MLS, agents and brokers must pay a
subscription fee and be members of the Utah Board of Realtors. This association prohibits
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members from sharing confidential information about homes, historic sales, and other agents,
and has strict rules surrounding access to the MLS, including the purposes for which it may be
used. Agents, for instance, are expressly restricted from sharing their login and password with
anyone. Consequently, access to the MLS provides brokerages and agents significant
information advantages over clients.

1.3.1 Formal Social Structure in Utah: LDS Congregation Boundaries
In this chapter I focus on the real estate market in Utah County, Utah to take advantage of
a setting where a single formal social institution significantly determines the social structure in
which real estate transactions are embedded. This formal social institution is the LDS (Mormon)
Church. Of the 516,564 Utah County residents (114,350 families/148,350 housing units)
reported in the 2010 US Census (American FactFinder 2010), approximately 89% report being
adherents to the LDS Church (ASARB 2010). Church members are assigned to congregations,
called “wards”, with whom they attend church weekly. A collection of geographically proximate
wards are assigned to a larger unit, called a “stake”, where members meet together less
frequently, but often attend large conferences or training events. As of March 2014 there were
147 stakes in Utah County and 961 wards. Thus, the average ward has approximately 450
members, 118 families, and 154 housing units. The average stake has over 3000 members in 7
wards, 826 families, and 1081 housing units.
Each house in Utah County is assigned to an LDS ward and stake based on its geographic
location. With few exceptions, homes are assigned to a single ward and a single stake where
members are required to attend congregation services to remain in good standing with the
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church.5 Indeed, to enter LDS temples, which represent a significant part of LDS church worship
(Mormon.org 2014), it is required that members regularly attend the ward to which they are
assigned. In rare instances a member will not attend the ward or stake to which they are assigned,
such as if they are an interpreter for the deaf and are needed in a neighboring stake, but
permission to do so requires consent from the leadership of the church. Discussions with church
leaders indicated that such approval is rare.
Ward and stake boundaries are comprised of a set of houses in a geographic area. Figure
1.2 shows the boundaries for a representative stake in Utah County with seven wards. Because of
the high density of LDS church members in Utah County, ward boundaries are quite small and
do not line up with significant neighborhood boundaries. For instance, the average stake in
Orem, Utah covers less than 1 square mile of land, and each stake contains on average seven
wards. Consequently, it is quite common that single neighborhoods will be shared between 2-3
wards, and perhaps even bridge stake boundaries. Thus, most homeowners in Utah County have
many geographically proximate neighbors with similar homes and socio-demographic
backgrounds, but that are members of different wards or stakes. This feature of the setting is
important to my empirical identification strategy.
Friendships and social interactions in Utah are directly influenced by congregation
boundaries. Table 1.1 contains a list of the typical weekly and monthly activities church
members engage in at the ward and stake levels. Given the large number of church events,
church members often feel there is little time remaining to spend on maintaining friendships

5

There are some cases where homes are assigned to multiple wards. These include church wards designed for single
individuals only (“singles wards”), wards for newly married couples who are students (“student married wards”),
and wards that provide services for a specific ethnic group (e.g., “Spanish wards” or “Tongan wards”).
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outside congregation boundaries.6 In addition to these events, the LDS Church employs a lay
ministry, and each member is given a responsibility in the congregation called a “calling.”
Examples of callings include Bishop, secretary to the Bishop, ward financial clerk, youth
adviser, nursery teacher, sports director, and Scoutmaster. These callings often require a
significant amount of time and facilitate high levels of interactions between individuals at the
ward and stake levels. For instance, Scoutmasters and youth advisers take youth on a monthly
overnight campout and hold weekly activities outside of church that are typically an hour and a
half long. Moreover, youth leaders often frequently visit parents to discuss youth progress in
Scouting or other programs. Bishops or Stake Presidents are responsible for giving callings,
which may change at any time, and church members have limited input into the callings they
receive.
The significance of congregation boundaries on social interactions is most keenly
observed when ward or stake boundaries change. Often boundaries are changed unexpectedly by
church leaders due to congregation growth or to rebalance units. When boundaries shift it is quite
common for members to lament the “loss” of friendships, as changes may put ward or stake
members in different church units. While these individuals have not changed their geographic
location, the limited time church members have to maintain relationships outside their
congregation significantly affects future interactions. My informal discussions with church
members revealed that members interact on a social level with other members outside their ward
and stake infrequently. One church member, for instance, stated that he barely knew his
neighbors across the street, as the neighbors attend a different stake. Another noted that their

6

The observations about church members in this section are based on informal discussions between the author and
church members.
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neighbor three doors down “might as well be in another universe,” as they are in a different
stake.
Overall, this setting has important benefits that make it suitable for addressing my
research questions. First, the church social structure in Utah is the primary driver of social
interactions and affiliations between individuals, and congregation boundaries are determined by
geographic assignment that may change unexpectedly over time. This feature of the setting
allows me to use home addresses for homes and agents to identify social affiliations. While still
not completely random, using geographic boundaries to identify affiliations helps alleviate
empirical concerns that stem from the tendency of individuals to affiliate with similar others
(Mouw 2006). Second, strength of affiliation varies between wards and stakes, allowing me to
investigate the impact of affiliation strength on transaction outcomes. Third, the real estate
industry is characterized by agent discretion and incomplete information, which potentially
creates tension when agents list for affiliates as they face financial incentives to leverage social
affiliations for their own benefit. Finally, agent productivity on transactions is observed over
time, and the link between agent choices, agent productivity, and firm performance is clear.

1.4 Setting-Specific Predictions from the General Hypotheses
In this section I lay out setting-specific predictions. These predictions are derived from
the general hypotheses presented earlier, and explore the impact of a geographically-assigned
social affiliation between listing agents and home sellers, through the formal social structure of
the LDS Church, on agent performance, effort, flexibility, and the value appropriation tactics
they employ. A summary of the setting-specific predictions and their corresponding hypotheses
are found in Figure 1.3.

1.4.1 Listing Agent Effort and Performance
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The first hypothesis argues that experts will create more value in transactions when
transacting with affiliates, compared to non-affiliates. This stems both from increased effort as
well as from information and solidarity benefits from the social structure. In this setting, I expect
that listing agents will increase care and effort on transactions when listing for affiliates through
marketing. When listing a home agents can leave instructions for buyer agents on the procedure
for showing a home. This may include instructions for how to access the home directly through a
key box or electronic keypad, or instructions for how to schedule an appointment. If the home is
vacant, agents often place a key box and insert the key box code into the confidential comments
associated with the listing. While this allows buyer agents to easily show the home, it does not
permit listing agents to actively manage and follow up on showings. Alternatively, agents may
require buyer agents call them to schedule an appointment and receive the key or code. This
allows agents more control over showings and provides opportunities for agents to receive
valuable feedback about the showing, such as reactions to the list price or characteristics of the
home that did or did not show well. If the home is not vacant, appointments usually must be
made. In these cases listing agents may instruct buyers to call the owner directly to set an
appointment or to call the listing agent. When listing agents request buyers call them directly,
they are able to manage showings and ensure that the home is ready to be shown. Thus, I expect
that listing agents increase marketing efforts and care by requesting buyer agents call them prior
to showings when listing for affiliates.
In addition to exerting more effort marketing the home, I expect agents will create value
in transactions when listing for affiliates by selling homes at higher prices. Sellers have strong
incentives to maximize home sale price. Brokerages and agents similarly desire to maximize
selling prices to increase commission, although they also have incentives to underprice homes to
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quickly turn inventory (e.g., Levitt & Syverson 2008; Rutherford et al. 2005). When listing for
affiliates agents have increased access to private or tacit knowledge about the home, the client,
and the neighborhood that allows them to better market and show the home, ultimately resulting
in higher selling prices. Higher levels of effort and increased motivation from solidarity factors
similarly lead to higher prices, as agents increase care and active management of showings when
listing for affiliates. Finally, solidarity factors lead agents to advise sellers to not accept “lowball” offers, resulting in higher overall selling prices, and may result in sellers being more
receptive to agent “coaching.” Consequently, I expect listing agents to list and sell comparable
homes at higher prices when listing for affiliates.
In addition to home selling price, however, time on market is also important as it
influences costs. There is typically a positive correlation between time on market and the sold
price premium paid for a home. If a home is priced high this typically increases time on market,
as there are fewer potential buyers willing to pay the high price. Moreover, in order for sellers to
receive a high price listing agents and sellers may need patience to avoid accepting early “lowball” offers. While listing for affiliates may consequently result in longer times on market if
listing agents are listing and selling comparable homes at higher prices, increased agent effort,
solidarity benefits, and information advantages offset this increase. Thus, the overall impact of
transacting with affiliates on time on market is ambiguous, although I expect that these forces
will offset each other, resulting in no significant difference on average in time on market, despite
higher home selling prices.
Finally, I expect agents will be more likely to ultimately sell the home. Sellers and listing
agents typically enter into a listing agreement that gives the agent the right to a commission if the
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home sells during a specific time period.7 Interviews with agents revealed that the typical listing
agreement in Utah lasts for 180 days. Listing agreements protect agent marketing investments
and provide agents a reasonable time period to sell the home. Many factors influence the
probability of home sale, including original list price, seller willingness to reduce price over
time, characteristics of the home, agent knowledge, agent access to buyers, and agent effort.
When listing for affiliates, agents have greater access to quality information, including tacit and
private information, better access to potential buyers via the social structure, and exert more care
and effort. In addition, decreased concerns of opportunism allow agents to better “coach” sellers
on selling strategies and which offers to accept. Thus, I expect that these benefits will result in
increased probability of home sale when agents list for affiliates, again reducing costs for agents
and the brokerage.

1.4.2 Tactics to Appropriate Value in Transactions
The second hypothesis argues that experts will appropriate more value when transacting
with affiliates. This stems from increased flexibility, which allows agents to engage in additional
tactics to appropriate value. In this setting one tactic often used to appropriate value is to engage
in dual agency, where listing agents represent both the home seller and the home buyer. 8 Dual
agency allows firms and agents to capture both sides of the commission in a transaction, and thus
significantly increases firm revenues and agent take-home pay. While dual agency may create
efficiencies that benefit both the client and agent through information and matching benefits
There are two major types of listing contracts. “Exclusive Agent” listing agreements require sellers to pay a
commission on the property if the property is sold through the efforts of any real estate broker. However, the seller
is not obligated to pay the commission if the property is sold solely through the efforts of the seller. The “Exclusive
Right to Sell” listing agreement requires the seller to pay a commission regardless of whose efforts resulted in a sale.
These agreements may stipulate particular individuals that should the property be sold to them the agent is not
required to pay the commission.
8
Dual agency is also referred to as “limited agency.” These situations arise when a single agent or a single
brokerage represent both the buyer and the seller. In this paper I focus on a single agent representing both the buyer
and the seller.
7
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(e.g., Brastow & Waller 2013),9 agents are limited in their ability to engage in this practice
because of the significant potential for conflicts of interest. In a typical real estate transaction
listing agents have fiduciary responsibility to sellers, which are seeking to maximize sold price,
and buyer agents have fiduciary responsibility to buyers, which are seeking to minimize sold
price. When agents represent both parties it becomes impossible for them to act with fiduciary
responsibility to both parties. Moreover, dual agency creates incentives for agents to either sell
homes at too high a price, because they are compensated by sellers based on the home’s sale
price, or to sell homes too quickly and cheaply to create dual agency deals with existing buyers.
Consequently, many sellers and buyers refuse to allow dual agency, and most states have passed
laws restricting dual agency, or requiring agents to disclose dual agency to each party in writing
prior to the deal.
When listing for social affiliates I expect that solidarity and information benefits will
provide agents increased opportunity to engage in dual agency deals. Solidarity benefits result in
increased trust and lessened concerns of opportunism from home sellers. Increased trust results
in clients accepting advice from listing agents more, such as advice on how to price the home,
when to lower price, and which offers to accept. Such solidarity benefits aid agents in creating
successful dual agency deals. Information advantages also provide agents increased opportunity
to engage in dual agency. When listing for affiliates agents have increased access to private and
tacit knowledge about the reservation prices of sellers and buyers, their financial situation, and
their overall goals. Such knowledge allows them to structure the transaction to increase the

9

Dual agency may create conflicts of interest, but it does not always lead to adverse outcomes for sellers. It may
also be used for its informational/matching benefits. For instance, if a listing agent procures a new listing, but
already has an existing client-buyer searching for that type of home, dual agency may be used to quickly match
sellers and buyers, resulting in benefits for both parties. In such cases agents use existing information about clients
to improve matches.
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probability that a dual agency deal occurs. It is important to note that while such factors may lead
to an increase in dual agency deals for agents, dual agency does not necessarily result in negative
outcomes for the seller.
Finally, when agents transact with affiliates I expect that increased flexibility will also
allow them to influence transaction outcomes in their favor. In this setting I investigate the extent
to which agents reduce selling prices of affiliate homes to “break slumps” and relieve financial
need. Financial need, measured as the number of days since the agent’s last listing went under
contract, creates pressure for agents to earn payment from commission. This pressure pushes
agents to use tactics that increase odds of a sale, and particularly of a quick sale. Such tactics
may include convincing sellers to reduce home list price to attract more buyers, or convincing
sellers to accept low offers instead of waiting for higher offers. I expect that agents can increase
the use of such strategies because of information and solidarity benefits associated with social
structures.

1.4.3 Impact on Firm Performance
My final hypothesis argues that, ceteris paribus, firm performance will increase with the
percentage of sales for affiliates. In this setting brokerage revenues, calculated as the total dollar
amount of real estate sales, are the primary metric to evaluate performance. However, dual
agency deals also significantly increase brokerage revenues. I measure overall brokerage
performance as the dollar amount of real estate sold in a given year, with dual agency
transactions counting as double the final sale price for that transaction. I calculate yearly
brokerage revenues for each brokerage, and expect revenues to increase with the percentage of
total transactions listed for affiliates in a given year. A summary of the above predictions are
contained in Figure 1.3.
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1.5 DATA
The data for this study originate from numerous sources. The core dataset comes from the
Wasatch Front Regional Multiple Listing Services (WFRMLS) in Utah, and contains data on all
MLS-listed residential properties in Utah County from 1995-2014. WFRMLS is the sole multiple
listing service operating in Utah County, and is the largest MLS in the state. Its database contains
data on more than 1 million real estate transactions since 1995. Most agents who list homes for
sale in Utah County rely on this service, and at any given time there are usually around 3,000
active listings in Utah County. Listing in the WFRMLS is only done by broker-subscribers, or by
agents or assistants working for the broker-subscriber. Listings are required to be entered into the
MLS within 5 days of the listing agreement, and information on sold houses, including sold
price, commission amounts, loan terms, sale date, and seller concessions, is required to be
updated within 10 days of closing (WFRMLS Policies, 2014). WFRMLS has many safeguards in
place that require listing agents to enter complete and accurate information, and failure of agents
to do their due diligence can result in fines and penalties.
The MLS data include transaction-level data on all MLS-listed transactions entered into
by real estate agents and brokerages in Utah County. Each listing includes data on housing
characteristics (e.g., street address, square footage, number of bedrooms, age of house, etc.),
important dates (e.g., listing date, sold date, under contract date, listing expiration date, etc.),
relevant brokerage and agent identities (listing agent, buying agent, and brokerage identities),
price information (e.g., original listing price, final listing price, final sales price, amount of seller
concessions, etc.), owner information (e.g., agent-owned, government-owned, bank-owned, etc.),
show instructions, listing contract terms (e.g., commission offered, type of listing agreement,
short sale indicator, etc.), and sold terms (e.g., type of loan, etc.). Table 1.3 details the primary
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variables used in my analyses, as well as their summary statistics. The data also include public
and confidential comments on each listing that describe the condition of the property and specific
show instructions. Following Levitt and Syverson (2008), I analyze the text from the public
comments to construct 81 dummy variables that control for house quality and differences
unobserved in the other MLS variables. Table A1.1 (appendix) presents the list of these variables
as well as their summary statistics.
In addition to the MLS data, I also collected real estate-related data from a few other
sources. First, I purchased data from the Utah Division of Real Estate. These data contain agent
license information, home addresses, and current brokerage affiliations. Second, I downloaded
information on each property from the County Assessor and Recorders offices. Finally, I added
in geographic data by running each property address through the Census Bureau’s geocoding
service.10 This allowed me to record longitude and latitude for many properties in my dataset, as
well as census block and tract identifiers.

1.5.1 LDS Church Boundary Data
LDS congregation boundary data were obtained for every property in Utah County at two
points in time. This was done by running each property address through the LDS Church’s online
“Meetinghouse Locator.”11 The Meetinghouse Locator returns the currently assigned ward and
stake for any address in the world. I ran each home found in Utah County’s Assessor records
through the locator in 2014 to determine the current ward/stake assignment. I then paired these
data with 2008 data that were collected using the same procedure. These two snapshots allow me
to identify church ward and stake boundaries for the majority of homes in Utah County for 20072014. I then link these data with hand-collected dates from various online sources on stake
10
11

The geocoder can be found at http://geocoding.geo.census.gov/geocoder
The meetinghouse locator can be found on the church’s website: www.lds.org.
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creations and boundary changes. This procedure allows me to construct a panel of congregation
boundaries for 1998-2014, including boundary changes, for many houses in my sample.
Real estate agent ward and stake boundaries are similarly identified by inputting agent
home addresses into the Meetinghouse Locator.12 Each agent is required to provide a mailing
address in order to be licensed in the state of Utah. When address changes occur, agents must
update their address with the state within 14 days to avoid penalties. Most agents chose to
provide a home address, although some agents provided office addresses. To minimize problems
of agents reporting office addresses, I excluded agent addresses from my analysis that include
names of major roads that are zoned for commercial purposes (e.g., State Street, Main Street,
Center Street), or that reference a suite number. However, including these addresses does not
significantly change my results.

1.5.2 Data Construction and Cleaning Process
I follow other major studies in cleaning and preparing the data for analysis. First, I
restrict my analysis by dropping the top and bottom 1% of observations from my sample in terms
of original list price.13 This removes homes that originally listed for more than $1,149,000 or for
less than $60,000. I also restrict my analysis to homes that were on the market for less than 2
years, and more than 0 days. This dropped approximately 1152 observations from my sample.
Restricting my data in these ways removes outliers, such as luxury homes or uncommon short
sales that are difficult to sale, and allows me to investigate the impact of social structure on
common real estate transactions. Additionally, I drop from my analysis homes that sold for
greater than 1.5X the original or final list price of the home as well as homes that sold for less
than a quarter of the original or final list price, as these appeared to be errors. This dropped 63
12
13

These address lists were purchased from the Utah Division of Real Estate.
Results are similar when dropping the top and bottom 1% of sold price.
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observations from my sample. Including these observations does not significantly impact my
results. Finally, following Levitt and Syverson (2008) I also dropped houses that reported the
total number of bedrooms as zero, the total number of bathrooms as zero, or the total number of
kitchens as zero. This dropped a total of 5577 observations from my sample. This cleaning
procedure left me with a total of 82,739 home listings and 40,838 sold listings with social
affiliation information.
To construct the variable “predicted sold price to original list price”, which is used as
either a control or dependent variable depending on the specification, I estimated sold price for
each home in the sample by regressing the log of sold price on home observables, quality
controls, transaction controls (short sale dummy and percentage of sold concessions), time
controls (sold year and month dummies, as well as their interactions), and geographic controls.
The R2 value on this regression was 0.87. I then predicted the selling price for each home using
the estimates from this regression, and divided this predicted selling price by the original list
price of the home. Final values were winsorized to 2.58 standard deviations above and below the
mean (top and bottom one half of one percent). This variable measures the degree to which a
home is overpriced at first time of listing. A value of 1 implies that the original list price is equal
to the predicted sold price, and values above 1 indicate overpricing. A similar variable, “sold
price to original list price”, was constructed by dividing the final actual sale price of the home by
the original list price. Final values of this variable were winsorized following the same method as
the previous variable. This variable measures the extent to which a home sells for close to the
original list price.
The limitations of these data are well known, and laid out in papers that have investigated
the real estate industry. First, the information in the MLS is entered by real estate agents, and
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there is not an independent verification system. While the MLS does actively monitor listings to
ensure that information is complete, agents may make mistakes or enter estimates for some
values, such as square footage. Second, to match up my datasets I had to rely on home addresses
or tax ID numbers for each home. In some cases tax ID numbers were not included in the listing,
and addresses did not match up between datasets, reducing my sample size. Finally, while these
data do include substantial information about each home, there are still home characteristics that
are unobserved. While this could lead to concerns about omitted variable bias, the high R 2 on my
hedonic regression (R2=0.87) suggests this is not a significant problem.
There are also important limitations with the congregation boundary data. First, I do not
observe when agents move their residence. The license data only include the agent’s current
address, or the address they last listed before their license expired. Consequently, if agents move
I may be incorrectly specifying congregation boundaries for that agent over time. Second, the
congregation boundary data only include two snapshots of boundaries (one in 2008 and the other
in 2014) for homes in Utah County, and not a panel of boundary changes. These two snapshots,
in conjunction with stake boundary change dates gathered online, allow me to identify
congregation boundaries and boundary changes for many homes in the sample. However, if
multiple stake changes occurred between 2008 and 2014 it is impossible to reliably track
congregation boundaries. Consequently, boundaries for these observations had to be coded as
missing. Similarly, I am unable to reliably identify congregation boundaries beyond the first
stake split event or the first stake creation event for each stake preceding 2008. Finally, I am
unable to identify which agents and home sellers are church members in my sample. While 90%
of the population in Utah County report being a member of the church (ASARB 2010), my data
do not include data on church membership.
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1.5.3 Interview Data
In addition to collecting archival data, I carried out interviews with real estate agents and
brokers in Utah. These interviews were informal in nature, and asked brokers and agents about
their experiences selling real estate in Utah. During my interviews agents expressed feelings that,
in general, they were able to be more productive when listing for congregation members. One
agent attributed this to increased levels of trust. He noted that the “expectation is everyone is
telling the truth, because [we are] all in the same ward. You don’t think, ‘Is this guy pulling my
leg?’ You don’t get people always saying, ‘can you verify that?’” Similarly, another agent shared
that information about the home and the financial situation of the seller is an important benefit to
listing for affiliates. He stated, for instance, that when listing for affiliates it is easier to assess if
individuals are upside down in their house, and to know what price sellers need to sell their home
for.
My interviews also uncovered evidence of external and internal social pressures
experienced by agents when listing for social affiliates. One agent stated that he felt “more
pressure to get the listing right” when working for church members in the ward or stake. He
remarked that, “You want to make sure you sell the home for the highest possible value in the
neighborhood, as this affects the social community, and you want to do it right.” He went on to
express his frustration when one client in his ward accepted a low-ball offer, against his advice.
He thought, “Oh crap, what do I do now? What will people think about this?” An agent also
noted that “you really want to do a really good job for someone in your ward. Maybe less so than
your best friend, or your mom, but much more than for the normal client.” He went on to
emphasize the difference in social pressure experienced when listing for social affiliates: “the
relationship is different though than when you list for a family member or your mom. [Your
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mom or a family member] won’t blame you [if something doesn’t go well with the transaction]
because they know you did your best. It won’t be awkward, and they will still love you.” He
argued that this isn’t the case for congregation members, and that there can be significant
pressure because of the social structure.

1.6 Empirical Model
To investigate the impact of congregation boundaries on real estate performance
outcomes, I use the following primary specification:
Yih = αi + β1*Xh + β2*Affiliationih + εih
where Yih is the dependent variable, such as the log of sold price, for listing agent i selling house
h while employed in brokerage j. Xh represents a vector of house characteristics, transaction
characteristics, quality controls (constructed using text analysis), time controls,14 and geographic
controls. Geographical controls include zip code dummies, which control for heterogeneity in
areas and the impact of distance between agents and listed homes. 15 αi are listing agent fixed
effects, and I include brokerage dummies to control for brokerage effects. “Affiliation” is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the home is listed in the same ward or stake as the
listing agent’s home address, 0 otherwise, and εih is the error term. The unit of analysis is the
agent/listing for the agent-level hypotheses and the brokerage/year for the firm performance
hypothesis. Table 1.3 provides a list of all dependent, independent, and control variables used in
my analyses, including their descriptive statistics. All regressions were estimated using ordinary

14

I use time fixed effects for list dates in instances where listing dates should influence outcomes, such as original
list price and days on market, and fixed effects for sold dates in instances where sold dates should influence
outcomes, such as for sold price, dual agency, and probability of default. Table notes specify which time controls are
used in each model.
15
The reported results use zip code dummies as geographic fixed effects. Alternative specifications using a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if an agent and home seller share a same zip code provide qualitatively similar
results.
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least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors clustered at the listing agent level. Additional
analyses are run using Cox hazard and logit models. For discrete choice models I present results
from OLS as they avoid bias from the incidental parameters problem (Neyman & Scott 1948).
However, logistic regression results for each specification provide similar results.

1.7 Results
1.7.1 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 provide a list of the variables used in my analyses, as well as the basic
descriptive statistics for each variable. Table 1.2 lists the dependent and independent variables,
and Table 1.3 the control variables. In my sample, the typical home sells for $200,579 and stays
on the market 110 days. It is originally listed at a 5% price premium, based on the predicted sold
price estimated using home observables, and sells for 96% of the original list price. The average
home has 3.8 bedrooms, 2.5 bathrooms, and 2444 square feet. Approximately 9% of homes sold
in Utah County are listed by agents that live in the same ward or stake as the home, and an
additional 1 % are sold by agents that previously shared a ward or stake with the home. The
average church ward has less than one agent actively listing homes, and approximately 7.5
homes are sold in a ward every year. Agents use a key box as the only method of marketing a
home 34% of the time, and request buyer agents call to schedule an appointment 56% of the
time. Listing agents serve as dual agents approximately 25% of the time. Figure 1.4 shows the
distribution of final sold price divided by the predicted sold price. This figure suggests agents
sell homes at higher prices, compared to the home’s predicted selling price, when listing for
affiliates.

1.7.2 Listing Agent Effort and Performance
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The first hypothesis argues that listing agents create more value in transactions when
listing for affiliates. The results for this hypotheses are presented in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. Table 1.4
investigates how agent marketing efforts change when listing for affiliates. Column 1 explores
the use of a key box. I find that agents are 5% less likely (from a base rate of 34%) to use a key
box as the only method for showing the home when listing for affiliates. Additionally, the results
in column 2 show that listing agents are significantly more likely to request buyers’ agents call
them to set an appointment for showings. After controlling for home vacancy and original list
price, listing agents request a call nearly 4% more often (from a base rate of 56%) when listing
for affiliates. Results using seemingly unrelated regressions or seemingly unrelated bivariate
probit regressions provide similar results. This suggests agents exert greater care and effort when
listing for affiliates.
Table 1.5 presents results for sale price, time on market, and probability of sale when
listing for affiliates. The models in Panel A investigate the change in home list and sale price.
Because these models include agent fixed effects, home characteristics, transaction controls, and
quality controls, the results from these analyses should be interpreted as the within-agent change
in selling prices of comparable homes when listing for affiliates. Overall I find that agents sell
homes for significantly more when listing for affiliates. Models 1 and 2 show agents list and sell
comparable homes for approximately 2% more. Moreover, as shown in model 3, agents list
homes for much closer to the final home sale price. The results in model 4 provide further
support, and show that agents list homes at higher prices when listing for affiliates, relative to the
predicted selling price.16 These results suggests that agents are listing and selling comparable

16

I also ran the model in column 4 by constructing a variable that predicted the original list price, following the
same procedure outlined earlier for the predicted sold price, and dividing this variable by the actual original list
price. Results for this model were nearly identical to the results in column 4.
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homes for significantly more when listing for social affiliates, providing additional support for
Hypothesis 1.
Finally, I investigate the impact of transacting with affiliates on time on market and the
probability of home sale. Typically when homes are sold for higher prices it results in increased
time on market and decreased probability of sale. However, I find that the probability of sale
increases when agents list for affiliates, and time on market does not significantly change. The
results for these analyses are presented in Panel B of Table 1.5. Model 1 shows that the
probability of home sale increases by almost 3% when agents list for affiliates, and Model 2
shows that agents are 6.4% more likely to complete the sale during the duration of a typical
listing contract (180 days). Relatedly, model 3 shows that time on market does not increase when
agents list for affiliates. After controlling for the original home list price compared to the
projected selling price, I find that listing agents sell homes for slightly quicker when listing for
affiliates. However, this result is not statistically significant at the 10% level (pval=0.13). Results
are similar using a hazard model as an alternative specification. Similarly, including unsold
houses in the regression and specifying time on market as either time to sale or time to
expiration/withdrawal shows affiliate homes sell or expire 3 days quicker (pval=0.06) on
average. Overall these results provide strong support for Hypothesis 1, and suggest agents are
selling homes at higher prices without increasing costs when listing for affiliates.

1.7.3 Tactics to Appropriate Value in Transactions
My next hypothesis argues that listing agents will experience increased flexibility and
engage in additional tactics to appropriate value from clients when transacting with social
affiliates. In particular, I expect that agents will increase use of dual agency and decrease home
selling prices in order to “break slumps.” Table 1.6 provides these results. First, as shown in
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model 1, I find that agents are 17% more likely to engage in dual agency when listing for
affiliates, a significant increase from the base rate of approximately 25%. Moreover, I find that
commission percentages charged to clients do not significantly decrease when agents act as dual
agents for affiliates (pval=0.87), and sellers do not contractually negotiate rates significantly
differently in anticipation of potential dual agency situations (pval=0.77). Because dual agency
effectively doubles commission amounts, this provides strong support for Hypothesis 2.
Table 1.7 provides results on home sale price and time on market when agents engage in
dual agency deals with affiliates. I find evidence suggesting that agents sell homes for cheaper
and quicker when engaging in dual agency and listing for affiliates. Models 1 and 3 present
results on sale price. While the results in model 1 are not quite significant at conventional levels,
the results in model 3 suggest agents reduce home sale price when listing for affiliates by
increasing seller concessions. These concessions are typically given to cover buyer closing costs,
and ultimately decrease the amount paid by the buyer for the home. I find that agents typically
have fewer concessions when listing for affiliates under single agency, or when listing as dual
agents for non-affiliates. However, when listing for affiliates agents increase sold concessions by
approximately 20% (base rate is 1% of the final home sale price). Relatedly, I find that listing
agents sell affiliate homes 6 days quicker as dual agents. Overall these results suggest that listing
agents may be using their influence with affiliates to reduce sale price prematurely in order to
engage in dual agency deals, providing further support for Hypothesis 2. However, it is
important to note that even with this decrease in sale price sellers are still receiving a higher
price for their home using an affiliated agent compared to using a non-affiliated agent.
Second, I investigate whether agents leverage flexibility from affiliations to relieve
financial need and “break slumps.” Models 2 and 3 of Table 1.6 present these results. I measure
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financial need or “slumps” as the log of the number of days since the agent’s last listing went
under contract (either as a listing or buyer agent).17 I then interact this variable with “Affiliation.”
After controlling for the last sold home’s selling price, I find that agents typically sell homes for
slightly more when not listing for affiliates and time since last sale increases. However, I find
that when listing for affiliates the opposite occurs: agents decrease the selling prices of affiliate
homes as time since last sale increases. This result suggests agents use different strategies to sell
affiliate homes when experiencing “slumps”, and that they may be leveraging affiliations to
“break slumps” by decreasing sold price. While my results in column 3 show that time on market
is not significantly different as days since last sale increase and agents list for affiliates, agents
may engage in this strategy in hopes that they can relieve pressures from financial need. Overall
these results provide strong support for Hypothesis 2. Figure 1.5 provides a graphical
representation of the creation and flow of value based on the results of these first two hypotheses

1.7.4 Impact on Firm Performance
My final hypothesis argues that ceteris paribus, firm performance will increase with the
proportion of total homes listed for affiliates. In particular, I expect the dollar amount of real
estate sold in a year to increase for brokerages as the percentage of listings (compared to total
number of listings) sold for affiliates increases. The results for these analyses are presented in
Table 1.8. It is important to note that for these models the unit of analysis is the brokerage/year.
Because these models include brokerage fixed effects, the results should be interpreted as the
within-brokerage effect of increasing the percentage of yearly sales to affiliates on yearly
brokerage revenues. Column 1 suggests that brokerage revenues increase approximately 2% for a
10% increase in the yearly percentage of transactions with affiliated clients. This provides strong
17

I use contract date for my financial need measure because this is the date that an agent has confidence a home will
be sold, and the approximate price it will sell for. Results using the number of days since last sale are qualitatively
similar.
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support for Hypothesis 3. Interestingly, the result in Column 2 suggests that brokerages do not
list fewer homes when increasing the proportion of listings for affiliates. This result implies that
while agents exert more effort when listing for affiliates, this does not result in brokerages listing
fewer homes. These results are robust to using logs (instead of levels) or to using count models.
Overall, these results suggest both agents and brokerages improve performance by listing for
affiliated clients, and provide strong support for Hypothesis 3.

1.8 Robustness and Identifying Mechanisms
In this section I investigate potential alternative explanations and provide additional
analyses that give insight into the mechanisms driving the main results.

1.8.1 Geographic Proximity vs Social Affiliations
A conspicuous alternative explanation is that geographic proximity is driving the
observed effects, independent of social affiliations, and that the specifications do not adequately
control for this using the 26 zip code dummies. To investigate this potential alternative
explanation I collected data on census tracts and block groups for each home in my sample. I
then re-estimated the models using 339 tract-block group dummies as geographic controls. My
results for these analyses are qualitatively similar to the zip code results. Second, I ran additional
analyses creating a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if an agent and home seller share the
same zip code. The results of these analyses are also qualitatively similar. As a final check, I
geocoded each home in my sample to capture its latitude and longitude. I then constructed a
measure of distance (in feet) between agents and homes. This analysis allows me to compare
agent performance on homes that are more geographically proximate to their residence, but
outside the social structure, to performance on homes that are more geographically distant but
within the social structure. My results from these analyses are also qualitatively similar to the zip
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code results. These additional analyses suggests that social affiliations, and not simply proximity,
are driving my results. Because I am unable to accurately geocode all addresses, or to identify
census tracts and block groups for all homes in my sample, my primary specifications present
results from the zip code dummies.

1.8.2 Strength of Affiliation
As an additional robustness check, and to explore the mechanisms underlying the results,
I exploit varying degrees of affiliation between members in church wards and stakes. As shown
in Table 1.1, individuals in church wards interact significantly more frequently than members of
church stakes. Given this high degree of interaction, and the fact that ward members live so close
to each other, it is rare for ward members to not know each other’s names, or to have some
experience interacting together through callings or activities. Consequently, ward affiliations are
much closer to friendships than simple affiliations or arms-length transactions. In contrast, stakelevel interactions are much less frequent, as members meet together less frequently and live
further apart. Thus, stake interactions are much more similar to affiliations than friendships,
although still stronger than arms-length transactions.
By exploiting these differences between wards and stakes, I investigate how affiliation
strength influences value creation and value appropriation by agents. Solidarity benefits are
strongest at the ward level, as ward members share common expectations, norms, and obligations
with other ward members that are enforced through social pressures and the high degree of
interaction. Information benefits are also largest at the ward level, due to the frequency of
interaction, the short distances between member homes, and solidarity benefits that lead to
increased sharing. At the stake level all these benefits are lessened due to reduced interactions
and increased distance between member homes. I consequently expect that the value creation
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benefits associated with listing for affiliates will be largest at the ward level. However, I also
expect positive benefits when agents list for stake affiliates, compared to listing for nonaffiliates. Similarly, I expect that flexibility will be largest at the ward level and consequently
lead to increased value appropriation, compared to the stake level or listing for non-affiliates.
The results for these analyses are presented in Tables 1.9 and 1.10. First, shown in Table
1.9, I find that strong affiliations lead to the greatest value creation improvements for agents.
Listing agents sell comparable affiliate homes for 1.1% more in the ward than in the stake (T-test
p-value<0.01), and sell comparable homes 4 days quicker when listing for ward affiliates. I do
not find that agents increase effort when listing for ward affiliates, compared to stake affiliates
(T-test p-value=0.59), or that they are more likely to complete the sale in 6 months. However,
taken together these results provide additional support for the previous theory, and suggest that
strong social affiliations positively impact value creation.
Table 1.10 presents results on flexibility and value appropriation by affiliation strength.
First, in column 1, I find that agents engage in dual agency 4% more often when listing for ward
affiliates, compared to stake affiliates (T-test p-value<0.01). Moreover, as shown in columns 2-4,
agents decrease home sale prices more and sell homes quicker under dual agency at the ward
level. This suggests agents leverage the flexibility from strong social affiliations to increase their
use of dual agency. Unreported results on the impact of days since last sale find that agents do
not significantly change their use of affiliations to “break slumps” when listing for ward affiliates
vs stake affiliates (T-test p-value=0.70). However, taken together these results provide additional
support for the previous theory, and suggest value appropriation is largest when affiliations are
strongest.

1.8.3 Unexpected Changes to Congregation Boundaries
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Finally, as an additional robustness check, and to investigate the mechanisms driving my
primary results, I exploit unexpected changes to church congregation boundaries. This analysis
allows me to explore the differential impact of previous affiliations, compared to current
affiliations, on value creation and appropriation by agents in transactions. Congregation
boundaries are occasionally unexpectedly changed by LDS Church headquarters due to growth
or a desire to rebalance the membership between wards and stakes. When changes occur, this
immediately impacts solidarity factors affecting agents. However, information advantages
change much more slowly, as agents still have possession of private or tacit knowledge postchange. It is important to note that agents do not change physical location post-boundary change.
The changes, however, have significant impact on the social structure as it influences who
individuals interact with through the church.
Tables 1.11 and 1.12 present results for current and previous affiliations. Overall the
evidence suggests that effort, price, time on market, probability of sale, and dual agency are all
positively impacted by current affiliations, compared to previous affiliations. I find that agent
effort is not significantly different when agents list for previous affiliates, compared to nonaffiliates, and time on market and probability that a listing will stay on the market more than six
months increase significantly. While the home sale price and probability of sale are higher when
agents list for previous affiliates, compared to listing for current affiliates, it appears that this is
driven by the significant increase in time on market. I also find that agents are no more likely to
engage in dual agency or to leverage social affiliations to “break slumps” when listing for
previous affiliates, compared to non-affiliates, suggesting that current affiliations are driving the
use of such tactics. Thus, taken together, these results suggest that the primary effects of this
chapter are driven by strong current social affiliations. Moreover, solidarity benefits from the
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social structure appear to be important to both value creation and appropriation in the
transaction.

1.9 Discussion and Conclusion
While many studies have emphasized the efficiency and cost benefits from transacting
within social structures, it has remained unclear the extent to which experts and firms can create
and appropriate value when transacting with social affiliates, especially in the absence of repeat
transactions. This chapter has argued that information benefits, solidarity benefits, and increased
effort lead to value creation in transactions when experts transact with social affiliates.
Additionally, this chapter has argued that social structures create flexibility and expand the
opportunity space for opportunistic behaviors by experts. When information is incomplete and
the shadow of the future weak experts consequently have increased opportunities to leverage
social affiliations in transactions to appropriate value.
Overall my results suggest transacting with affiliates leads to an increase in firm and
agent performance. I find that agents create and appropriate more value in transactions and exert
more effort when listing for social affiliates. Agents sell comparable homes for 2% more without
significantly increasing costs and are 17% more likely to serve as dual agents when listing for
affiliates. This results in a 2% increase in commission amounts for the average transaction, and a
~50% (~$6017) increase in commission amounts on dual agent transactions. Moreover, I find
that improved expert performance significantly impacts brokerage revenues—a 1% increase in
the percentage of yearly sales to affiliates increases brokerage revenues by approximately 1.5%.
Finally, I find that clients, on average, are strictly better off using an affiliated agent, compared
to a non-affiliated agent. However, some of the benefit of using an affiliated agent is mitigated
through dual agency.
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Theoretically, the results of this chapter imply that under conditions of incomplete
information experts make choices about how to behave in social structures. A consistent
criticism of studies investigating networks and social structures is that they overlook human
agency (Salancik 1995; Coleman 1988; Kilduff & Brass 2010) and treat individuals in an “over
socialized” way (Granovetter 1985). Consequently, actors are often theorized to be enabled or
constrained by social structures, but are left with little choice regarding their own actions. The
results of this chapter suggest that experts make conscious choices when dealing with social
affiliates, and that these choices are influenced by other elements of the context. Moreover,
experts sometimes behave in ways that do not lead to beneficial outcomes for clients. Thus, as
argued by both Granovetter (2005) and Coleman (1988), understanding the impact of social
structures on individuals requires understanding all dimensions of the context, as well as the
other incentives provided.
More practically, these results have important implications for firms. Apart from
financial incentives, experts respond to social factors and in-group preferences that positively
impact effort and performance in transactions. Consequently, firms may be able to improve
expert productivity, and motivate experts at low cost, by hiring and staffing experts to take
advantage of social affiliations. Moreover, heterogeneity in firm outcomes in many service
industries may be driven by the number and quality of social structures to which employeeexperts belong.
This study also has important implications for markets. My results suggest that social
pressures and preferences can, on average, lead to efficiency benefits in transactions and reduce
moral hazard problems in markets. Financial incentives and incomplete information in the real
estate industry have been shown to lead to problems of moral hazard (Levitt & Syverson 2008;
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Rutherford et al. 2005). Such problems contributed to an 8 trillion dollar housing bubble, the
collapse of which resulted in the largest financial meltdown in recent history and the loss of 8.4
million jobs (Economic Policy Institute 2014). My results suggest that agents experience
increased motivation that leads to increased effort and performance when listing for sociallyaffiliated clients.
While this chapter has used a distinctive setting to investigate the impact of a social
structures on expert performance and behaviors, the results of this chapter are likely
generalizable to many settings. The key features of this setting include employee discretion over
pricing and the use of firm resources, some degree of incomplete information, transactions
embedded in a social structure, and transaction revenues shared between firms and experts, but
paid by a social affiliate. Many settings share similar characteristics, and likely lead to similar
outcomes. First, settings that involve sales with price discrimination, such as software sales (e.g.,
Larkin 2014) or car sales, are likely to experience similar results. In these settings salespeople
are given discretion in pricing, and information surrounding the cost of the product and customer
willingness to pay is incomplete. Thus, salespeople may leverage information and trust benefits
to smooth transactions, leading to value creation. However, solidarity and information benefits
also provide additional flexibility in transactions that may provide opportunities for salespeople
to close more transactions and upsell affiliates.
Second, settings involving service experts, advice, and incomplete information likely
experience similar results. Doctors, for instance, are given discretion about when a cesarean
section is needed during delivery (e.g., Gruber & Owings 1996). Because patients have limited
information about their health status and the true need for a cesarean section, they often rely on
the advice of doctors, particularly doctors they trust. However, doctors have incentives to engage
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in cesarean sections to increase revenues and decrease risk from lawsuits. Caring for social
affiliates may provide physicians increased opportunity to steer patients into cesarean sections.
However, it may also create stronger obligations for physicians to minimize costs and avoid
downside health complications from the procedure. Similarly, in the financial services industry
clients often depend on the advice of financial advisers when deciding investment strategies.
However, advisers face financial incentives to steer clients into certain products to increase their
commission (e.g., Mullainathan et al. 2012). Sharing a social affiliation with clients may again
provide increased opportunity to steer clients to higher-commission products. However, it also
may lead to value creation if clients are more receptive to “coaching” and advisers use solidarity
and knowledge benefits to more efficiently construct portfolios.
This study is not without limitations. First, while this setting provides an opportunity to
improve upon the endogeneity problem encountered from individuals choosing affiliations,
social affiliations in this study are still not completely exogenous. Real estate agents choose
where to live, and agents and sellers choose who to transact with. Thus, it is difficult to
extrapolate these results to all social affiliations. Second, this chapter has largely disregarded the
impact of other important affiliations in the transaction, such as between buyers and buyer
agents, as well as between real estate agents. This provides an opportunity for future research.
Finally, I am unable to observe whether individuals are members of the church, and unable to
measure the intensity of social relationships. Thus, this chapter has focused on the impact of
“social affiliations” instead of friendships or social connections. Directly measuring the strength
of these relationships would provide added insight into the mechanisms driving the observed
outcomes and allow for a more detailed understanding of the factors influencing expert choices
when dealing with social connections.
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Moving forward there is significant potential for expanding and extending this work.
First, future work should focus on understanding how varying degrees of incomplete information
influence social pressures and in-group preferences for experts, and how this in turn influences
expert choices and performance. Second, future studies should extend this work by exploring
affiliations between buyers and buyer agents, as well as between agents. Investigating these
affiliations would allow additional insight into how professional and social affiliations interact,
and how experts utilize professional affiliations when transacting with social affiliations. Third,
future work should explore selection issues surrounding which firms and agents are most likely
to secure transactions with affiliates. Such an investigation could yield valuable insights into firm
entry and hiring decisions. Finally, future research could explore the extent to which survival at
entry and subsequent growth is impacted by the quality of an expert’s social structure. For
instance, it may be that superstars arise because of advantageous social structures at entry, which
allow experts to quickly build reputation and experience. The results of this chapter suggest
undertaking such research is important to enlarging our understanding of expert productivity and
firm performance.
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1.11 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Theoretical Framework

Figure 1.2: Boundaries for a Representative Stake in Utah County with Seven Wards

Note: This figure shows a representative stake in Utah County with seven wards. The green boundaries (including the highlighted
red boundary) represent stake boundaries, and the purple boundaries ward boundaries. This map covers approximately 2.5 square
miles of Utah County.
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Figure 1.3: Setting-specific Predictions Corresponding to the General Hypotheses
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Figure 1.4: Agents Sell Homes Higher Above Predicted Sold Price when Listing for
Affiliates
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1.6

Figure 1.5: Impact of Social Affiliations on the Flow of Value in Transactions

Table 1.1: Typical Interactions in LDS Church Wards and Stakes
Ward Level – (~450 individuals, 188 families, 154 housing units)
Weekly Interactions
-Church services: 3 hours
-Two hours of interactive classes
-Responsibilities associated with callings (e.g.,
teaching, library, clerk, etc.)
-Multiple leadership meetings for
approximately 30 members
-Weekday youth activities (youth and leaders)

Other Interactions
-Bi-monthly social activities
-Monthly women’s organization gatherings
-Monthly assigned visits to 2-4 families
-Monthly temple days – members invited to
come same day/time
-Calling interactions
-Sports league

Stake Level– (~3150 individuals, 826 families, 1081 housing units)
Regular Interactions
-Bi-annual church conference, all members
-Bi-annual training meetings for leadership
-Monthly scheduled temple days—members
invited to come same day
-Youth activities (youth, leaders, and parents)
*Multi-day annual event
*Full day events (~2/year)
*Youth dances (~6/year)
*Annual week long boys and girls camps for youth,
leaders, and parents

Weekly Interactions
-Leadership meetings (5-15 people)
Other Interactions
-Monthly meetings between Stake and Ward
clergy
-Stake leadership visits to ward (~6X/year)
-Stake-wide social activities (~2/year)
-Service activities
-Calling interactions
-Sports league
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics for Primary Specifications: Dependent and Independent
Variables
Variable
Dependent Variables
Sold
Original list price
Sold price
Days on mkt
Six months
Dual agent
Seller concessions %
Sold price/original list price
Predicted sold price/original list price
Brokerage revenue/yr
Brokerage # sold/yr

N
82739
40838
40838
40838
82739
40838
40838
40838
40838
2789
2789

Independent Variables
Affiliation
Previous affiliation
Same ward agent/house
Same stake agent/house
Franchise brokerage
# sold to date, agent
# list to date, agent
# sold to date, brokerage
Key box used
Key box used only
Call agent for appt.
Brokerage % sold to affiliation/yr

40838
40838
40838
39328
40838
40838
82739
40838
40838
40838
40838
2789

[62]

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

0.49
0.50
211679
119306
200571
106456
109.71
80.08
0.25
0.43
0.25
0.43
0.01
0.02
0.96
0.08
1.05
0.18
3,820,214 8,216,161
14.70
31.88

0
60000
30000
1
0
0
0.00
0.62
0.66
71900
1

1
1,149,000
1,500,000
481
1
1
0.10
1.19
1.90
894,000,000
370

0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1138
1870
3435
1
1
1
100

0.09
0.01
0.04
0.05
0.46
92.25
162.39
620.07
0.61
0.34
0.56
11.49

0.29
0.07
0.20
0.21
0.50
144.39
272.00
694.26
0.49
0.47
0.50
22.54

Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics for Primary Specifications: Control Variables
Variable
Control Variables
Total # bedrooms
Total # bathrooms
Total # kitchens
Total # fireplaces
Total # laundry rooms
Total # dining rooms
Total # family rooms
% of basement finished
Garage capacity
Pool
Square feet
Acres
Year built
HOA fee
Property type
Condominium
Mobile
Recreational
Single Family
Townhouse
Twin
Short sale
Year
Commission % offered buyer
Owner agent
Co-agent present
Immediate possession
Other
# agents in ward
# houses sold in ward/yr

N

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

40838
40838
40838
40838
40838
40838
40838
40838
40838
40838
40838
40838
40838
40838

3.79
2.51
1.07
0.55
1.00
0.13
1.14
41.14
1.50
0.07
2444
0.28
1985
23.68

1.22
0.96
0.26
0.73
0.34
0.34
0.71
45.37
1.09
0.25
1204
1.00
24.63
70.34

1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
500
0
1860
0

16
13
4
5
5
2
5
100
10
1
18400
4.48
2014
10000

40838
40838
40838
40838
40838
40838
40838
40838
40139
40838
40838
40838

0.10
0.00
0.00
0.79
0.09
0.02
0.06
2006
2.93
0.04
0.24
0.27

0.29
0.02
0.01
0.40
0.28
0.15
0.23
4.30
0.25
0.20
0.42
0.44

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1998
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2014
6
1
1
1

40838
40838

0.86
7.45

1.17
7.27

0
0

8
51

Note: Additional quality dummies were constructed for the following text strings, and their common variants: TLC, Needs Updating,
Estate Sale, Foreclosure, Handyman, As-Is, Rehabber, Bank-Owned, Priced to Sell, Motivated, Potential, Close, !, New, Spacious,
Elegance, Beautiful, Remodeled/Renovated, Historic/Vintage, Maintained/Well-Cared, Wonderful, Fantastic, Charming, Stunning,
Amazing, Granite, Immaculate, Breathtaking, Neighborhood, Spectacular, Landscaped, Stained Glass/Art Glass, Built-in, Tasteful,
Must See, Fabulous, Leaded, Delightful, Move-In, Gourmet, Corian, Custom, Unique, Maple, Newer, Hurry/Will Not Last, Pride,
Clean, Quiet, Dream, Block, Huge, Deck, Mint, Hardwood, Views, New Roof/New Shingles, Upgraded/Updated, Vaulted, Floor
plan, Award, Hot Tub, Tile, Cul-de-sac, Jetted Tub, Park, Brick, Value, Windows, Mother-in-law, Stainless, Theater, Surround Sound,
Pickiest, Rare, Starter, Master, Cute, Warranty, Temple, and Fenced. Summary statistics are included in the appendix
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Table 1.4: Listing Agents Exert More Care and Effort when Listing for Affiliates
Dependent Variable:
Affiliation
Vacant
Log(original list price)

(1)
Pr(Key Box Only)
-0.017*
(0.009)
0.406***
(0.014)
-0.046***
(0.018)

(2)
Pr(Agent Appointment)
0.020**
(0.010)
-0.327***
(0.014)
0.087***
(0.016)

1.288***
(0.270)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.429
40838

0.194
(0.344)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.422
40838

Constant
House Controls
Transaction Controls
Time Controls
Listing Agent FE
Listing Brokerage FE
Experience Controls
Quality Dummies
Geographic Controls
R2
Observations

Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by listing agent. Transaction
controls include dummies for immediate possession, owner agents, presence of a co-agent, use of a
dual/variable rate commission, and use of an EAL listing contract. Time controls include year and
month dummies for when the house was listed, as well as their interaction. Significance levels: * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

64

Table 1.5: Agents Create More Value when Listing for Affiliates
Panel A
(1)

(2)

Log(List Price)

Log(Sold Price)

Affiliation

0.019***
(0.005)

Constant

4.408***
(0.168)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.894
40838

Dependent Variable:

House Controls
Transaction Controls
Time Controls
Listing Agent FE
Listing Brokerage FE
Experience Controls
Quality Dummies
Geographic Controls
R2
Observations

0.020***
(0.005)

(3)
Sold to Original
List
0.003**
(0.001)

(4)
Original list to
predicted sold price
0.021***
(0.005)

3.671***
(0.186)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.898
40838

1.076***
(0.076)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.404
40838

2.760***
(0.180)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.257
40838

Panel B
Dependent Variable:
Affiliation
Constant
House Controls
Transaction Controls
Time Controls
Listing Agent FE
Listing Brokerage FE
Experience Controls
Quality Dummies
Geographic Controls
R2
Observations

(1)
Pr(Sold)
0.014*
(0.008)

(2)
Pr(Six Months)
-0.016**
(0.006)

(3)
Days on Mkt
-2.323
(1.490)

3.849***
(0.265)

-0.668***
(0.234)

-67.179
(57.761)

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.225
82739

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.193
82739

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.282
40838

Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by listing agent. Transaction controls include dummies for
immediate possession, owner agents, dual agency, dual brokerage, presence of a co-agent, and short sales, as well as variables for the
percentage of sold concessions (except models 1 and 2 of Panel B) and the original list price to predicted sold price (model 3 of Panel B
only). House controls include the log of original list price for Panel A model 3 and Panel B models 1 and 2. Time controls include year
and month dummies, as well as their interaction, for when the house was listed for Panel A models 1, 3 and 4 and Panel B models 1-3,
and for when the house was sold for Panel A model 2. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.6: Increased Flexibility and Access to Value Appropriation Tactics when Listing
for Affiliates
(1)
Pr(Dual Agent)
0.040***
(0.010)

(2)
Log(Sold Price)
0.036***
(0.009)
0.001*
(0.001)
-0.005**
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)

(3)
Days on Mkt
-0.674
(3.585)
1.139***
(0.391)
-0.426
(1.056)
0.986
(0.975)

Constant

0.772**
(0.318)

3.634***
(0.189)

-87.353
(58.746)

House Controls
Transaction Controls
Time Controls
Listing Agent FE
Listing Brokerage FE
Experience Controls
Quality Dummies
Geographic Controls
R2
Observations

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.203
40838

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.897
39899

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.278
39899

Dependent Variable:
Affiliation
Log(# days since last contract)
Affiliation X Log(days since last contract)
Log(last home sold price)

Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by listing agent. Transaction controls include
dummies for immediate possession, owner agents, presence of a co-agent, dual agency and dual brokerage (models 2
and 3 only), and short sales, as well as variables for percentage of sold concessions and the original list price to
predicted sold price (model 3 only). Time controls include year and month dummies, as well as their interaction, for
when the house was sold for models 1 and 2, and when the house was listed for model 3. Results for models 2 and 3
are robust to excluding part time agents, defined multiple ways, and to excluding observations where # of days since
last contract is high. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.7: Evidence of Increased Flexibility that Aids in Engaging in Dual Agency
Dependent Variable:
Affiliation
Dual agent
Affiliation X Dual agent

(1)
Log(Sold Price)
0.023***
(0.005)
0.006
(0.004)
-0.012
(0.008)

(2)
Days on Mkt
-0.781
(1.636)
7.083***
(1.733)
-5.554*
(3.261)

(3)
Sold Concessions %
-0.001**
(0.0004)
-0.001***
(0.0004)
0.0013**
(0.001)

3.671***
(0.187)

-67.809
(57.753)

0.080***
(0.014)

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.898
40838

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.282
40838

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.244
40591

Constant
House Controls
Transaction Controls
Time Controls
Listing Agent FE
Listing Brokerage FE
Experience Controls
Quality Dummies
Geographic Controls
R2
Observations

Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by listing agent. Transaction controls include
dummies for immediate possession, owner agents, dual agency and dual brokerage (model 1 only), presence of a coagent, and short sales, as well as variables for the percentage of sold concessions (except for model 3) and the
original list price to predicted sold price (model 2 only). Time controls include year and month dummies, as well as
their interaction, for when the house was listed for model 2, and for when the house was sold for models 1, and 3.
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 1.8: Listing for Affiliates Improves Firm Performance
Dependent Variable:
% Affiliation/yr
Log(# Agents in Brokerage/yr)
Log(# Listings Sold/yr)
Constant

(1)
Log(Revenue/yr)
0.002***
(0.001)
0.017
(0.022)
1.026***
(0.015)

(2)
Log(# Sold/yr)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.832***
(0.052)

12.282***
(0.050)

0.887***
(0.111)

Y
Y
0.963
2789

Y
Y
0.836
2789

Time Controls
Listing Brokerage FE
R2
Observations

Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are cluster by brokerage. Time trends
include year dummies. Results using count models for model 2 or logged % of Affiliation/yr are
similar. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.9: Agent Value Creation Largest at the Ward Level (Strongest Affiliation)
Dependent Variable:
Same ward agent/house
Same stake agent/house

Constant
House Controls
Transaction Controls
Time Controls
Listing Agent FE
Listing Brokerage FE
Experience Controls
Quality Dummies
Geographic Controls
R2
Observations

(1)
Log(Sold Price)
0.026***
(0.006)
0.015***
(0.006)

(2)
Pr(Six Months)
-0.015*
(0.009)
-0.016**
(0.008)

(3)
Days on Mkt
-4.225*
(2.252)
-0.190
(1.951)

3.713***
(0.188)

-0.646***
(0.238)

-85.715
(58.341)

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.898
39328

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.193
78017

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.282
39328

Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by listing agent. Transaction
controls include dummies for immediate possession, owner agents, dual agency, dual brokerage,
presence of a co-agent, and short sales, as well as variables for the percentage of sold concessions
(except model 2) and the original list price to predicted sold price (except model 1). Time controls
include year and month dummies, as well as their interaction, for when the house was listed for models 2
and 3, and for when the house was sold for model 1. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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Table 1.10: Value Appropriation and Flexibility Largest at Ward Level (Strongest
Affiliation)
Dependent Variable:
Same ward agent/house

(1)
Pr(Dual Agent)
0.046***
(0.015)

(2)
Log(Sold Price)
0.032***
(0.006)
0.006
(0.004)
-0.023**
(0.011)
0.016***
(0.006)
-0.004
(0.010)

(3)
Days on Mkt
-1.222
(2.535)
7.333***
(1.795)
-11.273**
(4.656)
-0.165
(2.203)
-0.733
(4.311)

(4)
Sold Concessions %
-0.001*
(0.0004)
-0.001***
(0.0004)
0.001
(0.0008)
-0.001
(0.0005)
0.001*
(0.0008)

0.720***
(0.326)

3.713***
(0.188)

-85.302
(58.099)

0.084***
(0.014)

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.202
39328

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.898
39328

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.283
39328

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.246
39092

Dual agent
Same ward X dual agent
Same stake agent/house
Same stake X dual agent
Constant
House Controls
Transaction Controls
Time Controls
Listing Agent FE
Listing Brokerage FE
Experience Controls
Quality Dummies
Geographic Controls
R2
Observations

0.037***
(0.012)

Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by listing agent. Transaction controls include dummies for
immediate possession, owner agents, presence of a co-agent, and short sales, as well as variables for percentage of sold concessions
(except for model 4) and the original list price to predicted sold price (model 3 only). Time controls include year and month
dummies, as well as their interaction, for when the house was sold for models 1, 2, and 4, and when the house was listed for model
3. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.11: Less Effort and Value Created when Agents List for Previous Affiliates
Dependent Variable:
Affiliation
Previous affiliation
Constant
House Controls
Transaction Controls
Time Controls
Listing Agent FE
Listing Brokerage FE
Experience Controls
Quality Dummies
Geographic Controls
R2
Observations

(1)
Log (Sold Price)
0.020***
(0.005)
0.039*
(0.021)

(2)
Days on Mkt
-2.222
(1.487)
11.754*
(6.504)

(3)
Pr(Key Box Only)
-0.017*
(0.009)
-0.020
(0.031)

(4)
Pr(Agent Appointment)
0.020**
(0.010)
-0.030
(0.047)

3.673***
(0.186)

-66.782
(57.766)

1.287***
(0.269)

0.192
(0.341)

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.898
40838

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.282
40838

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.429
40838

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.422
40838

Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by listing agent. Transaction controls include dummies for
immediate possession, dual agents and dual brokerage (models 1 and 2 only), owner agents, presence of a co-agent, and short sales, as
well as variables for percentage of sold concessions (except for models 3 and 4), and the original list price to predicted sold price
(model 2 only). Models 3 and 4 include controls for home vacancy, original list price, and compensation contract terms. Time controls
include year and month dummies, as well as their interaction, for when the house was sold for model 1, and when the house was listed
for models 2-4. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 1.12: Value Creation and Appropriation Reduced when Listing for Previous
Affiliates
Dependent Variable:
Affiliation
Previous affiliation
Constant
House Controls
Transaction Controls
Time Controls
Listing Agent FE
Listing Brokerage FE
Experience Controls
Quality Dummies
Geographic Controls
R2
Observations

(1)
Pr(Six Months)
-0.016**
(0.006)
0.074***
(0.019)

(2)
Pr(Sold)
0.015*
(0.008)
0.103***
(0.039)

(3)
Pr(Dual Agent)
0.040***
(0.010)
0.019
(0.035)

-0.665***
(0.234)

3.852***
(0.264)

0.773***
(0.318)

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.193
82739

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.225
82739

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.203
40838

Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered by listing agent. Transaction controls include dummies for
immediate possession, owner agents, presence of a co-agent, and short sales, as well as a variable controlling for the original list price
of the home (except Model 3). Time controls include year and month dummies, as well as their interaction, for when the house was
sold for model 3, and when the house was listed for models 1 and 2. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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CHAPTER 2
Favored in Selection: The Impact of Social
Affiliations on Real Estate Agent Access to
Valuable Transactions

CHAPTER ABSTRACT
This chapter investigates how social affiliations between real estate listing agents and home
sellers impact the type of transactions agents engage in, as well as the selection process
underlying agent selection. While many studies have argued that status and reputation act as
entry barriers and create advantages for high status or high reputation firms, it remains unclear
how social affiliations impact the selection process, particularly under conditions of incomplete
information. Using a unique approach that pairs data from the Wasatch Front Regional Multiple
Listing Services with data on LDS church congregation boundaries in Utah County, Utah for
1998-2014, I explore how social affiliations between home sellers and agents through
geographically-assigned Mormon church congregations influence the selection process and the
type of transactions agents engage in. I find that affiliations allow agents to list more expensive,
larger, and higher quality homes compared to when listing for non-affiliates, and to list such
homes at low levels of experience. I also find that affiliations create a distinct selection process
that substitutes for the positive selection impacts of previous performance, agent experience, and
fit, and creates a feedback loop where listing for affiliates allows agents to gain valuable
experience and reputation, which then positively impacts future listings with non-affiliates.
Overall my results imply that social affiliations between firms and clients can lead to important
selection benefits that increase firm performance, and that lead to important entry and
competition benefits.
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2.1 Introduction
In many industries, access to valuable transactions directly impacts firm performance and
survival. Such is the case for numerous service industries, which now are responsible for over
two-thirds of US GDP and employ nearly 80% of the US workforce (USTR, 2014). Often critical
to securing valuable transactions is overcoming agency problems, and recent studies have noted
the potential for reputation (e.g., Shapiro 1983; Fombrun & Shanley 1990; Fombrun 1996),
status (Podolny 1993; Benjamin & Podolny 1999), and social or professional networks (e.g.,
Merton 1968; Stuart et al. 1999) to reduce concerns of moral hazard and provide important
signals of quality that aid firms in securing valuable transactions. When information in
incomplete, however, and monitoring costly consumers in service settings often choose to
transact with social affiliates (e.g., DiMaggio & Louch 1998), as affiliations breed trust and
status or reputational mechanisms provide only noisy information. While this may generate
advantages for firms if they can leverage trust to reduce transaction costs and engage in more
transactions (e.g., Coleman, 1988; Greif 1993; Barney & Hansen 1994), it remains unclear how
affiliations influence the type of transactions firms engage in, as well as the underlying selection
process. Do affiliations allow firms to secure more valuable transactions with clients? Or do they
lead to the creation of a “relief organization” (Uzzi 1997) where firms are obligated to “help out”
affiliates by engaging in less valuable transactions?
In this chapter I explore the extent to which social affiliations, bred of common
memberships between employee-experts and clients in formal social institutions, impact the
types of transactions real estate agents engage in. Moreover, I investigate how the agentselection process differs when social affiliations are present, as well as how transacting with
affiliates influences future agent transactions with non-affiliates through the building of
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reputation and the acquiring of experience. My purpose is to build on previous work (Gubler,
2015) to highlight the impact of social affiliations external to the economic transaction on firm
performance through selection, and to provide insight into the selection process in non-repeated
economic transactions where information is incomplete and social affiliations are present.18
The literature has long noted the potential for reputation or status to confer performance
benefits, to act as barriers to entry, and to serve as mechanisms that communicate firm quality
(e.g., Shapiro 1983; Wilson 1985; Rao 1994; Podolny 1993; Benjamin & Podolny 1999). These
factors have been argued to often lead to a “Matthew effect”, where more experienced and
reputable firms engage in the most valuable transactions (e.g., Merton 1968). Such an effect can
result in strong barriers to entry that disadvantage new and inexperienced firms, and lead to
sustained performance differences between firms (Podolny & Phillips 1996; Roberts & Dowling
2002). When information is incomplete, however, and the risk of opportunism high, scholars
have found that consumers often prefer transacting with social affiliates (DiMaggio & Louch
1998). This consequently imposes a difference selection process that erodes advantages from
status or reputation, and allows less experienced and smaller firms to engage in more valuable
transactions. However, because of data limitations and empirical challenges it has remained
difficult to empirically estimate the impact of such affiliations on selection, and consequently on
firm performance. This chapter seeks to fill this gap.
My unique approach mirrors that of the prior chapter, and pairs novel data from
geographically-assigned church congregations in Utah County, Utah with real estate transaction
data from the Utah Wasatch Front Regional Multiple Listing Services (MLS) for 1998-2014. In
Utah County nearly 90% of its over half million residents report being members of the Church of
18

While the focus of this chapter is on non-repeated economic transactions, recent studies have also focused on the
impact of social structures and relationships on transactions in non-repeated exchanges (e.g., Elfenbein and Zenger,
2013).
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Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (ASARB 2010). This church geographically assigns each home
in the county to a congregation which church members are required to attend to stay in good
standing with the church. These assignments significantly impact social interactions between
individuals, and have been shown to impact both agent and brokerage performance in
transactions (Gubler, 2015). By collecting a panel of congregation boundaries I explore the
impact of social affiliations on the selection process and the types of listings real estate agents
engage in.
My results suggest that there is a strong and significant correlation between listing value
and the presence of a social affiliation between listing agents and clients. I find that homes list at
approximately 14% higher prices when affiliations are present, are 11% larger in terms of square
footage, and are less likely to be low quality, as indicated by the presence of negative quality
descriptors in the publically available listing comments. This suggests that higher quality and
more expensive listings are being procured by agents with which home sellers share a social
affiliation through a shared church congregation boundary.
Similarly, using within-effects models, I find that agents list and sell higher quality, more
valuable, and larger homes when listing for socially-affiliated clients. My results suggest agents
list homes that will sell for nearly 14% more when listing for affiliates, compared to their other
listings, and consequently increase average commission earned by approximately $1121. I also
find that agents are 24% less likely to list a home with negative quality descriptors when listing
for affiliates. Interestingly, I find evidence suggesting that these effects increase in magnitude
with the strength of affiliation, and disappear altogether when congregation boundaries are
unexpectedly changed.
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While these findings suggest that transacting with affiliates results in higher quality and
more valuable transactions on average for agents, I also find evidence suggesting clients use a
distinct selection process in choosing agents when social affiliations are present. My results
suggest clients are significantly more likely to choose affiliated agents than non-affiliated agents,
and that affiliations substitute for the positive selection benefits of agent experience and previous
performance. Moreover, my results suggest franchise brokerages are less likely to be chosen
when affiliations are present, and fit considerations are less important. These results have
striking implications for firms, as they imply different competition and entry effects. For
instance, my results suggest that while agents typically list more expensive homes as experience
increases, leading to disadvantages for new entrants, when listing for affiliates agents can list and
sell more expensive homes at low levels of experience. Moreover, agents receive the same
positive benefits of experience when listing for affiliates compared to listing for non-affiliates.
Thus, this selection process favors socially-affiliated agents, and not simply the most
experienced agents or firms, and leads to potential entry benefits.
Finally, my results suggest that listing for affiliates creates a feedback loop where agents
leverage affiliations to gain experience and reputation, which then allows them to secure more
valuable transactions with non-affiliated clients in the future. I find that a 50% increase in the
number of listings for affiliates in a given year leads to a 1.3-3.25% increase in the average
listing price of homes for that agent in the subsequent year. Moreover, I find that this effect is
larger for new entrants, again suggesting entry benefits through the use of social affiliations.
These results contribute to a variety of literatures, and have important theoretical
implications. First, they suggest that affiliations can erode benefits from reputation, status, or
experience, which often act as entry barriers to young firms and lead to Matthew effects where
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more established or reputable firms are able to procure the most valuable transactions. My results
suggest that the benefits of transacting with affiliates can potentially substitute for these
observables, and result in an alternative selection process. Similarly, these results provide
empirical evidence in showing an additional avenue through which trustworthiness can lead to
heterogeneity in firm performance (e.g., Barney & Hansen 1994). Finally, this study makes an
empirical contribution by identifying affiliations in a way that avoids many of the endogeneity
issues noted in previous studies, which result from individuals choosing to affiliate with similar
others (e.g., Mouw 2006). In this study affiliations are assigned geographically based on church
congregation boundaries, which change over time and encompass small geographic areas.
These results also have important managerial implications. First, these results suggest
firms can potentially enter crowded markets, or enter markets that heavily reward reputation or
previous experience, through employee social affiliations with clients. This is a previously
under-researched human capital resource that can be used to improve firm performance. Second,
and relatedly, these results suggest managers should take such considerations into account when
making hiring and staffing decisions. For instance, firms may realize important benefits from
hiring new employees that can leverage social affiliations in valuable markets related to the
current strategy of the firm. Finally, these results suggest that managers should craft policies to
encourage and support employee experts transacting with affiliated clients, as this leads to higher
quality and more valuable transactions that positively impact firm performance.

2.2 Theoretical Background
2.2.1 Defining Social Affiliations
In this study I investigate the impact of social affiliations between employee-experts and
clients on the selection process, and the types of transactions firms engage in. I define social
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affiliations as current shared memberships in formal social institutions, through which
individuals interact and experience common identity, norms, and values. Formal social
institutions may include churches, alumni organizations, corporations, clubs, charitable
organizations, schools, or other groups. Affiliations through formal institutions may differ in
strength, with some becoming close friendships and others remaining simple acquaintances
through the common social structure.
When social affiliations are present they have the potential to influence transactions in
important ways. First, they may influence information flows between members, and allow for
increased transmission of quality information between affiliates, including private, tacit, and
fine-grained information (Coleman 1988; Krackhardt & Hanson 1993; Uzzi 1997; Reagans &
McEvily 2003; Granovetter 2005). Improved information flows stem both from more frequent
interactions through the social institution, as well as from increased information sharing by
members under lessened concerns of opportunism.
Second, social affiliations may lead to greater trust and goodwill in transactions. This
stems both from shared norms, expectations, and obligations from the social structure
(Granovetter 1985; Coleman 1988; Arrow 2000; Granovetter 2005), as well as from in-group
preferences and biases activated by the social affiliation (Sherif et al. 1961; Tajfel et al. 1971;
Falk & Zehnder 2007). This increased trust and goodwill can potentially be used to improve
performance and create competitive advantages (Barney & Hansen 1994; Gubler, 2015), and to
decrease transactions costs (e.g., Ben-Porath 1980; Coleman 1988; Greif 1993; Granovetter
2005; Uzzi & Lancaster 2004; Lancaster & Uzzi 2012). Moreover, it is supported by the desire
of affiliates to maintain social reputation and avoid social punishments (Granovetter 1985;
2005).
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Finally, social affiliations may activate social preferences in affiliates. Such preferences
are defined as concern for the welfare and monetary outcomes of other affiliates, and often lead
affiliates to take actions that decrease their own monetary gains but lead to improved outcomes
for other affiliates (Charness & Rabin 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2002; Andreoni & Miller 2002;
Bandiera et al. 2005). Such preferences may also lead affiliates to consciously act in ways that
benefit the social community, such as through paying a premium to engage in transactions with
other affiliates.

2.2.2 Affiliations and Access to Valuable Transactions
There are two competing views surrounding the impact of social affiliations on the types
of transactions firms engage in. The first view argues that firms will experience negative impacts
from affiliations, as they lead to obligations and social or in-group preferences that lock firms
into less valuable transactions. Social obligations are borne of common norms and expectations
in the social structure, as well as a desire to maintain social reputation (Granovetter 1985; 2005).
Such obligations may also drive employee-experts to engage in less valuable transactions in
order to “help out” socially-affiliated clients (e.g., DiMaggio & Louch 1998). Similarly, social
and in-group preferences create incentives for employee-experts to act in ways that benefit social
affiliates monetarily, even to the potential detriment of the firm. While such behaviors may be
utility maximizing for the employee-expert, it may result in inferior economic outcomes for both
the employee-expert and the firm. However, a desire to maintain social reputation and to benefit
affiliates and the social community may drive employee-experts to engage in such transactions
and behaviors. Overall this view argues that affiliations lead firms to engage in less valuable
transactions, and to become a “relief organization” (Uzzi 1997) for socially-affiliated clients in
markets where information is incomplete (DiMaggio & Louch 1998).

78

The second view contrasts with the first, and argues social affiliations lead to significant
selection benefits from affiliations, as they create information and solidarity benefits that allow
firms to identify and engage in more valuable transactions. Solidarity benefits from greater trust
and goodwill (Arrow 2000; Adler & Kwon 2002), as well as in-group preferences (Sherif et al.
1961; Tajfel et al. 1971; Falk & Zehnder 2007), lead consumers to prefer transacting with
affiliates when quality is difficult to assess and monitoring costly. This preference stems from
the expectation by consumers that the expected outcome from transacting with affiliates will be
higher than transacting with non-affiliates (DiMaggio & Louch 1998). Information advantages
from affiliations similarly provide benefits to identifying and securing valuable transactions.
Such informational benefits may include access to private or tacit information about potential
affiliate-clients, including their goals and desired outcomes, as well as the timeline for the
transaction (Uzzi 1997). This provides firms first-mover advantages in marketing to clients and
allows them to present themselves in the best possible light, given client goals. Information
advantages also assist firms in avoiding less-valuable transactions and transacting with difficult
or dishonest people. Thus, information advantages help in the timely identification of valuable
transactions, and solidarity benefits lead to consumer preferences that benefit affiliates in
securing such transactions. This consequently allows firms and employee-experts to improve
performance by leveraging affiliations to engage in more valuable transactions.

2.2.3 A Distinct Selection Process Imposed by Affiliations
In addition to influencing the types of transactions firms and employee-experts engage in,
social affiliations may also influence the selection process used by clients in choosing firms and
employee-experts to transact with. Large literatures have focused on the potential for reputation
(e.g., Shapiro 1983; Fombrun & Shanley 1990; Fombrun 1996) or status (Podolny 1993;
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Benjamin & Podolny 1999) to signal quality and act as barriers to entry. When clients have
access to quality information they select firms to transact with based on relevant observables,
such as historic performance. However, as these observables become hard to assess consumers
may rely more on indirect measures of performance, including reputation or status (Podolny
1993). This selection process consequently allows for sustained heterogeneity in firm
performance (e.g., Rao 1994; Roberts & Dowling 2002), as it generates “Matthew Effects”
where established firms engage in more valuable transactions due to their better reputations,
higher levels of experience, or higher levels of status (Merton 1968; Roberts & Dowling 2002).
Such a process makes it difficult for new or less-experienced firms to enter markets. Similarly, it
makes it difficult for them to secure valuable transactions, as there is more at stake in these
transactions and clients consequently prefer transacting with more proven experts.
When information is incomplete, and monitoring difficult, historic performance,
reputation, or status provide only noisy signals to consumers about firm quality. Moreover, in
such cases there is often heightened potential for opportunism or unethical behavior (e.g.,
Yenkey, 2015). Under these conditions, clients may choose to transact with social affiliates to
decrease potential for opportunism (DiMaggio & Louch 1998), especially in valuable
transactions where there is more to lose. Such a selection process differs from the process
described above, and provides potential advantages to affiliates in securing valuable transactions
or in working with more valuable clients. This may occur for at least two reasons. First, studies
in social psychology have found that individuals tend to trust and have a positive bias towards ingroup individuals (e.g., Tajfel et al. 1971; Billig & Tajfel 1973; Ashforth & Mael 1989; Falk &
Zehnder 2007). This positive bias and increased trust leads clients to prefer transacting with
social affiliates, regardless of experience, status, or reputation, as they perceive their expected
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outcomes as being more favorable when transacting with in-group members. Second, solidarity
benefits from the social structure may reduce client concerns of opportunism and lead to
increased trust (Granovetter 1985; 2005; Arrow 2000; Adler & Kwon 2002). This trust drives
clients to prefer transacting with social affiliates, as they expect affiliates to behave less
opportunistically than non-affiliates (DiMaggio & Louch 1998). Such trust is supported by the
desire of affiliates to maintain social reputation and avoid social punishments (Granovetter 1985;
2005). Both of these mechanisms imply advantages for affiliates in securing valuable
transactions when information is incomplete and risk of opportunism high, as affiliations
substitute for reputation, experience, or status. Moreover, such a process supports the argument
put forth by Barney and Hansen (1994) that trust can lead to sustainable competitive advantages.

2.2.4 Creation of an Affiliation Feedback Loop
Importantly, the distinct selection process outlined above provides potential for a
feedback loop that may create significant benefits for young and inexperienced firms from
transacting with affiliates. In many service industries firms engage in more valuable transactions
based on their reputation, status, or experience. However, because clients may choose to transact
with firms based on trust and goodwill from affiliations, this may allow firms to enter crowded
or competitive markets at lower relative levels of experience, status, or reputation. The
implication of such a selection process is that firms may leverage social affiliations to gain
experience and build reputation by participating in valuable transactions with socially-affiliated
clients. This subsequently allows them to engage in more valuable non-affiliate transactions in
the future, which results in improved firm survival and long-term performance benefits. Such
entry and competition benefits from social affiliations have been overlooked in the current
literature, but are potentially of significant importance, as they can be used to erode entry
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barriers and competitive advantages of rivals based on experience, status, or reputation. Figure
2.1 illustrates this potential feedback loop.

2.3 Empirical Setting
The setting for this study is the residential real estate industry, which was described in
detail in the first chapter of this dissertation. This industry is suitable to investigate the questions
outlined above for a few reasons. First, this is an economically significant industry in the United
States roughly equal in size to the brand name pharmaceutical industry, the hotel and motel
industry, and the single-location full service restaurants industry (IBISWorld 2014). The chief
productive resource is labor, and the industry employs over 1 million workers (IBISWorld 2014).
Second, because the core of this industry is the real estate transaction, I am able to observe and
measure the impact of valuable or higher quality transactions on agent and brokerage
performance. Third, agents participate in many transactions over time, with heterogeneity in the
presence of social affiliations, which allows me to estimate the impact of transacting with an
affiliated home seller on selection outcomes for the agent, and consequently the firm. Finally,
brokerage productivity and revenues directly increase with the dollar amount of real estate sold
by agents. Agents are required to work for a licensed brokerage to sell real estate in Utah, and are
typically compensated a percentage (3%) based on the final home sale price. This commission is
then shared with the employing brokerage, such splits ranging from a 50/50 split to a 100/0 split
(agent keeps full commission but pays a fixed desk fee). Consequently the link between agent
and firm productivity is quite clear.
In order to sell real estate in Utah, agents must belong to a licensed brokerage that
oversees their work. The typical brokerage in my sample employs 23 agents a year, with the
largest employing 178 and the smallest 1 (self-employed). Forty-three percent of the listings in
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my sample are by nationally franchised brokerages, such as RE/MAX or Prudential, 49% are by
independent brokerages, and 8% are by self-employed brokers. Agents often move between
brokerages throughout their career, as they seek out better fit or opportunities. Because
brokerage revenue is directly influenced by agent ability and the types of transactions agents
engage in, it is or paramount importance for brokerages to identify, hire, retain, and support
high-performing agents.
Sellers use real estate agents for a variety of reasons. First, agents have access to valuable
information. In Utah, many variables relating to real estate transactions, including final sales
price, are not public information. While this information exists on the MLS database, it is not
accessible through the county assessor or recorder offices, and is not used in tax assessments.
Consequently, it is difficult for sellers or buyers to conduct independent market research, or to
understand the local market, and thus drives clients to use agents. Second, listing agents have
access to potential buyers through their professional network. These connections may allow
sellers to sell their homes faster and at higher prices. Third, listing agents have experience that
sellers rely on to price the home and develop a marketing strategy. Most sellers in Utah have
only limited experience selling real estate. Given the economic magnitude of the transaction and
the potential emotions involved, sellers often rely on real estate agents to help them make
informed decisions.
Fourth, listing agents have experience marketing homes, and can potentially provide
valuable advice that will help the seller increase the sold price of the home and reduce time on
market. This includes insight into the buyer’s mentality. For instance, real estate agents may
know how to best present or stage a home to attract buyers, or what aspects of the home, if
improved, would lead to a higher selling price. Fifth, listing agents negotiate final prices, and
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may have more leverage to drive a “hard bargain” as an outside party. Finally, listing agents help
sellers to navigate the closing process, including filling out necessary paperwork to legally
transfer ownership of the home to the homebuyer. All these benefits from using an agent provide
advantages to sellers that decrease time on market, increase sold prices, reduce stress, and avoid
costly errors.
However, using a real estate agent can also lead to problems of moral hazard for sellers.
Because sellers have limited information about agents, comparable homes, and the market,
agents may have incentive to use their knowledge advantages to engage in behaviors not
beneficial to the seller. First, listing agents may lead sellers to underprice homes and sell them
too quickly (Levitt & Syverson 2008; Rutherford et al. 2005; Hendel et al. 2009; Jia & Pathak
2010). Such behavior follows from the relatively weak financial incentives faced by agents. For
instance, the difference between a home selling for $300K and $315K is approximately fifteen
thousand dollars for the seller. However, after splitting the commission with the buyer’s agent
and the listing agent’s employing brokerage, this may translate into a difference of only $243 for
the listing agent.19 Consequently, many listing agents may opt to sell homes quickly and reduce
their cost of effort and increase probability of sale. Second, agents may have incentive to engage
in dual agency (also called “limited agency”), where they serve as both the listing and buyer’s
agent. This allows agents to capture the entire commission amount, but leads to potential
conflicts of interest. Studies have found that homes sell for quicker and cheaper than they
otherwise would under dual agency (Gardiner et al. 2007; Brastow & Waller 2013; Turnbull &
Dombrow 2007). Finally, listing agents may have conflicting incentives that lead them to act in
the interest of the buyer’s agent or the homebuyer. For instance, if the listing agent is socially

This assumes a 50/50 split with the cooperating broker, a 60/40 split with the listing agent’s broker, and a 6%
franchise fee.
19
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connected to the homebuyer they may act in ways not beneficial to the seller. While listing
agents have fiduciary responsibility to the seller, social or financial incentives may lead them to
act in ways undesirable for the seller.

2.3.1 Selection in Real Estate and Acquiring More Valuable Listings
In this setting I explore the impact of social affiliations through geographically-assigned
LDS church congregation boundaries on the types of listings real estate agents engage in, and the
overall selection process. The data used on social affiliations were outlined in detail in the first
chapter of this dissertation. As members of the social structure, agents have access to private and
tacit information. Such information may include insight into potential affiliate-clients, such as
when they would need an agent, their goals for selling the home, the state of their finances, and
their personality. This information may also include insight into the home, including the quality
of the home, how easy it will be to show, and potential selling price. These information
advantages provide listing agents relative advantages in choosing clients to work with, which
houses to list, and how best to secure potential listings. Moreover, listing agents may have access
to this information earlier than non-affiliated agents. Such access to private, tacit, and timely
information may provide affiliated agents advantages in identifying and securing valuable
listings with affiliates, compared to non-affiliated agents.
In addition to impacting information flows, social structures also create social pressures
and preferences. Such social factors may lead listing agents to represent clients they would prefer
to avoid, or to attempt to sell homes they otherwise would not. For instance, in an effort to
maintain social reputation and avert social punishments agents may feel obligated to help clients
list homes that are difficult to sell, or that are in poor repair. Similarly, social preferences may
lead agents to take on less valuable listings (in terms of sale price) as they seek to “help out”
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affiliated sellers. Such obligations and preferences may drive agents to list less valuable or lower
quality homes, resulting in inferior economic outcomes for the agent and the firm.
Conversely, social factors may lead to solidarity benefits that allow agents to engage in
more valuable transactions. In-group preferences and shared norms, obligations, and
expectations reduce concerns of agent opportunism and increase seller confidence that listing
agents will deal fairly, give quality advice, and ultimately sell their home at a high price. These
benefits may lead sellers to prefer transacting with affiliated agents to avoid potential for agent
opportunism. Additionally, social factors may allow listing agents to list more valuable homes at
lower levels of experience or reputation. When information is incomplete sellers are unable to
use observables, such as sale prices of previously sold homes, to select a listing agent. In such
cases, sellers may use outside referrals or rely on indirect measures of agent quality, including
agent reputation, status, or experience. However, such information provides only noisy signals of
agent quality, and may not convey useful information about the listing agent’s propensity to
engage in opportunistic behavior. In the face of these uncertainties and the risk for opportunism,
sellers may opt to use socially-affiliated agents, regardless of agent experience or reputation.
This may especially be the case when sale prices (and consequently potential losses) are higher.
Using affiliated agents mitigates seller concerns of opportunism, as they rely on social pressures
and agent social preferences, and leads them to believe that agents will provide additional effort
and a higher quality of service to maintain social reputation.

2.4 Data
The data used in this study were outlined in detail in the previous chapter. However, there
are a few notable differences relative to this study. First, the sample includes all listings from
1998-2014, regardless of whether they sold or not. This also includes listings that expired prior
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to being sold. Second, I include listings only for agents whose first listing was after 1997. This
allows me to more accurately measure agent experience, as it excludes agents from the sample
who had been selling homes previous to 1998, for which data is unavailable. It is important to
note, however, that these agents are included in the relevant control variables, such as the
measure of current brokerage size. Third, in contrast to the first chapter, I do not restrict this
sample by house price. While the previous study removed homes that were in the top and bottom
½ of 1% in order to focus on common real estate transactions, this study uses no such restriction,
instead including luxury and very inexpensive homes. It is important to note, however, that my
results are not sensitive to excluding these observations. Finally, while the previous study
focused mainly on listings that sold and the resultant selling price, this study focuses on initial
listings and the resulting listing price. Consequently, control variables are also measured using
data from the initial listing. For instance, agent experience is measured as the number of homes
listed to date, and time controls include year and month dummies for when the home was listed.
In addition to the variables outlined in the previous chapter, I construct new variables that
are important to this study. First, I construct a variable that compares the predicted original list
price, based on home observables, with the actual original listing price. This variable helps
control for the fact that homes may be over/underpriced when affiliates are used/not used.
Second, I construct a measure of low home quality using the 81 descriptive dummy variables
(from the public comments) detailed in the previous chapter. To measure low quality I create a
variable that indicates whether or not the agent referenced low quality (e.g., “fixer-upper”, “tlc”,
estate sale”, etc.) in the listing comments. Relatedly, I construct an additional measure of low
quality that is the count of references to low quality. Finally, I include a subset of the 81 dummy
variables as additional quality controls in many regressions.
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2.5 Empirical Approach
To investigate the impact of social affiliations from LDS congregation boundaries on
selection, I use a variety of approaches and specifications. The first set of specifications treats the
data as a cross-section, and explores the controlled correlations between affiliations and home
listing price, size, and quality. The basic specification follows:
Yh = α + β1*Xh + β2*Affiliationh + εh
where Yh is the dependent variable, such as the log of original list price, Xh represents a vector of
transaction controls, zip code dummies that act as geographic fixed effects, and year and month
dummies that act as time fixed effects. Affiliationh is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
if the home is listed in the same ward or stake as the listing agent’s home address, 0 otherwise. I
estimate this specification using ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression, with robust
standard errors. The results of these models provide insight into the controlled correlations
between social affiliations and the dependent variables.
The second set of models are “within” models, and investigate the impact of social
affiliations on home listing price, size, and quality for a given agent or brokerage. These models
are related to the first set of models, but include agent and/or brokerage fixed effects to
investigate the within effect of listing for a social affiliate. The basic specification is:
Yihj = αi + β1*Xh + β2*Affiliationih + ηj + εihj
where Yihj is the dependent variable, such as the log of list price, for listing agent i selling house
h while employed in brokerage j. Xh represents a vector of transaction characteristics, time fixed
effects, and zip code dummies that act as geographic fixed effects. αi are listing agent fixed
effects, ηj are listing brokerage fixed effects, and εihj are error terms. The unit of analysis is the
agent/listing, or the brokerage/listing when agent fixed effects are omitted. These specifications
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are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors clustered by listing agent or listing
brokerage. For discrete choice models I present results from OLS as they avoid bias from the
incidental parameters problem (Neyman & Scott 1948). However, logistic regression results for
each specification provide qualitatively similar results.
The third set of models used are similar to McFadden’s consumer choice models
(McFadden 1973; McFadden 1980), and investigate the factors influencing the client’s choice of
which listing agent to use. These models require the specification of a choice set, which can be
thought of as the agents available to be chosen by clients for each listing. In such models
specification of the choice set is important to the estimation and results, and consequently I
specify this choice set in numerous ways. The primary results specify the choice set as those
agents that live in the same zip code as the client selling their home (median=30 agents).
Additional future analyses will specify the choice set as those agents that live in the same census
tract, or within 2 or 5 miles of the client selling their home. These models then regress a dummy
variable indicating the choice of agent on agent and brokerage characteristics, including presence
of a social affiliation, agent experience, agent previous performance, typical agent listing price,
geographical distance between the agent’s home address and the listing address, and brokerage
characteristics. I also include interactions between the affiliation indicator and the agent and
brokerage characteristics to estimate how affiliations influence the impact of each variable. The
models are estimated as conditional logits, with robust standard errors clustered by listing.
Because these models include listing fixed effects, the results are interpreted as the impact of
affiliations and agent and brokerage characteristics on the probability that an agent in the choice
set is chosen to list a home. The key assumptions are that the choice set is correctly defined, and
that the choice of agent maximizes client utility.
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The last specification moves the unit of analysis to the agent/year level. This specification
investigates the impact of the number of listings listed for affiliates in the previous year on the
average price of listings listed by a given agent in the subsequent year. After controlling for time,
agent success, and experience, this model provides insight into the feedback loop created by
listing for affiliates in the recent past. The model is as follows:
Log(Yit) = αi + β1*Log(Experienceit) + β2*Log(Affiliate Listingsit-1) + β3*Log(#Soldit-1) +
β4*Log(#Soldit) + γt + εit
where Yit is the average listing price for agent i in year t, Experienceit is the median level of
experience for agent i in year t, Affiliate Listingsit-1 is the number of homes listed by agent i for
affiliates in the previous year, #Soldit-1 and #Soldit are the number of homes listed by agent i in
the previous/current year, αi are agent fixed effects, and γt are year fixed effects. This model is
estimated using OLS, with the errors clustered at the agent level, and estimates the impact of the
previous year’s number of affiliated listings on the current year’s average listing price for a given
agent.
It is important to note that a key aspect of this setting is that affiliations are imposed
based on small geographically-assigned congregation boundaries. While not perfect, this allows
me to largely avoid the endogeneity problem encountered in many related studies that occurs
because affiliates are endogenously chosen (e.g., Mouw 2006). Given the small geographic areas
of the congregations, and the difficulty in choosing certain wards or stakes to live in as they may
change unexpectedly over time, the affiliations in this study are more exogenous than those
encountered in many other studies. Moreover, many of these affiliations are formed through
church interactions, or through church responsibilities. Consequently, interactions are often
imposed on individuals, instead of chosen, and affiliates may differ significantly in preferences
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or characteristics. While some affiliations will lead to friendships, many affiliations will likely
remain acquaintances.

2.6 Results
2.6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in my analyses. The
average home in my sample lists for approximately $267,000, has 2723 square feet, and stays on
the market 130 days. Eleven percent of homes are listed by agents that share a ward or stake with
the home seller, and homes are listed on average for close to the predicted list price, based off
home observables. About 8% of homes are short sales and 9% of homes are defined as low
quality. The average agent has listed 84 homes. Table 2.2 provides these same statistics by
affiliation, including T-tests for differences. The results of this table suggest that when social
affiliations are present in a transaction homes are significantly more expensive, larger, and of
higher quality. Interestingly, agents and brokerages appear significantly less experienced on
affiliate listings. Table 2.3 presents descriptive statistics and T-tests on the 81 quality and
descriptive dummies constructed from the public comments. Each T-test reports the difference
between a given quality or descriptive indicator when an affiliation is present, compared to when
it is not. The results of this table provide detailed insight into quality differences by affiliation,
and suggest that social affiliations are correlated with higher quality listings.
Figures 2.2-2.6 graphically represent the differences between affiliate and non-affiliate
listings. Figure 2.2 shows homes are typically more expensive when listed by affiliates, as
evidenced by the distribution being shifted to the right. Results are similar when using final sale
price. Figure 2.3 shows homes have fewer negative quality indicators when listed by affiliates,
again suggesting listings for affiliates are higher quality. Figure 2.4 shows sellers typically use
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smaller brokerages to list their home when affiliations are present, and Figure 2.5 shows that
chosen agents are also significantly less experienced. Figure 2.6 shows that affiliations are
correlated with higher listing prices for agents regardless of experience level. Moreover, the
returns to experience appear similar when affiliations are present compared to when they are not.
Consequently, the overall picture that emerges is that higher quality and more expensive homes
are listed by social affiliates, on average, but that chosen affiliated agents typically work for
smaller brokerages and are much less experienced. However, as these results do not include
relevant controls, more complex analyses are needed.

2.6.2 Acquiring More Valuable Listings
I investigate the overall correlation between social affiliations and home price, size, and
quality first using cross-sectional between effects models. Table 2.4 presents the results. After
controlling for geography and geographical distance, time, agent experience, and other
transaction differences, I find that social affiliations are associated with homes listing and selling
for nearly 14% more than non-affiliated homes. Moreover, social affiliations are associated with
11% larger homes, and higher quality homes. These results provide support to the results
presented from the descriptive statistics, and again suggest that social affiliations may lead to
better listings for agents and firms. However, because these analyses are between effects models
they do not hold constant important variation within agents or brokerages that may lead to
unobserved selection effects. The next results presented use fixed effects to investigate the
correlations between home price, size, and quality within brokerages and agents.
Table 2.5 presents results including brokerage fixed effects, with errors clustered by
brokerage. These results can be interpreted as the within brokerage change in average listing
price, home size, and home quality based on the presence of a social affiliation. I find that the
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results are similar to the between models. These results suggest brokerages list 13% more
expensive homes when listing for socially-affiliated clients, list larger homes, and are less likely
to list low quality homes. Table 2.6 builds on these results by including agent fixed effects.
These results are interpreted as the within agent change in average listing price, size, and quality
when listing for affiliates. Again, these results are similar to the previous results. Agents list
nearly 14% more expensive homes when listing for affiliates, list 14% larger homes, and list
homes with 25% fewer negative quality attributions. Taken together, these results suggest that
agents and brokerages list more expensive, larger, and higher quality homes when listing for
socially-affiliated clients.
To test the robustness of these results I ran multiple additional tests. The first test
included a measure of distance in linear feet between the agent’s home address and the listing
address. This variable more accurately controls for the impact of geographic distance between
agent and client home addresses. The results from these analyses are similar to the results
presented. However, because I am unable to accurately geocode all addresses results are
presented from the zip code specifications to avoid reductions in sample size. For the second set
of robustness tests I reran the models including a control for the ratio of the predicted list price to
the actual list price. This variable controls for the over or underpricing of homes when affiliated
agents are used. The results from these analyses are also similar to the presented results,
suggesting that the observed increase in list price is not due simply to agents listing homes at
higher prices. Overall, the results of multiple robustness checks indicate that the relationships
presented in Tables 2.4-2.6 are robust to alternative specifications and the inclusion/exclusion of
multiple control variables, including geographic distance.

2.6.3 A Different Selection Process
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I next investigate the difference in the selection process when social affiliations are
present. Table 2.7 presents these results, which are estimated using conditional logit
specifications with odds ratios reported. These models regress the probability that an agent is
chosen to list a home on agent and brokerage characteristics. The results in column 1 suggest that
both previous experience and social affiliations significantly increase the odds of an agent being
chosen to list a home. However, the effect on affiliation is much larger, and the interaction
between affiliation and experience is negative. Column 2 includes previous agent experience as
an explanatory variable. The results for this model again suggest experience and affiliations have
positive impacts on selection. However, it also suggests that previous agent performance is
positively correlated with selection, and that there is a negative impact of affiliation on previous
performance. Overall, these models suggest that affiliations lead to selection benefits and
substitute for agent experience and previous performance.
The third column of Table 2.7 includes a variable for brokerage size, a dummy for
franchise brokerages, and a variable that measures the overall fit between agents and homes
based on the difference between a given home’s price and the previous average home listing
price for the agent. After including these variables the results again suggest there are significant
positive effects from experience and previous performance, which are mitigated by affiliations.
Additionally, the results suggest that franchise brokerages are more likely to be chosen by
clients, but that the affect is again mitigated by affiliations. Finally, the fit variable suggests that
as fit decreases (moves away from zero) agents are less likely to be chosen. However, the
opposite occurs for affiliated agents. Even when fit is low they are more likely to be chosen.
The last column presents results that include a measure of linear distance between each
agent and the home being listed. While this significantly decreases the sample size, due to the
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current difficulty in accurately geocoding addresses for agents and homes, the estimated results
are unchanged. Even after controlling for distance affiliated agents are significantly more likely
to be chosen than non-affiliated agents. Moreover, the negative impacts on experience and
previous performance from affiliations remain.

2.6.4 Creation of a Feedback Loop
Finally, I investigate whether agents can secure more valuable listings at lower levels of
experience when listing for affiliates. Table 2.8 presents these results. The results in column 1
suggest that agents generally list more expensive homes as experience increases. Column 2
provides additional insight, showing that agents list homes that are 2.7% more expensive when
they move into the lower middle 25% of the experience distribution, 4.4% more expensive
homes when they move into the upper middle 25% of the distribution, and 5.3% more expensive
homes when they move into the top 25% of the experience distribution. Interestingly, however, I
find that agents list 12-14% more expensive homes when listing for affiliates, even after
controlling for the effect of experience. Moreover, the results in column 3 suggest that agents list
more expensive homes on average at low levels of experience when listing for affiliates than
they do when listing for non-affiliates at the highest levels of experience. The results in column 3
similarly show that agents don’t receive any additional penalty or benefit from experience when
listing for affiliates than when listing for non-affiliates. This suggests agents may be able to
leverage affiliations to list more expensive homes at low levels of experience. Moreover, it
implies agents may be able to use such benefits to enter competitive markets.
Table 2.9 presents results investigating the impact of listing for affiliates on subsequent
average home list prices. These models regress the log of the average listing price for a given
agent in year t on the log of the number of homes listed by that agent in the previous year, t-1.
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Additionally, these models control for agent experience and the number of homes listed overall
by the agent in the current and previous year. Columns 1 and 3 present results without agent
fixed effects, and columns 2 and 4 results with agent fixed effects. The primary results, shown in
the first two columns, suggest that listing homes for affiliates leads to a significant increase in
the average agent list price of homes in the subsequent year. I find that a 50% increase in the
number of homes listed for affiliates leads to a 1.3-3.25% increase in the average home listing
price for agents in the subsequent year. Column 3 presents results restricting the sample to the
first two years for each agent. The results from this analysis suggest that the effects are even
larger for new entrants. Agents see an increase of over 3.5% in average home listing price for a
50% increase in the number of homes previously listed for affiliates. Finally, the model in
column 4 omits affiliate listings in year t from the calculation of the average list price. The
estimated results are similar to those presented in column 2. Overall, the results of Table 2.9
suggest that listing for affiliates has a significant positive impact on future home list prices, and
provides support in favor of the feedback loop. Moreover, these findings suggest that affiliations
can be leveraged as a resource to build experience and reputation, which then carries over to
future transactions with non-affiliates.

2.7 Robustness and Identifying Mechanisms
Table 2.10 provides results from two additional sets of models. The first set of models
estimates the impact of previous social affiliations on agent home list price and quality. As noted
in the first chapter, congregation boundaries are often unexpectedly changed because of church
growth or a need to rebalance church units. When such changes occur individuals do not relocate
geographically, although the new boundaries significantly alter the social structure, including
social interactions. In columns 1 and 2 I explore the impact of such shifts on the types of homes
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agents list. I find that when listing for previous affiliates agents do not list homes that are
significantly more expensive or that are of higher quality. This suggests that strong current social
affiliations, and not simply geographic proximity, are driving the main results.
The second set of models estimate the impact of affiliation strength on the types of homes
agents list. As shown in the previous chapter (see Table 1.1 of Chapter 1), individuals in wards
interact much more frequently that individuals affiliated only through the stake. Consequently,
information and solidarity benefits are much stronger at the ward level than the stake level. It is
important to note, however, that geographic distance between stake affiliates is still quite small
on average. My results in columns 3 and 4 show that the selection effects are largest when
affiliations are strongest. Agents list homes that are nearly 15% more expensive when listing for
ward affiliates, and list homes that are approximately 9% more expensive when listing for stake
affiliates (T-test p-value<0.01). The results in column 4 show that agents are no less likely to list
low quality homes at the ward level compared to the stake level. Overall these results suggest
that strong affiliations are driving the observed selection results.

2.8 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the impact of social affiliations between real estate listing
agents and clients on the types of transactions agents engage in and the underlying selection
process. The results suggest that affiliations lead to agents listing more expensive, larger, and
higher quality homes. Moreover, agents list more expensive homes even at low levels of
experience, and social affiliations substitute for the positive impacts of experience, previous
performance, brokerage reputation, and fit in the selection process. Additionally, the results
suggest that transacting with social affiliates generates a feedback loop that positively impacts
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future transactions with non-affiliates, implying that agents can leverage affiliations to build
valuable experience and reputation.
Theoretically, this chapter makes a few key contributions. First, the results imply that the
Matthew Effect and the positive benefits of status and reputation can be eroded by strong social
affiliations between firms and clients. This suggests that incomplete information plays an
important role in understanding the benefits of status and reputation, including their potential to
lead to sustainable performance advantages, as it also may drive clients to prefer transacting with
social affiliates. Second, and relatedly, while the literature has argued that those with strong
reputation benefit most from social structures, the results of this chapter suggest that this is not
the case under conditions of incomplete information. Finally, this research highlights the
importance of understanding the link between trust, status, and reputation in explaining firm
performance.
This chapter similarly has important implications for firms. First, this study suggests that
firms can potentially leverage social affiliations to enter crowded or competitive markets. Thus,
managers need to carefully assess the potential impact of affiliations between employee-experts
and clients when making hiring and staffing decisions. Second, these results suggest that
allowing service experts to transact with socially-affiliated clients can lead to significant
performance benefits for the firm. Instead of creating a “relief organization”, these affiliations
provide key advantages to firms that can be leveraged as a resource to improve firm
performance. Finally, this study suggests that sustained performance differences between firms
in service industries may be driven, at least in part, by social affiliations between employees and
clients.
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There are a number of limitations to this study. First, while my setting allows me to
improve upon the endogeneity problem encountered in many network or social capital studies,
which is inherent from individuals choosing who to affiliate with (e.g., Mouw 2006), the
affiliations in this study are still not truly exogenous. Agents chose where to live, and agents and
clients choose whether or not to engage in a transaction together. Second, as noted in the
previous chapter, I am unable to measure the strength of affiliation (aside from the ward vs stake
comparisons), or to identify which individuals are members of the LDS church. Finally, while
the data include numerous elements that give insight into the selection process, many
characteristics of agents and clients are unobserved. This includes variables such as age or
gender. Including such variables may improve the selection model and provide added insights.
Moving forward there is significant potential to extend this work. For instance, future
work should investigate how varying levels and types of incomplete information influence the
selection process, as well as returns to status or reputation. Future work could also more deeply
investigate the competitive and entry implications from social affiliations. For instance, such
work could focus on how access to valuable transactions at entry influences the emergence of
superstar agents. The results of this chapter suggest that continued research focusing on the role
of social structures in individual and firm performance is a worthwhile endeavor.
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2.10 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Illustration of Potential Feedback Loop Created by Social Affiliations

.6
.4
.2
0

Density

.8

1

Figure 2.2: Affiliations Correlated with Higher List Prices

8

10

12
14
Log of Original List Price
No Affiliation
Affiliation

kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0489

104

16

.06

.07

.08

.09

.1

Figure 2.3: Affiliations Negatively Correlated with Listing Low Quality Homes
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Figure 2.4: Affiliations Negatively Correlated with Brokerage Size
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Figure 2.5: Affiliations Negatively Correlated with Agent Experience
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Figure 2.6: Correlation between Original List Price and Agent Experience, by Affiliation
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Table 2.1: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Original list price
Square feet (sqft)
Low quality (count)
Low quality (dummy)
Predicted list price/original list price
Predicted sold price/original list price
Sold
Days on mkt
Affiliation
Previous affiliation
Same ward agent/house
Same stake agent/house
Franchise brokerage
# list to date, agent
# list to date, brokerage
Short sale
Immediate possession
Co-agent present
Comments length
Year
Month
Zip

N
49823
49823
49823
49823
49823
22637
49823
49823
49823
49823
49823
46562
49823
49823
49823
49823
49823
49823
49785
49823
49823
49823

Mean
266837
2723.36
0.10
0.09
1.00
1.05
0.46
129.78
0.11
0.01
0.05
0.06
0.42
84.01
1087.81
0.08
0.24
0.26
201.61
2007
6.14
84306

Std Dev
243415
1447.12
0.33
0.29
0.20
0.18
0.50
99.59
0.31
0.07
0.22
0.24
0.49
188.51
1316.40
0.26
0.42
0.44
62.75
3.73
3.24
297.78

Min
5500
500
0
0
0.55
0.66
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1998
1
84003

Max
14.9 MM
28260
4
1
2.15
1.90
1
730
1
1
1
1
1
1758
6219
1
1
1
244
2014
12
84664

Table 2.2: Sample Descriptive Statistics, by Affiliation
Variable
Original list price
Square feet (sqft)
Low quality (count)
Low quality (dummy)
Predicted list price/original list price
Predicted sold price/original list price
Sold
Days on mkt
Franchise brokerage
# list to date, agent
# list to date, brokerage
Short sale
Immediate possession
Co-agent present
Comments length

Mean
Std Dev
No Affiliation
258863
240714
2664.29
1416.47
0.11
0.34
0.10
0.30
1.00
0.20
1.05
0.18
0.47
0.50
128.35
96.29
0.43
0.49
85.63
190.75
1094.2
1320.59
0.08
0.27
0.24
0.43
0.26
0.44
200.31
63.49
N= 44365
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Mean
Std Dev
Affiliation
331650
255290
3203.55
1596.58
0.06
0.26
0.06
0.23
1.01
0.20
1.07
0.18
0.40
0.49
141.47
122.55
0.41
0.49
70.84
168.57
1035.83
1280.77
0.06
0.24
0.20
0.40
0.26
0.44
212.32
55.13
N= 5458

T-Tests
P-value
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.020**
0.000***
0.002***
0.000***
0.000***
0.410
0.000***

Table 2.3: Difference between House Quality Indicators for Affiliates and Non-Affiliates
Quality Indicators
TLC †
Needs Updating †
Estate Sale †
Foreclosure †
Handyman †
As-Is †
Rehabber †
Bank-Owned †
Priced to Sell
Motivated
Potential †
Close
!
New ‡
Spacious
Elegance ‡
Beautiful ‡
Remodeled/Renovated ‡
Historic/Vintage
Maintained/Well-Cared ‡
Wonderful ‡
Fantastic ‡
Charming
Stunning ‡
Amazing ‡
Granite
Immaculate ‡
Breathtaking ‡
Neighborhood
Spectacular ‡
Landscaped ‡
Stained (Art) Glass
Built-in ‡
Tasteful
Must See ‡
Fabulous ‡
Leaded †
Delightful
Move-In ‡
Gourmet ‡
Corian

Mean
0.008
0.001
0.001
0.003
0.001
0.009
0.0003
0.005
0.020
0.030
0.012
0.190
0.440
0.294
0.068
0.007
0.208
0.049
0.003
0.025
0.056
0.029
0.013
0.009
0.034
0.087
0.031
0.005
0.137
0.013
0.100
0.001
0.028
0.003
0.079
0.144
0.001
0.001
0.031
0.010
0.005

Difference
-0.0030
-0.0013
-0.0002
-0.0017
-0.0005
-0.0054
-0.0003
-0.0033
-0.0004
-0.0006
-0.0030
-0.0224
-0.0104
-0.0282
0.1450
0.0018
0.0352
-0.0078
-0.0027
-0.0036
0.0131
0.0035
-0.0007
0.0031
0.0048
0.0331
0.0036
0.0038
0.0303
0.0089
0.0124
0.0004
0.0081
0.0003
-0.0010
0.0024
-0.0004
-0.0009
0.0002
0.0052
0.0017

P-value
0.010***
0.023**
0.664
0.024**
0.261
0.000***
0.206
0.001***
0.825
0.799
0.052*
0.000***
0.145
0.000***
0.000***
0.146
0.000***
0.011**
0.001***
0.107
0.000***
0.152
0.652
0.022**
0.062*
0.000***
0.148
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.004***
0.177
0.001***
0.688
0.792
0.168
0.344
0.043**
0.922
0.000***
0.099*

Quality Indicators
Mean
Custom ‡
0.077
Unique
0.007
Maple
0.022
‡
Newer
0.041
Hurry/Will Not Last ‡
0.290
Pride ‡
0.002
Clean ‡
0.053
Quiet ‡
0.077
‡
Dream
0.010
Block
0.139
Huge
0.098
Deck
0.062
Mint ‡
0.001
Hardwood
0.073
Views
0.124
New Roof/New Shingles ‡ 0.013
Upgraded/Updated ‡
0.153
Vaulted
0.116
Floor plan
0.111
‡
Award
0.002
Hot Tub
0.019
Tile
0.132
Cul-de-sac
0.042
Jetted Tub
0.053
Park
0.140
Brick
0.036
Value †
0.030
Windows ‡
0.047
Mother-in-law
0.029
Stainless
0.032
Theater
0.028
Surround Sound
0.010
Pickiest ‡
0.007
Rare ‡
0.008
Starter †
0.033
Master
0.164
Cute
0.017
Warranty ‡
0.022
Temple
0.009
Fenced
0.082
N=49823

Difference
0.0369
0.0011
0.0152
-0.0080
-0.0108
0.0013
-0.0099
0.0007
0.0021
-0.0035
0.0126
0.0181
-0.0009
0.0079
0.0458
-0.0012
0.0056
0.0043
0.1709
0.0006
-0.0000
-0.0209
0.0112
0.0072
0.0644
0.0046
-0.0119
-0.0018
0.0052
0.0039
0.0524
0.0043
0.0001
0.0023
-0.0153
0.0073
-0.0061
0.0042
0.0052
-0.0025

P-value
0.000***
0.331
0.000***
0.005***
0.000***
0.047**
0.002***
0.848
0.151
0.038**
0.003***
0.000***
0.040**
0.035**
0.000***
0.485
0.282
0.351
0.000***
0.408
0.995
0.000***
0.000***
0.026**
0.000***
0.084*
0.000***
0.543
0.031**
0.119
0.000***
0.002***
0.927
0.069*
0.000***
0.167
0.001***
0.050**
0.000***
0.520

Note: “Difference” if the difference in means, computed by subtracting the mean for non-affiliate houses from the mean for affiliate
houses for each variable. P-values are from T-tests with the null hypothesis that the difference between affiliate and non-affiliate
homes for each variable is zero. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. † indicates variables used in the low quality

measure. Quality controls in the tables below include all variables denoted with either † or ‡.
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Table 2.4: Affiliations Correlated with More Expensive, Larger, and Higher Quality
Homes
Dependent Variable:
Affiliation
Log(# of houses listed to date)
Owner agent
Co-agent present
Immediate possession
Short sale

(1)
Log(List
Price)
0.135***
(0.007)
0.013***
(0.001)
0.021**
(0.009)
0.007
(0.005)
-0.033***
(0.005)
-0.045***
(0.008)

(1)
Log(List
Price)
0.113***
(0.006)
0.012***
(0.001)
0.023***
(0.008)
0.005
(0.004)
-0.016***
(0.005)
-0.045***
(0.008)

(2)
Log(Square
Feet)
0.109***
(0.006)
0.114***
(0.001)
0.038***
(0.009)
0.036***
(0.005)
0.007
(0.005)
0.054***
(0.008)

(3)
Low
Quality
-0.041***
(0.004)
-0.003***
(0.001)
-0.005
(0.007)
-0.009***
(0.003)
0.023***
(0.004)
0.054***
(0.007)
0.0002***
(0.0000)

(4)
Pr(Low
Quality)
0.594***
(0.037)
0.965***
(0.010)
0.966
(0.072)
0.928**
(0.034)
1.188***
(0.043)
1.613***
(0.090)
1.002***
(0.0001)

12.185***
(0.017)

12.163***
(0.017)

7.824***
(0.016)

0.070***
(0.013)

0.074***
(0.010)

Y
Y
N
N
N
0.327
49823

Y
Y
Y
N
N
0.419
49823

Y
Y
N
N
N
0.207
49823

Y
Y
N
N
N
0.016
49785

Y
Y
N
N
N
0.025
48776

Comments length

Constant

Geographic Controls
Time Controls
Quality Controls
Brokerage Fixed Effects
Agent Fixed Effects
R2
Observations

Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Models 1-4 are estimated using OLS, and Model 5 using Logistic
regression with odds ratios reported. Difference in observation numbers in Model 5 is due to a zip code predicting
failures perfectly. Results for Model 4 are robust to estimating using count models. Time controls include year and
month dummies for when the home was listed; Geographic controls include zip code dummies; Quality controls include
low quality descriptive indicators as well as the other quality indicators noted in Table 2.3. Significance levels: * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.5: Affiliations Correlated with More Expensive, Larger, and Higher Quality
Homes (Within Brokerage)
Dependent Variable:
Affiliation
Log(# of houses listed to date)
Owner agent
Co-agent present
Immediate possession
Short sale

(1)
Log(List
Price)
0.130***
(0.016)
0.016***
(0.005)
0.029**
(0.013)
0.006
(0.012)
-0.027**
(0.010)
-0.040***
(0.015)

(1)
Log(List
Price)
0.109***
(0.015)
0.014***
(0.005)
0.026**
(0.011)
0.002
(0.011)
-0.011
(0.010)
-0.040***
(0.013)

(2)
Log(Square
Feet)
0.109***
(0.022)
0.116***
(0.005)
0.037***
(0.013)
0.025**
(0.012)
0.011
(0.010)
0.056***
(0.013)

(3)
Low
Quality
-0.033***
(0.005)
-0.004*
(0.002)
-0.011
(0.009)
-0.011
(0.008)
0.032***
(0.007)
0.054***
(0.009)
0.0002***
(0.0001)

(4)
Pr(Low
Quality)
-0.029***
(0.005)
-0.004**
(0.002)
-0.008
(0.008)
-0.010
(0.008)
0.024***
(0.006)
0.048***
(0.007)
0.0002***
(0.0001)

12.180***
(0.034)

12.159***
(0.037)

7.837***
(0.034)

0.070***
(0.013)

0.080***
(0.022)

Y
Y
Y
N
N
0.380
49823

Y
Y
Y
Y
N
0.462
49823

Y
Y
Y
N
N
0.265
49823

Y
Y
Y
N
N
0.063
49785

Y
Y
Y
N
N
0.068
49785

Comments length

Constant

Geographic Controls
Time Controls
Brokerage Fixed Effects
Quality Controls
Agent Fixed Effects
R2
Observations

Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses. Models 1-5 are estimated using OLS. Results for Model 4 are
robust to estimating using count models. Time controls include year and month dummies for when the home was listed;
Geographic controls include zip code dummies; Quality controls include low quality descriptive indicators as well as the
other quality indicators noted in Table 2.3. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.6: Affiliations Correlated with More Expensive, Larger, and Higher Quality
Homes (Within Agent and Brokerage)
Dependent Variable:
Affiliation
Log(# of houses listed to date)
Owner agent
Co-agent present
Immediate possession
Short sale

(1)
Log(List
Price)
0.135***
(0.019)
0.016**
(0.006)
0.032**
(0.013)
0.024*
(0.012)
-0.033***
(0.008)
-0.035***
(0.013)

(1)
Log(List
Price)
0.112***
(0.016)
0.010*
(0.006)
0.034***
(0.012)
0.022*
(0.011)
-0.021***
(0.007)
-0.035***
(0.013)

(2)
Log(Square
Feet)
0.139***
(0.017)
0.018***
(0.006)
0.028**
(0.014)
0.024*
(0.014)
0.002
(0.008)
0.051***
(0.012)

(3)
Low
Quality
-0.025***
(0.006)
-0.004
(0.004)
-0.014
(0.009)
-0.006
(0.006)
0.033***
(0.006)
0.046***
(0.010)
0.0002***
(0.0000)

(4)
Pr(Low
Quality)
-0.022***
(0.006)
-0.004
(0.003)
-0.012
(0.008)
-0.007
(0.005)
0.025***
(0.005)
0.042***
(0.009)
0.0001***
(0.0000)

12.217***
(0.051)

12.191***
(0.051)

7.87***
(0.045)

0.127***
(0.030)

0.117***
(0.026)

Y
Y
Y
Y
N
0.480
49823

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.547
49823

Y
Y
Y
Y
N
0.372
49823

Y
Y
Y
Y
N
0.164
49785

Y
Y
Y
Y
N
0.176
49785

Comments length

Constant

Geographic Controls
Time Controls
Brokerage Fixed Effects
Agent Fixed Effects
Quality Controls
R2
Observations

Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses, clustered by listing brokerage. Models are estimated using OLS.
Results for Model 4 are robust to estimating using count models. Time controls include year and month dummies for
when the home was listed; Geographic controls include zip code dummies; Quality controls include low quality
descriptive indicators as well as the other quality indicators noted in Table 2.3. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.

111

Table 2.7: Investigating how Affiliations Impact the Selection Process- Conditional Logit
Models
Dependent Variable:
Affiliation
Log(Avg. # homes sold overallt)
Affiliation X Log(Avg. # homes sold overallt)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Pr(Chosen)
6.735***
(0.380)
1.549***
(0.016)
0.905***
(0.015)

Pr(Chosen)
7.803***
(0.608)
1.272***
(0.023)
0.930**
(0.027)
1.575***
(0.040)
0.858***
(0.034)

Pr(Chosen)
8.074***
(0.755)
1.286***
(0.024)
0.930**
(0.027)
1.517***
(0.039)
0.862***
(0.035)
1.125***
(0.041)
0.829***
(0.049)
0.967**
(0.013)
0.974
(0.021)
0.328***
(0.019)
1.170**
(0.088)

Pr(Chosen)
6.799***
(0.768)
1.274***
(0.036)
0.931*
(0.039)
1.498***
(0.058)
0.725***
(0.043)

Log(# homes sold in yeart-1)
Affiliation X Log(# homes sold in yeart-1)
Franchise brokerage
Affiliation X Franchise brokerage
Log(# of agents in brokeraget)
Affiliation X Log(# of agents in brokeraget)
Difference from avg. list price
Affiliation X Difference from avg. list price
Linear distance between agent and home

Listing Fixed Effects
R2
Observations

0.999***
(0.000)
Y
0.101
389438

Y
0.102
256622

Y
0.114
256622

Y
0.122
69551

Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses, clustered by listing. Odds ratios reported. Choice set is specified as all
agents that live in the same zip code as the home being sold. Future models will include additional specifications of the choice set.
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.8: Social Affiliations and Relationship with Experience or Reputation
Dependent Variable:
Affiliation
Log(# of houses listed to date)
Affiliation X Log(# of houses listed to date)

(1)

(2)

(3)

Log(List Price)
0.123***
(0.030)
0.015**
(0.006)
0.004
(0.011)

Log(List Price)
0.135***
(0.019)

Log(List Price)
0.123***
(0.016)

0.027**
(0.011)
0.044**
(0.019)
0.053*
(0.029)

0.026***
(0.011)
0.039**
(0.019)
0.053*
(0.029)
0.008
(0.023)
0.043
(0.037)
-0.002
(0.073)

12.218***
(0.051)

12.241***
(0.050)

12.244***
(0.050)

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.480
49823

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.480
49823

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.480
49823

# of houses listed to date (lower middle 25%)
# of houses listed to date (upper middle 25%)
# of houses listed to date (top 25%)
Affiliation X # houses (lower middle 25%)
Affiliation X # houses (upper middle 25%)
Affiliation X # houses (top 25%)

Constant
Geographic Controls
Time Controls
Brokerage Fixed Effects
Agent Fixed Effects
Transaction Controls
R2
Observations

Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses, clustered by listing agent. Models are estimated using OLS.
Time controls include year and month dummies for when the home was listed; Geographic controls include zip code
dummies. Transaction controls include dummy variables for owner agents, presence of a co-agent, immediate
possession, and short sales. Results are similar to including quality controls. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.

113

Table 2.9: Feedback Loop Generated by Listing for Affiliates
(1)
Log(Average
List Price)t
0.065***
(0.016)
0.034***
(0.011)
-0.045***
(0.011)
0.036***
(0.010)

(2)
Log(Average
List Price) t
0.026**
(0.012)
0.043**
(0.022)
-0.012*
(0.013)
0.049***
(0.012)

(3)
Log(Average
List Price) t
0.071***
(0.026)
0.033
(0.042)
-0.031
(0.034)
0.034
(0.027)

(4)
Log(Average
List Price) t
0.024*
(0.014)
0.055**
(0.024)
-0.024*
(0.014)
0.048***
(0.013)

Constant

11.952***
(0.040)

11.893***
(0.050)

11.942***
(0.059)

11.869***
(0.057)

Time Controls
Agent Fixed Effects
R2
Observations
Sample

Y
N
0.152
7032
All Years

Y
Y
0.615
7032
All Years

Y
N
0.180
1809
First 2 Years

Y
Y
0.599
6602
All Years

Dependent Variable:
Log(# of homes listed for affiliates)t-1
Log(# of homes listed to date, median for year) t
Log(# of homes listed total)t-1
Log(# of homes listed total)t

Note: Unit of analysis is the agent/year. Robust standard errors presented in parentheses, clustered by listing agent. Column 4 omits
affiliation listings in year t from the calculation of the mean list price. Difference in observations is due to years where agents listed
exclusively for affiliates. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 2.10: Selection Effects Largest with Strong Affiliations and Disappears with
Affiliations
Dependent Variable:
Affiliation
Previous affiliation

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Log(List Price)
0.113***
(0.016)
0.032
(0.038)

Low Quality
-0.025***
(0.006)
0.008
(0.024)

Log(List Price)

Low Quality

0.147***
(0.020)
0.087***
(0.019)

-0.024***
(0.008)
-0.027***
(0.008)

Same ward agent/house
Same stake agent/house
Constant
Geographic Controls
Time Controls
Brokerage Fixed Effects
Agent Fixed Effects
Transaction Controls
Quality Controls
R2
Observations

12.190***
(0.051)

0.127***
(0.030)

12.188***
(0.049)

0.130***
(0.029)

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.547
49823

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
0.164
49823

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
0.552
46562

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
0.157
45574

Note: Robust standard errors presented in parentheses, clustered by listing agent. Models are estimated using OLS. Time
controls include year and month dummies for when the home was listed; Geographic controls include zip code dummies;
Quality controls include low quality descriptive indicators as well as the other quality indicators noted in Table 2.3. Transaction
controls include dummy variables for owner agents, presence of a co-agent, immediate possession, and short sales. Significance
levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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CHAPTER ABSTRACT
This chapter proposes and tests a theoretical framework on how workplace awards affect
employee motivation and performance, arguing that award programs have complex
consequences that critically depend on individual differences in motivation across tasks. Our
theory builds on the existing literature's focus on the direct, positive effect of awards on
employees who previously lacked motivation for the now-awarded task, and argues that awards
can have deleterious effects on performance for employees with high pre-existing task
motivation. Most novelly, the theory predicts that these employees also suffer reduced
motivation and performance in tasks not included in the award program. Data from an attendance
award program implemented at one of five industrial laundry plants shows evidence consistent
with our theory. The program improved performance for employees with attendance issues prior
to award introduction, but this effect disappeared once an employee lost award eligibility, and
was achieved partly by gaming the award rules. In contrast, workers with perfect pre-program
attendance suffered worse attendance after losing eligibility. This employee group also lost 8%
efficiency in daily laundry tasks after introduction. Our chapter suggests that even purely
symbolic awards can generate gaming and crowding out costs that may spill over to other
important tasks.
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3.1 Introduction
A large literature in management, social psychology, and economics has focused on how
monetary reward policies such as pay for performance can motivate employee productivity
(Prendergast 1999; Gerhart et al. 2009; Larkin et al. 2012). Although monetary rewards can
powerfully motivate productive behavior (Eisenberger et al. 1999; Prendergast 1999), they also
can generate dysfunctional consequences (Lepper and Green 1978; Gneezy et al. 2011).
Multitasking theory holds that workers who engage in multiple tasks will focus on rewarded
tasks at the expense of others (Milgrom and Roberts 1991), leading to costly gaming that
increases an individual’s pay while harming the organization (Kerr 1975; Obloj and Sengul
2012). The introduction of monetary rewards, which increase extrinsic motivation for a task
(Amabile 1993), may also “crowd out” an employee’s intrinsic or other non-reward based
motivation (Deci et al. 1999).
These and other costs of monetary rewards are one reason that managers often use
nonmonetary but still extrinsically oriented rewards such as status and prestige (Silverman
2004). Corporate award programs are one of the most common nonmonetary extrinsic rewards in
firms (Frey 2007). One recent survey suggests that over 80% of corporations use award
programs such as “employee of the month,” “top sales club,” and awards for innovative ideas or
suggestions (Garr 2012). Although practitioners have long argued that awards extrinsically
motivate employees without the financial or psychological costs of formal compensation (e.g.,
Davidson 1999), academics have only recently studied such programs (Frey and Neckermann
2008). The small but growing awards literature has focused almost exclusively on the benefits,
arguing that awards motivate employees through mechanisms that include status-based
competition and social comparison (Markham et al. 2002; Moldovanu et al. 2007; Kosfeld and
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Neckermann 2011), increased self-esteem (Kuhnen and Tymula 2010), and strengthened
identification with the employer (Akerlof and Kranton 2005; Neckermann et al. 2014).
Furthermore, this literature argues that corporate awards and performance recognition programs
achieve this motivation with little or no cost (Besley and Ghatak 2008; Blanes i Vidal and Nossol
2011), avoiding the costs associated with monetary rewards by habituating positive behavior
through mechanisms such as increased organizational loyalty (Frey and Neckermann 2008;
Neckermann et al. 2014).
In this chapter, we argue that existing work on awards largely ignores three dimensions
that are critical to a comprehensive theory of award-based motivation. First, the literature seldom
considers individual differences in employee motivation and thus ignores the impact of an award
on employees who were already highly motivated towards the now-awarded task. Second, the
literature almost exclusively examines the impact of the award on the task for which it is given,
and not on other tasks. Finally, the literature does not consider the effect of losing eligibility for
an award during the program, which is common in awards based on specific, well-defined rules
(Garr, 2012). Our theory suggests that awards carry costs beyond the simple prize money and
program implementation costs, and can even negatively affect the motivation of some employees
on certain tasks. While the net impact of an award program may still be positive, it is crucial to
consider not just the direct effect of awards on the intended employees and tasks, but also the
indirect effects previously ignored by the literature. Our chapter builds a comprehensive theory
that combines these direct and indirect effects. Given the widespread use of corporate awards
and the growing scholarly interest in them, we see the need for a more nuanced and realistic
theory—one that incorporates task, employee, and eligibility.
We address this need by integrating theories of multitasking and crowding out to
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construct a theory of how employees with heterogeneous levels of motivation towards a task
react to the introduction of an award, with respect to both the awarded task and other tasks. Our
theory also builds predictions about how losing the opportunity to win an award affects these
same employee-and-task pairs. Crucially, we hold that an employee’s response to the
introduction of a task-specific award will depend on her pre-existing motivation for that task.
Specifically, we hypothesize that a corporate award will increase performance of the awarded
task by employees who had previously performed it poorly, and who therefore had low task
motivation in the absence of formal rewards. We classify these workers as “reward-motivated.”
However, drawing from multitasking theory, we hold that these reward-motivated
employees will strategically respond to the formal program rules and only take actions that
directly increase their chances of winning. We further argue that multitasking theory implies that
once a reward-motivated employee loses award eligibility, her performance will return to prereward levels. These hypotheses directly contrast with arguments in the existing awards literature
that awards enhance organizational loyalty and habituate positive behavior.
We also build hypotheses about how the introduction of a task-specific award affects
employees who were already performing that task well. Research in social psychology and
economics suggests a host of reasons that employees might be motivated to perform a given task
well, even without a formal reward, and strong individual differences in which of these reasons
primarily motivates an employee (Grant, 2007; Sauermann and Cohen 2010). These primarily
“internal” mechanisms include pure intrinsic motivation, prosocial motivation, social pressure,
and others. We classify workers with such motivations as “internally motivated,” identifying
them by high task performance in the absence of a formal financial or nonmonetary reward. We
argue that with the institution of an award program, internally motivated employees will suffer
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from motivational crowding out, manifesting as reduced performance when they lose their
eligibility.
Our most novel contribution is to extend and combine the theories of crowding out and
multitasking to predict that the introduction of an award will lead to the crowding out of internal
motivation in domains other than the awarded task. Although multitasking theory does consider
indirect spillovers that reduce performance on nonrewarded tasks, the mechanism for this
reduction is a rational decrease in effort due to an overall effort constraint and not due to a
decrease in intrinsic motivation. We argue that the introduction of a task-specific award will lead
to negative motivational spillovers, whereby an employee who had been internally motivated for
the awarded task will lose motivation for a different task, even without the effort constraint
central to multitasking theory. We argue that negative motivational spillovers result from the
award program violating a psychological contract between the firm and its internally motivated
employees that is based on perceptions of fairness and equity. The award program, by offering
recognition to employees who had previously shown little concern for the task, insufficiently
acknowledges the prior contributions of those who had already been doing the task well for nonreward based reasons.
We empirically test our theory by studying an attendance award program implemented in
an industrial laundry plant in the Midwestern United States. In March 2011, the managers at one
of the company’s five plants independently—but systematically and carefully—implemented a
monthly attendance award program that recognized all employees with perfect attendance, and
awarded one such employee, randomly selected from all those with perfect attendance in that
month, a $75 gift card. Perfect attendance was defined to cover both punctuality and a lack of
unexcused absences. The independent implementation of the award at only one plant allows us to
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investigate its effect in a quasi-experimental way, using employees at the other four plants as a
quasi-control group for the single “treated” plant.
In line with both our theory and the previous literature, we find that the award improved
the attendance of employees with previously poor attendance. However, consistent with
multitasking theory, there is clear evidence that employees took actions to stay eligible for the
award, even if those actions ran contrary to the spirit of the award. For example, employees were
far more likely to take unplanned “single absences” by calling in sick, likely on days when they
anticipated arriving late for work. Before the award was introduced, these employees were likely
to simply arrive late, but the award appears to have caused them to call in sick so as not to lose
their eligibility for the award. Furthermore, once an employee became disqualified for the award
in a given month, she immediately reverted to her pre-award level of attendance and punctuality,
suggesting that the award did not increase baseline motivation for good attendance.
We also find significant evidence that employees who were already highly motivated for
attendance before the award program suffered from crowding out once it was introduced.
Employees with perfect attendance and punctuality in the pre-award period were 5.5 times more
likely than similar employees in the control group to have a second attendance issue in a given
month once an initial event had disqualified them from the award. This is consistent with
crowding out theory, which argues that the introduction and then removal of an extrinsic
motivator will reduce an employee’s intrinsic motivation for the task.
Most strikingly, we find evidence for negative motivational spillovers from the award.
Employees with perfect pre-award attendance and punctuality reduced their average laundry task
productivity by 8% after the introduction of the award. In contrast to the direct crowding out of
motivation for attendance, which occurred only after an employee was disqualified for the award
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in a given month, this indirect crowding out of work productivity occurs from the start of the
month, when the employee is still eligible for the award. Notably, attendance and punctuality do
not affect the company’s measure of productivity, so this result cannot be from traditional
multitasking based on effort allocation decisions.
Overall, this chapter builds and tests a theory of negative motivational spillovers that
bridges the multitasking notion of reduced performance on an uncompensated task and the
crowding out idea that extrinsic rewards can reduce intrinsic motivation. By considering
heterogeneity across task, employee type, and eligibility for the award, we build and test a
nuanced theory of the impact of awards on employee and corporate performance.

3.2 Theoretical Development
3.2.1 A Taxonomy on Motivation from Awards
Figure 3.1 presents the theoretical framework developed in this section, which is based on three
dimensions that are critical to predicting the effects of awards: employee motivational type, task
type, and eligibility. In our framework, employees are defined as either “internally-motivated”
(performing highly on the awarded task absent the award) or “reward-motivated” (only
performing highly with the extrinsic award program). Tasks are divided between those that are
awarded and those that are not. At any given time, employees are either still eligible to win the
award or are no longer eligible, depending on their performance on the awarded task and the
rules of the award program.
Our paper’s theoretical design begins with the one combination presented in existing
literature—the performance of eligible, reward-motivated employees on the awarded task. We
term this the “direct effect” of an award, and argue that there are two direct effects. First, as
existing empirical studies demonstrate, reward-motivated employees improve performance on
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the task while eligible under the program rules. Second, as implied by multitasking theory but
not shown in prior work, reward-motivated employees strategically game program rules to
improve chances of winning, even when this undermines the spirit of the program.
We then extend existing award theory by arguing that award programs have “indirect
effects” on motivation and productivity based on the three incomplete assumptions in prior
studies on direct effects: 1) that all employees lack full motivation for the awarded task absent
the award; 2) that the award only affects motivation and performance on the awarded task; and 3)
that the award’s impact is constant once introduced, regardless of a given employee’s eligibility
based on the program’s rules. This chapter’s unique theoretical contribution is to explain and
empirically show that these indirect effects of award programs from employee heterogeneity,
motivational spillovers to other tasks, and eligibility produce substantial economic costs.
Like most of the empirical literature on motivation, throughout the chapter we use task
performance absent formal rewards as a proxy for internal motivation. Therefore, in our setting,
we classify those employees with high task performance without formal rewards as “internally
motivated” towards that task, compared to those with low task performance absent formal
rewards who we earlier designated as “reward-motivated” towards that task. As we note in the
chapter’s empirical section, an important component of our empirical setting is the absence of
long-term career-based rewards such as promotion, which might extrinsically motivate high
performance even without short-term formal rewards.

3.2.2 Direct Effects of Awards on Motivation
Direct effects on effort: Although monetary rewards remain important for extrinsic motivation,
scholars have long been interested in the effect of nonmonetary rewards on effort, motivation,
and job performance. Large bodies of theoretical literature in sociology, economics, and
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psychology explain why nonmonetary extrinsic rewards motivate employees through desire for
status and social recognition among peers and employers (Blau 1964; Greenberg 1988; Grant
and Gino 2010) and for social approval (Akerlof 1980; Benabou and Tirole 2006; Andreoni and
Bernheim 2009). Sociologists (Olson 1965; Sewell et al. 1969) and, more recently, economists
(Frank 1985; Frey 2006; Ariely et al. 2009; Ederer and Patacconi 2010) have also noted that
individuals are motivated by the prospect of prestige, rank, and respect.
Award programs, perhaps the most prominent example of formal, nonmonetary extrinsic
motivation policies in firms, have been understudied by academic researchers despite their
widespread use (Frey and Neckermann 2008). Although no standard definition exists for
“award,” scholars note that corporate awards contain four fundamental traits: they involve a
formal program set up by managers; they involve public recognition for performance; they
involve the award of something valuable, such as money, a certificate or trophy; and they
involve scarcity or competition, since not everyone can win (Frey and Neckermann 2008).
An emerging body of empirical research on awards is almost universally positive about
their effects on employee performance. Kosfeld and Neckermann (2011), for example, show a
short-term motivational effect in experiments with students, while Neckermann et al. (2014)
found that unannounced symbolic awards in a call center increased performance on nonawarded
tasks for both award recipients and nonrecipients. Notably, Neckermann et al. (2014) is the only
paper, to our knowledge, that has considered the possibility of spillovers across tasks and it only
examines positive spillovers. Other studies have found award programs to improve motivation
for critical but typically uncompensated employee behaviors such as attendance (Scott and
Markham 1982; Markham et al. 2002).
Although most research does not cleanly identify the precise mechanism behind the
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motivational increase from award programs, the empirical settings almost all involve significant
peer recognition for the award. Interestingly, for awards involving a small financial reward
(ranging from $5 to $100), the size of the reward does not affect the size of the improvement in
employee response (Frey and Neckermann 2008), suggesting that the primary motivational
benefit from the award is often not financial. A small number of laboratory (Huberman et al.
2004) and field (Larkin 2010) studies even suggest that some employees are willing to pay for
the peer recognition that stems from winning an award. Recognition and status amongst peers
appears to be the largest source of motivation from corporate awards, an argument previously
advanced in behavioral economics (Frey 2006).
The implication of this literature is that employees who lack motivation in the absence of
formal rewards, and thus exhibit low performance absent an extrinsic reward, will have the
greatest increase in motivation and productivity due to the extrinsic motivation of an award. The
literature on awards almost always makes a critical and usually unstated assumption that
employees are capable of improving their performance on the awarded task. This, in turn,
implicitly assumes that employees whose performance improves due the award had previously
lacked the motivation—rather than the ability—to perform that well, since the introduction of an
award does not change employee skill. We therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a: The introduction of an award program for a previously
unrewarded task improves performance on that task for employees who had
previously performed poorly on it (that is, reward-motivated employees).
Direct effects on gaming: The existing literature has almost exclusively focused on the direct
effect of awards presented in Hypothesis 1a—task-specific motivation for reward-motivated
employees. Yet a second and under-studied direct effect is that employees will strategically
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respond to corporate reward systems by carefully following the formal rules to maximize their
reward, even when these actions are costly to the employer. Gaming of award program rules
stems directly from multitasking theory in economics (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). In
multitasking theory, the use of extrinsic rewards for a task inherently draws away effort and
attention from other, nonrewarded tasks, creating negative performance spillovers on the second
task (Prendergast 1999). It is in practice highly difficult to design reward programs that perfectly
align employee action to the interests of the firm, and firms therefore use reward systems that are
prone to distortive, manipulative behavior by workers (Kerr 1975). Empirical research
demonstrates that such gaming behavior is rampant in many commonly-used monetary reward
systems, and that this behavior is highly costly to employers (Oyer 1998; Obloj and Sengul 2012;
Larkin 2014).
In empirical work, multitasking and gaming have been almost exclusively applied to the
use of monetary rewards. However, the predictions from the multitasking literature naturally
extend to any type of formal extrinsic reward system used in corporations. Indeed, formal
economic models of nonmonetary rewards effectively treat these rewards as equivalent to
monetary rewards in terms of the mechanisms by which they affect motivation (Benabou and
Tirole 2006).
Although the existing literature has not examined multitasking and gaming in an awards
setting, we believe that the predictions from the multitasking literature apply directly to the use
of awards. As noted above, awards represent a strong motivational tool for reward-focused
agents not otherwise motivated for the task at hand. It is natural to expect awards to lead to
dysfunctional multitasking behavior where agents focus on the rules rather than the spirit of the
award program. If employees at least partially respond to awards rationally and strategically, as
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predicted by multitasking theory, we should expect them to manipulate rules to improve their
probability of winning.
Hypothesis 1b: Reward-motivated employees who respond to an award with
increased performance will on average achieve some of this increase by
manipulating the rules of the system.
In terms of our taxonomy, both Hypotheses 1a and 1b represent direct effects of the
award program, since they focus on the effect of the award on the awarded task for rewardmotivated employees. Hypothesis 1a serves as a concise summary of the empirically-supported
hypotheses in the vast majority of existing work on awards, and provides a useful summary of
the existing theory in the taxonomy of our theory. We would therefore expect our empirical
findings to corroborate this well-known result. Hypothesis 1b, while new to the awards literature,
follows directly from the vast literature on multitasking and gaming.

3.2.3 The Indirect Effect of Awards
We next present the effect of award introduction when at least one of the criteria classifying the
direct effect does not hold; that is, when employees are internally-motivated, when they are no
longer eligible for the award, and/or when they work on non-awarded tasks.
Motivation reversion after lost eligibility: Multitasking theory holds that employees pay
careful attention to the rules of a reward program. In an award setting, one of the most important
sets of rules involves exactly how the award winners are determined. Although not always the
case, awards are commonly based on ex-ante criteria specifying the process by which the award
winners will be selected, and these criteria usually imply that, at some point, employees who lack
sufficient performance on the award criteria become ineligible for the award, even before the
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winners are determined (Garr, 2012).
Multitasking theory predicts that agents care only about the rules governing the reward
program, not its spirit. If employees respond to awards by gaming the rules to increase their
chance of winning, they logically will respond to the loss of eligibility by ceasing to be
motivated by the award program. It is notable that much of the research on nonmonetary
extrinsic motivators posits that these rewards can provide a subtle habituation of desired
behavior through mechanisms such as increased organizational loyalty or the learning of positive
habits (Frey and Neckermann 2008; Acland and Levy 2012; Allcott and Rogers 2014). Our
theory predicts the opposite – that the loss of award eligibility will cause a motivation reversion
such that reward-motivation employees return to their pre-award level of motivation. Formally:
Hypothesis 2: Reward-motivated employees who respond to an award with increased
performance will revert to their lower pre-award performance once ineligible for the
award.
Crowding out internal motivation: Social psychologists and management scholars have long
recognized that some employees may have strong task-specific motivation that stems from
sources other than external rewards. Intrinsic motivation, the value a worker receives simply
from enjoying the task itself (Amabile et al. 1994), is the most widely studied alternative to
motivation based on extrinsic rewards. Psychologists have demonstrated that it can generate
learning, creativity, enjoyment, and effort (Deci 1971, 1975; Deci and Ryan 1985; Ryan and
Deci 2000) and ultimately lead to improved productivity (Shamir 1991; Grant 2008). Workers
who receive no formal extrinsic rewards for particular tasks may also be motivated through
extrinsic social mechanisms such as prosocial motivation, peer image, and social pressure and
through psychological mechanisms such as gratitude (Deci 1971; Hackman and Oldham 1975;
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Benabou and Tirole 2006; Grant 2007; Mas and Moretti 2009; Grant and Gino 2010;
Wrzesniewski et al. 2014). Although separating these motivational mechanisms is difficult, we
note that our theory is not dependent on a high level of internal motivation stemming from purely
intrinsic factors.
It is critical to note that the research on intrinsic and other internal motivations has found
them to be person-task traits, not person-specific traits that apply to all tasks (Fehr and Falk
2002; Grant 2007; Grant and Berry 2011). Employees with internal motivation toward one task
may require extrinsic rewards to perform highly on another.
Many social psychologists and an increasing number of economists argue that the
introduction of extrinsic rewards can substitute for—or crowd out—intrinsic motivation through
a number of mechanisms (Deci and Ryan 1985; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997). Desire for
competence on the job, for example, is one of the leading mechanisms for intrinsic motivation in
self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan 2002), and can be “crowded out” as an external reward
shifts the lens through which an employee views a behavior. Prior to the introduction of an
extrinsic reward, the employee may pursue a behavior because she perceives it as what a
competent employee does, but once a reward has been introduced, she may instead perceive that
behavior as something that gets her a reward (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000a). Later research has
focused on the role of image in crowding out (Benabou and Tirole 2006; Grant and Mayer 2009;
Lacetera and Macis 2010), a critical mechanism because of the importance of image in
motivating prosocial behavior. Although the lens by which peers view and judge one’s actions is
an extrinsic factor, intrinsically motivated actors can become demotivated if they feel others will
view their actions as opportunistic or extrinsically motivated (Ariely et al. 2009). This might
occur, for instance, if the external perception of the motives behind a given worker’s prosocial
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behavior shifts from “a desire to be a ‘good’ employee” to “a desire to win an award and receive
social recognition.”
Laboratory and field evidence on crowding out abounds. However, as Prendergast (1999)
notes, only a few papers provide any empirical evidence on crowding out in firms (Holmas et al.
2010; Bareket-Bojmel et al. 2014; Hossain and Li 2014). In some ways, this is unsurprising:
firms more often track performance data for tasks that they reward than for nonrewarded tasks.
Also, previous research has not examined the introduction of a reward for an unrewarded activity
and the subsequent removal of it. Even if crowding out exists, the effect of the reward
introduction on overall motivation is ambiguous because it depends on the relative magnitudes of
the gain in extrinsic motivation and the drop in intrinsic motivation. The net effect of introducing
an extrinsic reward therefore crucially depends on its size (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000b). Our
theory, therefore, does not yield a prediction about the direct effect of an award on the awarded
task for internally motivated employees. While the award is in place, these employees will have
increased extrinsic but decreased intrinsic motivation, yielding an ambiguous overall effect on
performance.
However, adding the award eligibility dimension provides a clear prediction of the effect
of an award on internally-motivated employees. Specifically, crowding out theory
unambiguously predicts reduced motivation and performance once a reward is introduced and
then removed (Deci et al. 1999). The reward’s removal eliminates the extrinsic motivation but
the intrinsic motivation does not return. Our earlier hypotheses suggest that the increased
extrinsic motivation brings increased focus on the award program rules, including those around
eligibility. If the award introduction increases the extrinsic motivation of an internally-motivated
employee but reduces her internal motivation, then by the same logic underlying Hypothesis 2,
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the employee’s loss of eligibility will lead to reduced extrinsic motivation. The net effect on
motivation for internally-motivated employees from ineligibility following award introduction is
therefore unambiguously negative, compared to the period before the award was introduced. This
is because the introduction of the extrinsic reward reduced internal motivation, but the loss of
eligibility eliminates any increase in extrinsic motivation from the award. Formally:
Hypothesis 3: Performance on the now-awarded task by internally-motivated
employees will be lower than pre-award performance after the employee loses
eligibility.
Negative motivational spillovers on nonawarded tasks: Although the introduction of an award
should most directly affect the awarded task, it may also impact other tasks. Multitasking theory
predicts that extrinsic rewards should only reduce effort and performance on other tasks if there
is a direct tradeoff in effort required; otherwise, it predicts that a reward for one task should have
no impact on another. Most studies in economics and social psychology on employee
performance have little to say on such possible interactions in the absence of effort constraints,
instead focusing on the performance of individual tasks. Crucially, we focus on why tasks
without a tradeoff in effort allocation might still incur negative motivational spillovers from the
introduction of an award on one task but not the other. This part of the theory therefore combines
elements of multitasking from economics and crowding out from social psychology.
Why might the motivations for two tasks be related? The theory of psychological
contracts holds that employees form an implicit exchange agreement with employers that
governs their overall relationship and influences their individual day-to-day actions (Levinson et
al. 1962; Rousseau 1989; Rousseau and Greller 1994). Notably, some employee actions are
governed by transactional considerations such as the exchange of compensation for productive
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effort. Transactional considerations can play a crucial supporting role in sustaining the deeper,
longer-lived relational contract between employee and employer (MacNeil 1985). However,
most employee actions are relational and are governed not by explicit rewards, but by a more
complex implicit contract involving shared values (MacNeil 1985). The implication of this is that
if an award or other nonmonetary extrinsic reward for one relational task undermines the
employee-employer relationship, then this, in turn, is likely to affect the performance of other
relational tasks.
The introduction of a reward might change the implicit contract between employees and
employer because it might affect perceptions of fairness and equity, which are critical for
maintaining psychological contracts (Robinson and Rousseau 1994). In equity theory (Adams
1965), individuals compare the ratio of their rewards to their contributions with those of others,
the comparisons tending to be unfavorable due to individuals overestimating their own
contributions (Festinger 1954). Perceptions of inequity are known to both decrease effort and
productivity as well as increase counterproductive behaviors such as cheating and dishonesty
(e.g., Greenberg 1990; Gino and Pierce 2009; John et al. 2014; Edelman and Larkin 2014).
Introducing an award for a task which an internally-motivated employee previously
considered part of the relational contract with the employer could engender feelings of
unfairness. This occurs because employees who previously were not motivated to perform well
on the task are able to gain peer recognition by changing their behavior and winning the award.
Since internally-motivated employees had previously exhibited the now-awarded behavior
without receiving any reward or special recognition, the implementation of an award program
creates feelings of inequity in their minds by failing to recognize (reward) these prior
contributions. Furthermore, the award introduction would reclassify high performance as
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transactional rather than relational (Feldheim 1999) by introducing formal recognition for strong
performance, causing internally-motivated employees to feel that their psychological contract
with the employer had been violated.
Because an employee’s relational contract with the employer is complex and governs all
nontransactional noncompensated portions of her work (Rousseau and Parks 1993), the literature
on breach of psychological contract focuses on reductions in aggregate measures such as loyalty,
commitment, and overall job motivation (Cullinane and Dundon 2006). However, we
hypothesize that a violation of a psychological contract by transactionalizing a task with an
award will reduce an employee’s nonreward motivation for nontransactional tasks governed by
the relational contract. The impact of this breach on internal motivation—and thereby on task
performance—will occur only for internally motivated employees who were highly motivated
for the now-awarded task. This idea, which we term negative motivational spillovers, is
formalized by the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Introducing an award for a task will cause employees who are internally
motivated for that task to perform other tasks less well than they did in the pre-award
period.
Crucially, the negative motivational spillovers from an award introduction are not
dependent on award ineligibility. According to our theory, the mere introduction of the reward
will reduce motivation and performance on the non-awarded task for internally-motivated
employees, even when an employee is eligible for the award on the awarded task. Empirically, of
course, we must distinguish this reduced performance from the more standard multitasking
argument; in the next section, we discuss how the two tasks in our study do not involve an effort
tradeoff, which is the theoretical mechanism behind multitasking in economics.
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We also note that Hypothesis 4 will hold for any nonawarded task for which the
employee who is internally motivated for the awarded task also has some motivation outside the
formal rewards system. The nonawarded task may be formally rewarded by the firm, but our
hypothesis is contingent on the employee also having some nonreward motivation for it.
In contrast to negative motivational spillovers for internally-motivated employees, our
theory does not predict negative spillovers for employees who are reward-motivated for the
awarded task. This is because the relational contract between these employees and the firm is not
violated by the introduction of a reward on a task for which they do not have pre-existing
motivation.

3.2.4 Summary of Theory and Hypotheses
Figure 3.1 outlines the three dimensions by which our theory extends the existing
literature on the impact of awards on employee motivation and performance: employee-task
motivation, task, and eligibility. Notably, our theory incorporates existing empirical findings
(Hypothesis 1a) and theoretical implications (Hypothesis 1b) on the direct effect of awards for
reward-motivated employees. More novelly, it builds three new hypotheses on the indirect effect
of corporate awards that combine multitasking theory from economics (Hypothesis 2), crowding
out theory from the literature on motivation (Hypothesis 3), and equity theory from social
psychology (Hypothesis 4).

3.3 Empirical Setting
Our setting is an industrial laundry cleaning company in the Midwestern United States, which we
will refer to as LaundryCo. LaundryCo is a leading regional provider of work uniforms,
professional work apparel, and commercial laundry cleaning services. Their services primarily
include the selling, cleaning, and repairing of work uniforms and small workplace items such as
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mats, towels, and mop heads. Nearly all of the cleaning services occur at five plants, which are
similar in layout, machinery, staffing positions, and products.
The production process at LaundryCo is complex. Each day, route-service representatives
drop off soiled uniforms, which go through a complex process with many interdependent tasks
before they are returned to customers. The process involves sorting garments by type and soil
level, washing with a specific temperature and chemical mix, drying and pressing, inspecting to
ensure that garments with missing buttons or other problems are fixed, and sorting for the quick
loading of clean garments to return to customers. Non-uniform items undergo a similar process,
but extra steps are often involved, such as rolling laundered floor mats or folding and bundling
hand towels. Workers are cross-trained on many tasks, but tend to specialize in a few, amongst
which they alternate throughout each day. As with most labor-intensive service operations,
LaundryCo is highly dependent on worker efficiency. Inefficiency results both from mistakes,
such as incorrect sorting, and when the productivity of upstream workers lags, leaving
downstream workers idle.
Each plant is supervised by two managers who focus on efficiency and worker
productivity. These managers enjoy substantial autonomy in the policies they implement to
increase efficiency. Each plant has about 35 employees. To facilitate the transfer of garments
though each stage of the cleaning process, LaundryCo attempts to give each plant an open and
uncluttered layout. One consequence of this layout is that employees can clearly observe each
other’s behavior. They can see, for example, who is late or absent, and they interact frequently as
they switch between tasks. In addition to formal work interactions, LaundryCo also puts
significant effort into building a “friendly” workplace through programs such as birthday
recognition, company barbeques, fundraisers, and “alumni” reunions.
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LaundryCo tracks individual productivity, measuring how many garments a worker
processes for each task each day. The company then uses the task’s time-studied rate, determined
by corporate headquarters, to calculate the employee’s productivity on that task. Scores are
normalized such that a score of 100 reflects performance that meets expectations. For example,
the time-studied rate for pressing dress shirts is 50.4 seconds, meaning an employee would have
to press over 71 shirts in an hour to earn a score of 100. For each worker, the system computes
overall daily productivity, equal to the weighted average (by time spent) of the worker’s
productivity scores on each task that day. For example, a worker who spent two hours pressing
dress shirts with an efficiency score of 80, two hours rolling mats with a score of 140, and four
hours sorting cleaned clothes with a score of 160 would have a final daily productivity of 135.
LaundryCo workers are paid using a piece-rate bonus system, with a guaranteed base
hourly rate and hourly wage bonuses for daily productivity above the expected 100, up to a
maximum bonus at 140. The bonus system differs slightly across plants, although the
productivity cutoffs are the same across all plants. The study’s treatment plant uses a linear
increase in hourly pay as productivity increases from 100 to 140. The four other plants give
employees discrete wage increases at 120 and 140. Interviews with management suggest that
because workers do not know their precise productivity while working, the two compensation
systems are similar in their incentive effects. Daily efficiency is normally distributed around a
mean of 115, with high performers in the 130-150 range, and low performers between 80 and
100 (see Appendix 2).
Given the externalities generated by the plant’s upstream-downstream nature, arriving
consistently and on time is essential to operational efficiency. Tardiness and unexpected absence
both contribute to inefficiency, since one section of the plant may be understaffed. Even if the
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plant manager finds a substitute for that section, that substitute must abandon another task and
will likely not be as efficient in the job as the missing worker, which can lead to downstream
idling time. LaundryCo therefore has relatively detailed policies concerning tardiness and
attendance. Repeated tardiness first precipitates a written warning from the plant manager. The
third warning in a year results in suspension from work and the fourth results in termination.
However, LaundryCo leaves the administration of this policy to individual plant managers, who
are usually lenient towards slight or occasional tardiness. The difficulty and cost of finding and
training replacement workers discourages managers from terminating such employees.
Attendance policies allow workers to take excused absences for sickness or vacation. To
be counted as excused, an absence must be scheduled with the company. Sickness is considered
excused if the employee notifies the manager even a few minutes before the start of the shift.
Each employee is given a fixed number of paid time-off (PTO) days each year that can be used
for any absence, excused or unexcused. Although the nature of the absence does not affect the
use of PTO days, LaundryCo does track unexcused absences and plant managers may issue
formal warnings and eventually terminate an employee with too many. Interviews with
management revealed that employees often call in right before their shift to excuse an absence.

3.3.1 Attendance Award Program
In an effort to encourage fewer unexcused absences and less tardiness, the general and plant
managers at one LaundryCo plant (hereafter referred to as “Plant 1” or “the treatment plant”)
implemented an award program that recognized the employees who had perfect attendance in a
given month and awarded one of them, randomly selected, a $75 gift card to a local restaurant or
store. Perfect attendance was defined as having no unexcused absences and no “tardies.” An
unexcused absence was defined as an absence of which the employee did not notify the plant
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management in advance, while a “tardy” was defined as being more than five minutes late for a
shift. The names of all award-eligible employees in a given month—those with perfect
attendance according to the rules—were announced at a monthly plant-wide meeting early in the
following month. The previous winner randomly selected the new winner by drawing a name out
of a hat.
The plant manager announced the program in mid-February 2011 and it began on March
1. It lasted 10 months and was terminated by corporate headquarters, with the last award given
for December 2011. In an average month 20 employees were eligible, meaning that the expected
value of the award was less than $4, the equivalent of about 20 minutes of work. The expected
monetary value of the award is therefore negligible.
In the course of our research, we carried out a series of interviews with LaundryCo
managers about their experience with the attendance award program. 20 The managers at the
treatment plant stated that they decided to introduce the award because certain employees’
punctuality and attendance problems were affecting plant productivity and because they “hadn’t
really tried out awards as incentives too much.” Crucially, the managers stated that they did not
feel that their plant’s punctuality, attendance, or performance problems differed from those of the
other plants. Interviews with managers from other plants corroborate that the treatment plant did
not differ on attendance and punctuality.
Managers of the treatment plant did not discuss their plan with the executive team at
LaundryCo or with managers of other plants. They believed the award would be a cost-effective
way to improve attendance and punctuality. The managers also believed that the close-knit plant
culture and the fact that many employees had worked together for so many years would make the

The appendix (Appendix 2) contains more details from our interviews and managers’ interpretation of our study’s
results.
20
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competition and the chance for any employee with perfect attendance to win motivational. In
short, the managers felt that even if the plan failed, $75 in gift cards per month was a small
investment and the maximum expected cost of the program (apart from the minimal managerial
time needed to run the program).
Senior executives at LaundryCo informed us that, while they believe in the motivational
benefits of incentives and awards, they do not believe that “employees should be rewarded for
something they are supposed to be doing anyways [coming on time to work each day].” They
therefore terminated the award program after hearing about it in a company human resource
meeting in early December 2011. The treatment plant managers were disappointed when the
award was shut down. While they understood top management’s objections, they also felt that a
large number of employees liked the program and that it had improved attendance and
punctuality. They did state that while they had heard some “grumblings” from employees about
the fairness of the award program, they hadn’t considered the impact this might have on
motivation or productivity, apart from better punctuality and attendance by employees with a
checkered history and the potential downstream benefits on productivity.

3.4 Methods
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy
The introduction of the award at one plant and the existence of several similar plants without
awards represent a type of quasi-experiment that is frequently used to estimate policy effects
(Gertler et al. 2011). We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) design to assess the impact of the
attendance award on the punctuality, attendance, and productivity of Plant 1’s workers. The DiD
design treats LaundryCo’s other four plants as a quasi-control group. The DiD strategy
“differences out” fixed differences between Plant 1 and the control group plants and uses post138

treatment changes at the control group plants as a counterfactual for what would have happened
at Plant 1 had it not introduced the award.

3.4.2. Data
We use a 21-month panel of daily worker-level data that spans two periods: the period before
Plant 1 introduced the award, which we call the “pre-award” period (12 months), and the period
when Plant 1 had the award program in place, which we call the “award period” (9 months).
These data include punctuality and attendance measures, as well as measures of daily worker
productivity for 218 workers in five plants between March 1st, 2010 and November 30th, 2011.
The typical observation details an individual worker’s daily record, including clock-in and clockout times, information on items worked on, productivity ratings for each item, overall daily
productivity output, whether the employee was absent or not, and demographic variables such as
tenure, age, gender, and marital status.
Employees generally had set shift times, but these sometimes shifted slightly due to
seasonal demand. We did not have access to LaundryCo’s employee schedules and therefore
inferred a worker’s shift from her observed clock-in and clock-out times and the list of actual
shift times. We shared our coding with the plant manager at Plant 1, and he agreed that our
manual coding was both appropriate and accurate for normal weekday shifts. Since our manual
coding was less accurate on days when the worker arranged to come in late, switched shifts with
other workers, or worked extra hours, we restricted our analysis to weekdays, dropped
observations in which an employee worked less than 7.5 hours of an 8.5 hour shift, and dropped
observations that indicated a worker was more than an hour early or late for a shift. This affected
less than 1% of the weekday observations, and our results are qualitatively similar to including
these observations.
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3.4.3 Dependent Variables
We use five main dependent variables. The first three (tardy, minutes late, absent) are
performance metrics that the plant managers hoped to improve through the attendance award
program. Tardy is a dummy variable indicating that a given worker showed up more than five
minutes late on a given day and is one metric for disqualification in the award program; the other
disqualifying event is an unexcused absence. Minutes late is a continuous measure of the minutes
and seconds late an employee showed up to work; it has a negative value if the employee
clocked in early. Absent is a dummy variable indicating that the worker was absent from work
for reasons other than public holidays, workers compensation days, suspensions, family medical
leave, and funerals. However, we do not observe whether an absence was excused or unexcused.
Single absence is a dummy variable similar to absent, but it only takes the value of 1 if an
employee was absent on a given day but not absent the previous or following workday. The last
dependent variable, daily worker efficiency, is the worker’s productivity efficiency number for a
given day. We winsorized this variable to two standard deviations from the mean because
managers suggested that severe outliers were likely errors. Using the nonwinsorized data does
not significantly change our results.

3.4.4 Validity of Difference-in-Differences Approach
DiD strategies do not require that treatment and control groups be the same, and are explicitly
designed to allow comparison of treatment and control groups that are different in observable
ways (Gertler et al. 2011). Any difference in the two groups that does not change
contemporaneously with the treatment event does not affect the statistical estimates of treatment.
In our case, however, the treatment and control plants are very similar on most dimensions. All
five plants work on the same range of tasks, use the same production technology, and share a
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common floor layout. Also, two of the control group plants are geographically proximate to Plant
1 (32 and 34 miles), and therefore help control for local shocks, such as weather, that might
affect tardiness. All five plants had the same attendance policies and enforcement procedures.
The biggest difference between Plant 1 and the control group plants is that Plant 1 is
unionized. This leads to some clear differences between the treatment and control groups, as seen
in Table 3.1 (see Appendix 2 for employee-level statistics). Although employees in both groups
are similar in age, those at Plant 1 have higher tenure and wages, and include more males.
However, employees at Plant 1 had levels of tardiness and attendance similar to those of control
plant employees. Also, there is no evidence of differential time trends in employee tenure,
wages, or other key variables. Since DiD studies “difference out” fixed differences between
treatment and control group units, only differences which change across time can bias the results
(Gertler et al. 2011). In our case, the differences in the makeup of the treatment and control
plants appear stable and therefore do not affect our statistical estimates.

3.4.5 Empirical Specification
We use a standard DiD specification to estimate the impact of the award on the dependent
variables:
Yit = αi +β1* TREAT_GRPi +β2* POSTTREATt +β3* TREAT_GRPi*POSTTREATt + ϒt +εit
where Yit is the dependent variable, TREAT_GRP is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the worker is
in the treatment group and 0 otherwise, POSTTREAT is a dummy variable equal to 1 for dates
after the award program went into effect and 0 otherwise, and TREAT_GRP*POSTTREAT is the
interaction of the two previous variables. The coefficient on this interaction (β3) estimates the
treatment effect; to conserve space, we simply label this variable as treatment in the results
tables. Our specification takes advantage of the panel nature of the data by introducing a full set
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of fixed effects, including worker fixed effects (αi), which account for unobserved worker
heterogeneity, and time fixed effects (ϒt), which account for time trends across months, days in
the month, and days of the week. In specifications with worker fixed effects, the variable
TREAT_GRP is absorbed. Similarly, POSTTREAT is absorbed by the time fixed effects.
All the regressions reported in the chapter were estimated using ordinary least squares
(OLS). Three of the five dependent variables are binary, but logit or probit models perform
poorly when predicting rare events such as the ones in this study (King and Zeng 2001). In
contrast, OLS specifications result in unbiased coefficient estimates (Stewart 2009) but incorrect
standard errors. However, DiD models typically underestimate standard errors regardless of the
specification (Bertrand et al. 2004), so we bootstrap standard errors for all regressions in the
study. Therefore, OLS is appropriate for coefficient estimation for all five of our dependent
variables. In contrast to other approaches, such as the rare events logistic model, OLS is also
convenient in terms of time required to bootstrap and in ease of coefficient interpretation.

3.5 Results
3.5.1 Basic Treatment Effects
Table 3.2 shows the regression results of the average treatment effect for the five dependent
variables that represent performance in the study. The award caused substantial improvement on
two of the three performance metrics that the managers attempted to influence (tardy, minutes
late, and absent). There was a 1.5-percentage-point reduction in tardiness at Plant 1, or a 45%
reduction from the pre-award baseline of 3.3%. In addition, the average worker clocked in nearly
a minute earlier, a reduction in minutes late of about 39% from the pre-award baseline of -2.03.
We do not observe a statistically significant treatment effect on absences, although the use of
single absences increased by nearly 40% from a baseline of 1.5%, a result we discuss later.
142

Finally, the award did not lead to overall changes in laundry task efficiency.
DiD models are known to produce false positives due to serial correlation issues
(Bertrand et al. 2004). Random assignment of treatment groups and dates can lead to significant
effects some 45% of the time. While bootstrapping standard errors helps alleviate this problem,
we present placebo tests on our main results in the appendix (Figure A2.3 and Table A2.1) that
demonstrate our results are unlikely to be spurious.
Two other typical confounds in DiD models are that an unobserved contemporaneous
change led to the identified effects and that the results stem from simple mean reversion.
Although it is impossible in field studies to definitively disprove these confounds, plotting the
effect over time can help alleviate the concern (Gertler et al. 2011). If the identified effect
happens exactly upon treatment, then it is less likely that the effect is due to an unobserved
change or to mean reversion. Figure 3.2 shows treatment effects from a regression using
individual treatment-month dummies. As seen in the figure, the treatment effect is largest and
most statistically significant in the month just after the award is introduced. Figure 3.2 therefore
lends evidence to the argument that the award introduction causally leads to the identified
effects. In fact, Figure 3.2 also suggests that the effect of the award may dampen over time, a
finding we discuss in the final section of the chapter.

3.5.2 Heterogeneous Employee Response: The Direct Effect of Awards
While the award program appears to have led to at least some of the behavior desired by the
managers who implemented it, our hypotheses all involve heterogeneous responses by
employees based on their motivation towards attendance and punctuality. To examine worker
heterogeneity in pre-existing motivation for the awarded task, for both treatment and control
plants we split workers into groups based on their propensity for tardiness before the award was
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put in place. Nearly 32% of workers had no tardies during the twelve-month period before the
award was implemented, while nearly 20% of workers were tardy once a month or more.
Between these extremes, just over 10% of workers were tardy once every six months or less,
12% of workers were tardy once every four to six months, and 26% of workers were tardy every
month to three months.
In the results shown below, we split the sample into “low tardy” and “high tardy” groups
at the median level of pre-award tardiness, or one tardy every four months. This yields 116
workers in the “low tardy” group, and 102 in the “high tardy” group. The “low tardy” group
corresponds to the internally motivated employee group in our framework, since they exhibited
high performance on punctuality without any formal reward for this task. The “high tardy” group
corresponds to the reward-motivated group in our theory, and exhibited frequent tardiness in the
pre-award period. We note that some of the “high tardy” group workers may also demonstrate
some internal motivation towards attendance. We also repeated our models using alternative
group definitions. The results are robust to any definition of “low tardy” up to one tardy every
four months, including only using employees with no pre-award tardies in the “low tardy” group.
Our results are also robust to splitting the sample into “no tardy,” “low tardy,” and “high tardy”
workers.
There are two common methods for comparing heterogeneous treatment effects that are
equivalent when implemented properly (Fink et al. 2012): interaction effects and subsample
analysis. Because the treatment effect in DiD models is already an interaction term, we report
subsample analyses to avoid difficulty in interpretation from triple interactions (Gelman and
Pardoe 2007). It is important to note that these subsample analyses, like all the statistical tests in
this chapter, are done relative to the relevant control group of employees. A subsample analysis
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focusing on, for example, the effect of the award on employees with perfect attendance before
the award program compares the behavior of employees with perfect pre-award attendance at the
treatment plant with employees with perfect pre-award attendance at control group plants.
The effect of the award on tardy and minutes late is shown in Table 3.3. The “high tardy”
group decreases its rate of tardiness by 2 percentage points, or about 36% from a baseline of
5.6%, although they do not decrease minutes late significantly. This is initial evidence for
Hypothesis 1b – that reward-motivated employees game the award eligibility rules by clocking
in no later than five minutes late, rather than by truly improving punctuality on the average day.
This effect can be seen more clearly in Figure 3.3, which shows the percentage change for “high
tardy” workers in the treatment and control plants for employees clocking in at various intervals
on the minutes late scale. In the treatment plant there was a large reduction in employees
clocking in seven or more minutes late, but nearly all of the change goes into the mass of
employees clocking in between four and five minutes late. Employees in the treatment plant are
over 50% more likely to clock-in just before this five minute cutoff compared to the control
group after award introduction. There are no other improvements in minutes late when
comparing to the control group, except for this shift.
Table 3.4, which shows the treatment effect on the absence and single absence variables,
contains further evidence on gaming of the award system. The positive and significant results on
single absence for “high tardy” employees suggests they were significantly more likely to take a
single day off in a given week. Our interviews suggest this result was caused by “high tardy”
employees calling in sick on days they otherwise would have arrived late. It is inconceivable that
the award caused employees to become sick more often, but is consistent with our hypotheses
that the award would cause an employee to call in sick in order to maintain award eligibility. By
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strategically taking a sick day, these employees were able to maintain eligibility for the award.
It is telling, and consistent with our theory, that we find corresponding evidence of
manipulation by the “low tardy” workers, as our theory suggests they might also experience
increases in reward motivation. While the overall performance for the “low tardy” group on
tardy and minutes late did not change, the award appears to have caused previously internallymotivated employees to view perfect attendance through a reward-oriented lens, since they
apparently began gaming the eligibility system in ways similar to reward-motivated employees.
Overall, the subsample analysis strongly supports our theory on the direct effect of
awards. Hypothesis 1a, which states that employees not motivated prior to the award will
perform better on the awarded task, is directly supported by the large reduction in tardiness.
Hypothesis 1b, which states that some of the better performance will come via rule manipulation,
is supported by the lack of an effect on minutes late, and the results on single absences. Our
results therefore corroborate the existing literature as to the direct effect of awards, and suggest
that awards cause both positive improvements and gaming behavior.

3.5.3 Motivation Reversion after Loss of Eligibility
The above results suggest a conscious response to the award by reward-motivated employees—
those with low performance on the awarded task before the award program began. Hypothesis 2
predicted that the loss of eligibility for the award would cause reward-motivated employees to
revert to their previous poor performance. We test this hypothesis by splitting the treatment
dummy variable into two separate dummy variables. A pre-fail dummy indicates that, as of the
start of the day in question, an employee has not yet had a disqualifying event in the month in
question. A post-fail dummy indicates that, as of the start of the day in question, the employee
has already been disqualified for the current month’s award due to a tardy or an unplanned

146

absence. For each treatment day, one or the other of these variables equals 1.
The results for the tardy dependent variable are shown in Table 3.5. The “high tardy”
group reduces its level of tardiness while eligible for the award (as shown by the negative and
significant coefficient on the pre-fail dummy). However, their degree of tardiness is no different
than it was in the pre-award period once they are no longer eligible for the award in a given
month (as shown by the insignificant coefficients on the post-fail dummy). Similarly, Table A2.3
in the appendix shows that the average employee arrives nearly a minute earlier while still
eligible for the award, but after she loses eligibility, her minutes late is not different from preaward levels. Hypothesis 2b, stating that the behavior of reward-motivated employees will revert
to pre-award behavior once they lose eligibility for the award, is supported.

3.5.4 Crowding Out Internal Motivation
Table 3.5 also has direct evidence for Hypothesis 3, which states that nonreward motivation for
the awarded task will be crowded out for the subgroup of employees with high pre-award task
motivation. This can be seen in the positive and significant coefficient on the post-fail dummy
for the “low tardy” group. Once a “low tardy” employee has become disqualified for the award
in a given month, she is 5.5 times more likely than “low tardy” employees in the control group to
have a second failure in attendance or punctuality. The award caused employees who had
previously had good punctuality to have significantly worse punctuality once the extrinsic
reward was removed, which clearly suggests crowding out. Again, the lack of an effect in the
pre-fail period is also consistent with our theory, which argues that the presence of the extrinsic
reward leads to an ambiguous overall effect on an internally motivated employee’s performance
as long as she is still eligible for the award.

3.5.5 Negative Motivational Spillovers on Nonawarded Tasks
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We next examine the effect of the award on employee performance on a separate task
domain. LaundryCo employees are assigned one or more laundry tasks over a workday. Since
the efficiency measure is based on actual working hours, their performance on the laundry task is
not affected by their punctuality or attendance. This is because making a greater or lesser effort
to be punctual does not make their assigned laundry tasks easier or more difficult. This is
especially true because punctuality on a given day generally does not affect take-home pay,
because employees clocking in seven or less minutes late are paid as if they started on time. In
only 1.8% of observations do employees clock in eight or more minutes late. Our results are not
affected by using only the 98.2% of observations in which an employee is no more than seven
minutes late. Therefore, any change in laundry task performance is not resulting from effort
towards punctuality.
We first analyze the direct effect of the award on employees’ productivity on their
assigned laundry tasks. The results are shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.6. As predicted by
Hypothesis 4, internally motivated “low tardy” employees suffer a drop in productivity of over 9
points, a reduction of over 8%. The productivity of “high tardy” employees does not change due
to the award, which is consistent with our supposition that reward-motivated employees would
not feel that the award violated their psychological contract. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.7 show
the same results broken down by award eligibility. As predicted, the productivity reduction
appears larger while the “low tardy” employee is still eligible for the award; the result on the
post-fail dummy is also positive, but with a p-value of only 0.17, likely because there are few
employee-days for the “low tardy” group in the post-fail cell. The coefficients for the pre- and post-fail dummies are nearly identical. Consistent with our theory, the reduced laundry task
productivity from the award occurs immediately and is not due to loss of eligibility for the
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award.

3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This study builds a more sophisticated and realistic theory of the effect of corporate awards on
employee motivation and subsequent performance. We hypothesized that the almost universally
positive nature of the empirical literature on awards is due to its focus on a single case—
employees who had previously lacked the motivation for high performance. By integrating
theory from economics and social psychology—most notably the theories of multitasking,
motivational crowding out, and psychological contracts between employers and employees—we
hypothesized that the introduction of a corporate award would have heterogeneous effects on
employee-task pairs, depending on an employee’s pre-award level of motivation towards the
awarded task.
Our empirical results are corroboratory of both existing studies and the extensions
presented in our theory. Indeed, at face value, the award used in the study was effective at
motivating the average employee on the awarded task, in that it reduced average tardiness and
encouraged workers to show up earlier for their shifts. This direct result of the award is highly
consistent with the existing awards literature. However, these gains were driven entirely by the
subset of reward-motivated workers who lack the internal motivation for consistent attendance
and punctuality. Furthermore, these employees appear to have improved at least partially by
manipulating the rules of the award system. Finally, the performance improvement of rewardbased employees disappears once an employee becomes ineligible for the award in a given
month.
More worryingly, we find strong evidence of crowding out of motivation among
internally-motivated employees. This was most clearly seen in the fact that employees who had
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previously had perfect attendance became over five times more likely than their comparison
group at other plants to have a second attendance problem after losing eligibility for the award.
Most strikingly, we find evidence of negative motivational spillovers that affect performance on
a completely separate task. The mechanisms underlying this result may appear to be subtle, but
as we document below, the significant productivity decrease by the plant’s previously punctual
employees was by far the statistical effect with the largest economic consequence in the study.
This finding of negative motivational spillovers is remarkable because it suggests that awards for
one type of behavior might crowd out internally motivated behavior not only on the awarded
task, but also on other tasks.
Our findings complement Neckermann et al.’s (2014) study, which shows positive
spillovers after the introduction of a series of corporate awards. A comparison of the two studies
may help explain why their results differ and why more nuanced theory on corporate awards is
needed. The awards reported in Neckermann et al. (2014) were given for positive behavior
identified by managers, with the criteria announced to workers only after the award was given.
Thus, reward-motivated employees could not change their behavior in order to win. Also, the
positive spillovers documented in that study may simply have been employees inferring what
behaviors managers would choose to reward next. In our study, however, the criteria for winning
were known in advance. As noted by Larkin (2010) and Garr (2012), both types of awards—
those that recognize ex-post behavior on categories not known to employees and those that are
governed by established ex-ante rules—are widely used.
Our results suggest that the award had a significant negative impact on net plant
productivity. Aggregating the coefficient estimates allows a high-level estimation of the total
effect on plant efficiency of introducing the award. Depending on the exact assumptions used,
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the award introduction reduced overall plant efficiency by 1.4 to 3.1%. The small increase in the
number of minutes worked raised overall productivity by 0.12%, but the various sources of
productivity losses reduced productivity by 1.4 to 2.5%, depending on whether results with only
marginal significance are included. In addition, the increased use of single absences reduced
overall efficiency by another 0.6%, although we note that these absences may simply substitute
away a future PTO day for the worker. Even if this is the case, however, interviews suggested
that any absence given with short notice is costly. A reduction in overall plant efficiency of 1.0%
is approximately equivalent to the loss of one-third of a worker, so the magnitude of the effect is
quite large.
The plant managers anticipated that the award’s direct cost of $75 per month would
easily “pay for itself” as better attendance would mean fewer bottlenecks and thus higher
productivity. At worst, if there were no improvement the cost would be a mere $75 a month, the
cost of the gift card. However, our results suggest the monthly cost of the award program was at
least $1,497, which is equal to 1.4% of the plant’s total monthly labor cost (wages, retirement,
insurance and payroll taxes), plus the $75 gift cards. The award was therefore approximately 20
times more costly than anticipated by Plant 1’s managers. Using the higher end of our estimates,
the total monthly cost of award introduction was $3,302. These results clearly indicate that
awards can be far more costly than anticipated and can significantly and negatively impact
overall firm performance.

3.6.1 Limitations
Like many studies of this type, ours has several limitations. First, worker assignment to treatment
and control groups was not random and there were differences between the two groups, such as
the non-union status of the four control plants. These fixed differences, along with any other pre-
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existing differences between groups, are “differenced out” by the DiD methodology. However,
this approach does assume common time trends across groups. We interviewed managers at the
treatment and control plants and, apart from an annual health screening offered to control plant
employees in April 2011,21 managers reported no policy or management changes near the
introduction of the award. We also note that the monthly treatment effect model (Figure 3.2)
indicates that the largest effects occurred in the month after treatment. This suggests that neither
the health intervention nor any other unobserved change not exactly correlated with treatment
could explain our results.
It could also be that our results are simply due to poor planning or program
administration and not a problem with the program itself. But our interviews suggest that the
plant managers carefully considered and administered the program, and our interviews with
corporate management reflected their high confidence in the competence of the Plant 1
managers. Even more informative is that the positive direct effects of the program were seen
immediately upon implementation, suggesting that the program was working as the plant
managers intended. Still, in studies like ours, it is impossible to completely separate the effect of
the program design, which has large external validity, from the effect of the management or
implementation.
Furthermore, we cannot definitively prove the mechanism by which the attendance award
negatively affected some workers’ productivity. The explanation that the award crowded out
intrinsic motivation is theoretically appealing, especially given the strong laboratory evidence on
crowding out. However, as in most field studies, this interpretation is speculative, since we
cannot directly measure intrinsic motivation and do not know the mechanism that led some
workers to perfect attendance and punctuality even when neither was required or compensated.
21

See Gubler and Pierce (2014).
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There are several alternative explanations besides intrinsic motivation, such as individual
differences in responsiveness to social pressure or individual prosocial tendencies. Our results do
show, however, that whatever the motivational mechanism was, the award reduced it for some
employees.
Finally, our results consider a single type of award program while in practice, award
programs vary widely across and even within organizations. They differ, for example, in whether
or not employees know in advance which behaviors will help them win the award. The
attendance award in our setting randomly rewarded only one of the many employees who
qualified each month. Many awards are restricted to a limited number of employees, such as
“Employee of the Month” or “circle of excellence,” which recognizes the top 10% of
employees—common for salespeople (Larkin 2010). Other awards are given to anyone who
meets the criteria. As with monetary incentives, there are many ways in which award programs
can vary, as can their costs and benefits. We therefore suggest caution in applying the study’s
empirical results to all types of award.

3.6.2 Theoretical Implications
Economists have only recently started to consider the psychological effects of incentive
programs. On the other hand, social psychologists have traditionally been focused on the
response of individual employees to different incentive programs, rather than on questions of
firm-level effects or optimal incentive design (Nickerson and Zenger 2008; Larkin et al. 2012).
This study provides further evidence that scholars need to incorporate the strengths of both
approaches: the holistic, cost-benefit lens of economics and the realistic social psychology model
of human behavior, incorporating biases and emotions.
Given the heterogeneity in the types of awards used in corporations, we hope one
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contribution of our theory is to allow scholars and practitioners to design award programs more
systematically. We believe that many corporate award programs are not designed to account for
heterogeneity in employee motivation or for an employee’s multiple daily tasks. Nor do they
account for the possibility that formal recognition of improved performance on a given task may
seem unfair to employees who don’t need to improve that much because they were motivated all
along to perform well. Our theory suggests that using awards to improve behavior should likely
be limited to cases in which most employees lack internal motivation for the task in question;
obviously, this conjecture requires further empirical validation.
Although our study does not directly show crowding out (Deci 1975; Deci and Ryan
1985), it does suggest that employees who previously behaved in ways that were not explicitly
rewarded or compensated—namely, showing up early for their shift—cut back on this behavior
due to the introduction of the reward. The notion of crowding out is usually applied to monetary
rewards (e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini 2000b), with recent work suggesting that nonmonetary
rewards do not, for example, reduce prosocial blood donations (Goette and Stutzer 2008;
Lacetera et al. 2012). In contrast, our results suggest that crowding out may also apply to
extrinsic but nonmonetary rewards such as corporate awards. In addition, crowding out is usually
focused on reduction in motivation for actions that are compensated. Our results suggest that
compensating one action can also lead to crowding out in a completely different realm, the first
evidence of such negative motivational spillovers of which we are aware. Existing research
further suggests that the long-term costs from demotivation, particularly following program
termination, may be even greater than what this study’s time-range of data can show (Gneezy
and Rustichini 2000a; Meier 2007).
Our results also suggest that the direct effect of an award is more like a monetary
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incentive than a subtle nudge toward positive behavior. While social psychologists and
behavioral economists have long been interested in small interventions that can imperceptibly
alter behavior, the fact that awards usually do not carry great monetary value does not mean they
are only a subtle influence on worker behavior. A job award is, after all, a formal program
designed by a manager and not simply a small difference in framing.
Finally, our study suggests that the antecedents of negative motivational spillovers
require further research. Awards are commonly used for tasks deemed less important than the
workers’ primary tasks, which are more often rewarded with monetary compensation (Garr
2012). In our setting, the less-important awarded task was attendance and the more-important
compensated task was productivity. Even if the two tasks are not linked in terms of employee
effort, our theory and empirical results suggest that a reward introduced for a less important task
may spill over to the more important task. It is important that future work unpack the
mechanisms underlying negative motivational spillovers because, as our study demonstrates, the
economic costs in the form of individual and organizational performance can be substantial.
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3.8 Figures and Tables
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics at Worker/Day Level
TREATMENT
Variable
Tardy

Obs
7126

Mean
0.04

Minutes late

7126

-1.73

Total absences
Single absences
Daily efficiency
Late
Monthly absences
Total hrs worked
Tenure

7846
7846
6576
7126
7861
7861
7861

Age
Male
Base salary

7861
7861
7861

Tardy
Minutes late
Total absences
Single absences
Daily efficiency
Late
Monthly absences
Total hrs worked
Tenure
Age
Male
Base salary

Award Period
Sd
Min
0.16
0.0

Min
0.0

Max
1.0

Obs
5742

Mean
0.03

5.37

-59.7

54.0

5737

-2.19

5.10

-49.0

58.2

0.04
0.01
125.6
0.15
0.79
8.25
3373

0.19
0.07
32.4
0.35
1.65
1.64
2681

0.0
0.0
54.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
176

1.0
1.0
218.0
1.0
8.0
23.7
9262

6318
6318
5669
5742
6339
6339
6339

0.05
0.01
124.7
0.10
1.03
8.17
3186

0.21
0.11
36.2
0.29
1.80
1.69
2708

0.0
0.0
54.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
176

1.0
1.0
218.0
1.0
10.0
13.1
9262

43.51
0.43
25695

10.05
0.50
845

21.0
0.0
19240

62.0
1.0
28600

6339
6339
6339

43.63
0.43
25495

9.84
0.49
1363

21.0
0.0
19240

62.0
1.0
28600

CONTROL
Variable

Pre-Award
Sd
0.20

Pre-Award

Max
1.0

Award Period

Obs

Mean

Sd

Min

Max

Obs

Mean

Sd

Min

Max

23600
23600
27449
27449
22320
23600
27684
27684
27684
27684
27684
27522

0.03
-2.12
0.05
0.02
120.3
0.17
1.06
8.01
1720
39.36
0.34
19850

0.17
4.73
0.22
0.13
34.7
0.38
1.76
1.38
1920
12.88
0.47
4899

0.0
-59.4
0.0
0.0
54.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
4
18.0
0.0
8320

1.0
59
1.0
1.0
218.0
1.0
15.0
44.0
8566
69.0
1.0
48526

14081
14081
16300
16300
14148
14081
16474
16474
16474
16474
16474
16474

0.02
-1.88
0.05
0.02
125.3
0.14
1.13
8.09
1754
39.87
0.32
197334

0.15
5.07
0.22
0.12
35.6
0.34
1.78
1.25
1992
12.79
0.47
5167

0.0
-59
0.0
0.0
54.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
60
19.0
0.0
8320

1.0
59
1.0
1.0
218.0
1.0
12.0
16.37
8566
69.0
1.0
48526
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Table 3.2: Basic Treatment Effect
(1)

(2)

(3)

Tardy
-0.015***
(0.006)
0.020***
(0.006)

Minutes Late
-0.801**
(0.343)
-2.057***
(0.214)

Time Controls
Worker FE
R2

Y
Y
0.004

# of employees

218

Dependent
Variable:
Treatment
Constant

Absent
0.007
(0.006)
0.051***
(0.009)

(4)
Single
Absence
0.006***
(0.002)
0.023***
(0.005)

(5)
Efficiency
-1.992
(3.193)
117.353***
(9.036)

Y
Y
0.006

Y
Y
0.004

Y
Y
0.003

Y
Y
0.008

218

218

218

206

Observations
50,549
50,544
57,913
57,913
48,713
Note: Standard errors presented in parentheses are block bootstrapped with 400 repetitions.
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The variable “Treatment” is the
interaction of the treatment group and post award introduction dummies, and represents the
estimated effect of the introduction of the award. The post award introduction dummy is
coded as missing for observations after the award was removed.

Table 3.3: Sub-sample Analysis on “Tardy” and “Minutes Late”
Dependent
Variable:
Sample:
Treatment
Constant
Time controls
Worker FE
R2
# of
employees
Observations

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Tardy
Low Tardy
0.001
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)

Tardy
High Tardy
-0.020***
(0.008)
0.035***
(0.010)

Minutes Late
Low Tardy
-1.144
(0.730)
-2.872***
(0.301)

Minutes Late
High Tardy
-0.319
(0.341)
-1.348***
(0.261)

Y
Y
0.004

Y
Y
0.007

Y
Y
0.015

Y
Y
0.007

116
23,502

102
27,047

116
23,502

102
27,042

Note: Standard errors presented in parentheses are block bootstrapped with 400
repetitions. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.4: Sub-sample Analysis on “Absence” and “Single Absence”
Dependent
Variable:
Sample:
Treatment
Constant

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Absence
Low Tardy
0.021***
(0.008)
0.050***
(0.013)

Absence
High Tardy
0.000
(0.008)
0.051***
(0.012)

Single Absence
Low Tardy
0.006**
(0.003)
0.026***
(0.007)

Single Absence
High Tardy
0.006**
(0.002)
0.020***
(0.006)

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Time controls
Worker FE

R2
0.007
0.005
0.004
0.004
# of
employees
116
102
116
102
Observations
27,114
30,799
27,114
30,799
Note: Standard errors presented in parentheses are block bootstrapped with 400
repetitions. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 3.5: Effect of Losing Award Eligibility on Tardiness
Dependent Variable:
Sample:
Pre-fail treatment
Post-fail treatment
Constant

(1)
Tardy
ALL
-0.017***
(0.006)
-0.010
(0.009)
0.020***
(0.006)

(2)
Tardy
Low Tardy
-0.002
(0.003)
0.045**
(0.021)
0.002
(0.004)

(3)
Tardy
High Tardy
-0.021**
(0.009)
-0.016
(0.010)
0.035***
(0.010)

Time controls
Y
Y
Y
Worker FE
Y
Y
Y
R²
0.004
0.005
0.007
# of employees
218
116
102
Observations
50,549
23,502
27,047
Note: Standard errors presented in parentheses are block
bootstrapped with 400 repetitions. Significance: * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3.6: Treatment Effects on Efficiency by Employee Type
Dependent Variable:

(1)
Efficiency

(2)
Efficiency

(3)
Efficiency

(4)
Efficiency

Sample:

Low Tardy

High Tardy

Low Tardy

High Tardy

-9.551***
(3.273)

2.052
(4.415)
-9.815***
(3.431)
-9.327
(6.735)
118.871***

2.018
(4.535)
3.152
(4.011)
127.393***

(3.016)

(3.388)

Y
Y

Y
Y

0.014

0.016

Treatment
Pre-fail treatment
Post-fail treatment
Constant
Time controls
Worker FE
R2
# of employees

97.725***
(22.685)

125.307***
(8.822)

Y
Y
0.014
109

Y
Y
0.017
97

109
97
Observations
22,450
26,263
21,303
24,822
Note: Standard errors presented in parentheses are block bootstrapped with 400
repetitions. Significance: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure 3.1: Study Taxonomy and Summary of Hypotheses
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Figure 3.2: Monthly Treatment Effect on Minutes Late

Figure 3.3: Change in Minutes Late After Award Implementation for “High Tardy” Group

% Change In Minutes Late Pre/Post

60%

LATE, TARDY

LATE, NOT TARDY

EARLY
40%
20%
0%
-20%
-40%
-60%
-80%
<0

0-1

1-2

2-3

3-4

4-5

5-6

6-7

7-8

8-9

9-10

Minutes Late
Control

Treatment

Note: Percentage changes represent changes from the initial baseline clock-in frequency for each minute interval.
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10

CONCLUSION
This dissertation has investigated the role of social structure and financial incentives in
individual productivity and organizational performance. Drawing on unique data from two
distinct service settings, it has explored how heterogeneity in social factors and motivations at
the individual level influence individual productivity, choices, opportunities, and behaviors.
Moreover, it has investigated how such effects scale up to influence organizational-level
outcomes. The key takeaway from the three chapters is that social structures and factors, which
vary at the individual-level, combine with financial concerns to significantly influence individual
and organizational outcomes. Moreover, when properly managed, such factors can be leveraged
to improve performance and generate advantages for firms.
The results of these chapters have important theoretical implications. First, they suggest
the need for future work that explores micro-macro links in strategy. The key assumption
underlying the microfoundations view is that individuals are heterogeneous. Thus, firm
heterogeneity in performance outcomes is impacted by individual mobility, productivity, and
value appropriation, and some firms may generate advantages relative to rivals because of their
unique ability to attract, motivate, and retain key individuals. The results from these chapters
support this view, and suggest that further work that investigates the interplay between
individuals and firms is needed. Second, the results from this dissertation suggest a more
nuanced view of social structure. In particular, these studies suggest that individual choice, as
well as elements of the context, are important to understanding the impact of social structures on
individuals and organizations. Finally, the results of this dissertation provide support for Simon’s
argument that we need a more comprehensive “model of man” (Simon 1957). Such a model must
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include the response of individuals to social factors and financial incentives, as well as their
interplay. Moreover, it must continue to explore how elements of the context or organization
influence individual choice. Such an avenue moves beyond the current literatures in human
capital or human resources, and provides a fruitful area for additional research.
The results of this dissertation similarly have important managerial implications. First,
they suggest that individual heterogeneity in social structures and motivations are important to
firm outcomes. This is a previously understudied yet important aspect of human capital. Firms
can potentially improve employee and firm performance by understanding how to best manage
this heterogeneity. Second, these results imply that hiring and staffing policies are critical to
organizational outcomes. Moreover, understanding the complementarity between individuals and
organizations is key to effectively creating and sustaining advantages from labor. Finally, these
results suggest that it is critical for managers to craft policies that leverage social factors to
improve performance of employees and the firm. Moreover, it is important for managers to take
social and psychological factors into account when devising such policies.
There is much potential to build upon and extend this work. In each chapter I have
concluded with thoughts for related future work. To conclude this dissertation, however, I
provide some overarching thoughts about potential future directions. First, this dissertation
suggests there is significant potential in investigating heterogeneity between organizations in
their ability to leverage social factors to improve performance and generate sustainable
advantages compared to competitors. This includes exploring how social structures can be
leveraged strategically over time, as organizations are founded, grow, and compete with rivals.
Second, I believe future research should continue to investigate the impact of micro-level factors
on macro-level outcomes. While a significant amount of work has focused on the firm or
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industry levels, significantly less work has explored the link between individual and
organizational-level factors. Yet, as evidenced by these chapters, such factors can be critical to
understanding organizational performance and success. Finally, I believe there is much potential
in focusing on how strategy theories and findings apply to service industries, whose chief
productive resource is labor. While such industries comprise a large percent of the US economy,
surprisingly much of the research in strategic management has shied away from these industries.
Future theoretical and empirical work should continue to investigate how service settings differ
from more traditional strategy settings. Such an approach necessitates embracing individuals—
their productivity, skills, motivations, abilities, and potential for mobility—as key resources of
organizations.
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APPENDIX 1: Appendix to Chapter 1
Table A1.1: House Description and Quality Indicator Dummies from Public Remarks
Quality Indicators
TLC
Needs Updating
Estate Sale
Foreclosure
Handyman
As-Is
Rehabber
Bank-Owned
Priced to Sell
Motivated
Potential
Close
!
New
Spacious
Elegance
Beautiful
Remodeled/Renovated
Historic/Vintage
Maintained/Well-Cared
Wonderful
Fantastic
Charming
Stunning
Amazing
Granite
Immaculate
Breathtaking
Neighborhood
Spectacular
Landscaped
Stained Glass/Art Glass
Built-in
Tasteful
Must See
Fabulous
Leaded
Delightful
Move-In
Gourmet
Corian

Mean
0.01
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.001
0.01
0.0002
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.19
0.40
0.33
0.07
0.01
0.19
0.05
0.003
0.03
0.05
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.06
0.04
0.01
0.14
0.01
0.09
0.001
0.03
0.003
0.07
0.01
0.001
0.001
0.03
0.01
0.01

Std. Dev.
0.09
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.03
0.11
0.01
0.08
0.14
0.14
0.12
0.39
0.49
0.47
0.25
0.08
0.39
0.22
0.06
0.17
0.22
0.17
0.12
0.10
0.15
0.24
0.19
0.05
0.34
0.10
0.29
0.02
0.17
0.05
0.26
0.12
0.04
0.04
0.17
0.08
0.07

Quality Indicators
Custom
Unique
Maple
Newer
Hurry/Will Not Last
Pride
Clean
Quiet
Dream
Block
Huge
Deck
Mint
Hardwood
Views
New Roof/New Shingles
Upgraded/Updated
Vaulted
Floor plan
Award
Hot Tub
Tile
Cul-de-sac
Jetted Tub
Park
Brick
Value
Windows
Mother-in-law
Stainless
Theater
Surround Sound
Pickiest
Rare
Starter
Master
Cute
Warranty
Temple
Fenced

Mean
0.06
0.01
0.02
0.06
0.03
0.002
0.07
0.08
0.01
0.02
0.09
0.06
0.002
0.07
0.10
0.02
0.09
0.11
0.09
0.001
0.02
0.12
0.05
0.05
0.14
0.05
0.03
0.05
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.04
0.15
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.10

Std. Dev.
0.24
0.08
0.14
0.23
0.17
0.05
0.25
0.27
0.09
0.13
0.28
0.24
0.04
0.26
0.30
0.13
0.29
0.31
0.28
0.04
0.14
0.33
0.21
0.22
0.35
0.21
0.16
0.22
0.15
0.15
0.12
0.10
0.07
0.08
0.20
0.36
0.16
0.16
0.07
0.30

Note: These house characteristic and quality dummies take the value of 1 if they (or their common derivatives) are referenced in the
public comments section of the listing, 0 otherwise.
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Figure A1.1: Flow Chart of a Typical Real Estate Transaction for Listing Agents
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Figure A1.2: Map of Utah County with Listing Agent Home Addresses

Note: This map of Utah County shows the approximate locations of home addresses for real estate agents living in Utah County
that listed a home during my sample period. The red stars represent a single agent’s home.
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APPENDIX 2: Appendix to Chapter 3
Site interviews on empirical results
After analyzing the productivity and attendance data, we presented our results to the
executive team at Laundry Co and to the managers of Plant 1. They found many of our results
unsurprising, including the improvement in punctuality and attendance from the award program.
They were not surprised at the use of single absences to retain eligibility. They told us they had
suspicions that employees might be using absences strategically, as they seemed to notice many
calls right before shift start times from employees during the period of the award. Neither were
they surprised that it was primarily the workers with previous punctuality problems who drove
the improvements in punctuality and attendance; that had been the point all along.
They were somewhat surprised by the disqualification results, but did note that they had
observed some changes in employee behavior based on whether or not the employee was still
eligible for the award. One manager observed: “There seemed to be this feeling among
employees that once you are disqualified, ‘what the heck, might as well revert back to what I was
doing, and then I’ll try again next time.’” They noted that the need for perfect punctuality and
attendance was difficult for many employees, but that “quite a few employees were able to go six
months or more without being disqualified.”
What really surprised them was the decrease in productivity. While they had noticed
fairness concerns about the award program, they hadn’t linked it to decreased performance. One
manager noted: “We did hear some grumbling. The ones that were showing up on time [before
the award was introduced] were wondering why everyone was now being rewarded for
something they were already doing… [These individuals were saying,] ‘We have been doing this
all along, but haven’t got anything special.’” Another manager noted: “Employees were divided
[175]

about the program. It was about 50/50 on who seemed to like the program.” The plant managers
also noted that the “low tardy” employees expressed increased expectations of winning the
drawings: “These were the people that usually came on time anyways, and so were always in the
hunt [to win].” However, most of the winners were members of the “high tardy” group, which
may have deepened feelings of unfairness among internally motivated “low tardy” workers. The
senior corporate management took our results as a confirmation of their feeling that employees
shouldn’t be rewarded for things that they are expected to do anyways, as it creates fairness
problems amongst workers.
Plant management did not allow us to interview production workers who had participated
in the program, as they did not want to “bring back the topic [for discussion].”

Table A2.1: Descriptive Statistics at the Worker/Month Level
TREATMENT
Variable

Pre-Award

Award Period

Obs

Mean

Sd

Min

Max

Obs

Mean

Sd

Min

Max

% time tardy per month
# minutes late per month
% time late per month
% time absent per month
% time single absent per month

33
33
33
33
33

0.07
-2.64
0.20
0.02
0.01

0.08
3.17
0.17
0.02
0.01

0.0
-11.4
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.37
3.74
0.59
0.08
0.03

33
33
33
33
33

0.06
-3.63
0.16
0.06
0.03

0.06
2.91
0.15
0.03
0.02

0.0
-9.67
0.0
0.02
0.0

0.19
0.21
0.47
0.11
0.11

Average efficiency

32

122.1

22.4

87.5

168.0

32

122.9

25.8

75.0

169.4

Max

CONTROL
Variable
% time tardy per month
# minutes late per month
% time late per month
% time absent per month
% time single absent per month
Average efficiency

Obs

Pre-Award
Mean
Sd
Min

Max

Obs

Award Period
Mean
Sd
Min

185
185
185
185

0.04
-2.09
0.20
0.05

0.06
2.19
0.22
0.08

0.0
-13.33
0.0
0.0

0.33
5.4
0.95
0.50

106
106
106
106

0.05
-1.51
0.24
0.06

0.11
2.45
0.20
0.06

0.0
-10.5
0.0
0.0

1.0
8.31
1.0
0.42

185
174

0.03
110.0

0.05
30.3

0
54.5

0.50
217.8

106
99

0.03
122.3

0.03
29.5

0
66.9

0.11
218.0
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Table A2.2: Placebo Tests
Variable

Random Treatment Group (50)

Random Treatment Group and
Date (50)

Tardy
Minutes late
Single absence

Mean
Coefficient
-0.0006
-0.1182
0.0015

Mean
Coefficient
-0.0003
-0.0969
0.0025

p<
0.1
6%
2%
6%

p <0.05
4%
2%
4%

p < 0.1
14%
12%
12%

p <0.05
6%
4%
8%

Note: The average results of the placebo tests are shown above. For both types of placebos, the
mean coefficient is both close to zero and significantly smaller than the corresponding coefficient
from Table 3.3. Also, across the placebos the results are significant at close to the expected rate. We
present the point estimate and 95% confidence intervals for each placebo regression of minutes late
in Figure A2.1, which show that our point estimate has the smallest standard error of any of the
individual placebos. Placebo regressions for our other models produced similar results. Overall, the
placebo test results suggest that the treatment effects shown in Table 3.3 were actually a result of
the treatment. The award program encouraged improved attendance behavior for workers in Plant
1, supporting Hypothesis 1. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the employee level.

Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A2.3: Pre- and Post-Fail for Minutes Late

Dependent Variable:
Sample:
Pre-fail treatment
Post-fail treatment
Constant

(1)
Minutes late

(2)
Minutes late

(3)
Minutes late

ALL
-0.883**
(0.357)
-0.469
(0.357)
-2.046***
(0.215)

Low Tardy
-1.165
(0.755)
-0.872
(0.969)
-2.870***
(0.303)

High Tardy
-0.453
(0.327)
0.061
(0.422)
-1.326***
(0.262)

Time controls
Y
Y
Y
Worker FE
Y
Y
Y
R²
0.006
0.015
0.007
# of employees
218
116
102
Observations
50,544
23,502
27,042
Note: Standard errors presented in parentheses are block
bootstrapped with 400 repetitions. Significance: * p<0.10, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure A2.1: Plant Process Flow Chart
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Figure A2.2: Histogram of Daily Efficiency for All Workers

Figure A2.3: Eligible Months by Worker
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Figure A2.4: Placebo Regressions for Minutes Late

[180]

Figure A2.5: Change in Minutes Late After Award Disqualification
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Note: Percentage changes represent changes from the initial baseline clock-in frequency for each minute interval. Values above
bars indicate the baseline frequency for prefail clock-ins.
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